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AESTHETICS, AESTHETIC EDUCATION AND ART EDUCATION

by

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JOHN J. JAGODZINSKI

A THESIS

SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH

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FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH

The undersigned certify that they have read, and recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research, for acceptance, a thesis entitled AESTHETICS, AESTHETIC EDUCATION AND ART EDUCATION submitted by John Jagodzinski in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Education.

Supervisor

Date: May 5, 1977

To my wife Carolyne

ABSTRACT

This study examined major philosophical underpinnings of aesthetic education to find out whether these offered a sufficiently comprehensive framework for the art educator's purposes. It was assumed that an examination of Studies in Art Education, since its inception in 1959, would provide a cross-section of positions relative to aesthetic education. Twenty-three positions were isolated, reflecting two broad "tendencies." The first grouping had an affective orientation, relying on intuition as its epistemic base; the other grouping had a cognitive orientation, drawing on the analytical-positivist paradigm. A linear typology reflecting this situation was drawn up, and a content analysis was undertaken. The type of aesthetic theory, the type of criticism and the aestheticians these aesthetic programs drew on were described. From these findings another diagram was developed which reflected the extent to which these programs relied upon historical, sociological, gestalt or existential components.

The content analysis showed that the philosophical foundations of these programs were traceable to the phenomenological-existentialists (Merleau-Ponty, Sartre, Heidegger and Roman Ingarden), John Dewey, Suzanne Langer and Monroe Beardsley. Furthermore, it was discovered that aesthetic programs presented a spectrum of criticism which ranged from structuralism and formalism to contextualism. John Dewey, it was estimated, provided the foundational basis for a little less than half of all aesthetic programs examined.

After a careful delineation of each of the above positions, it was argued that not one of the aestheticians presented an adequate aesthetic for art educators. The basis of this argument rested on the grounds that stress had been placed on psychological and individual aspects of aesthetic theory. Such an emphasis overlooked the sociological and historical aspects of aesthetic theory.

It was further argued that neo-Marxist aestheticians (Morawski, Goldman, Lukács) and the sociologist Mannheim, by developing the components of ideology and history, were more helpful in explaining the relationships between micro and macro aesthetics. Micro aesthetic referred to criticism, evaluation, and interpretation on an individual and psychological level while macro aesthetics referred to criticism, evaluation and interpretation on a social and historical level.

Finally, the implications of this conclusion for aesthetic education were examined. It was argued that a reorientation towards a more critical and political aesthetic program was necessary for the nurture of homo aestheticus in a modern industrial society.

PREFACE

"...we should no longer be alienated or disturbed, because the ever-new, ever-developing element - the artist - compels us to change ourselves according to his will and not, like shopkeepers, to regard the things of today as the last word."

Erich Mendelsohn, Letters of an Architect, ed. Oskar Beyer (London: Abelard - Schuman, 1967), Munich, November 11, 1913, pp. 27-28.

"I am fifty years old and have always lived freely; let me end my existence a free man. When I am dead, people must say about me; 'He never belonged to any school, to any church, to any institution, to any academy, above all to any regime, if not the regime of liberty'."

Gustave Courbet, 1970. Letter to the Minister of Fine Arts, refusing the Legion of Honor. Quoted in Charles Leger, Courbet (Paris: Cres, 1929), p. 155.

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1

CHAPTER ONE

Introduction

1.1 A Brief Historical Perspective of Art Education and Its Various Value Positions

During its 150 years of growth on the North American continent, art education has adopted a number of distinctive value positions as the rationale for its existence in the larger educational context. Each value position has been drawn from the needs of society or from the larger educational philosophy. Rarely has art education had the institutional autonomy necessary to determine its own unique personal philosophy.[1] It has never been central in the broader educational context and hence has had to rely on fluctuating societal support.

In the early 19th century, art production had status as a social grace. Schools, based on the classical humanist methods of Great Britain, trained wealthy young women in the arts of embroidery, music, drawing and wax sculpturing. Training in these arts was considered a sign of cultural refinement and good breeding.[2]

During the same time, art education in the common public schools had a more pragmatic value base. Instead of developing the recognition of beauty and good taste, students were trained in drawing. The central assumption was that drawing improved hand and eye coordination and contributed to legible penmanship. Furthermore, skill in drawing was regarded as an indicator of potential for later training as a skilled artisan.

In summary, art education on the North American continent, from 1800 to 1850, had three basic value orientations. First, art was important as a cultural accomplishment, especially refinement of taste, for future consumers of manufactured goods; second, it improved writing; and third, the skill of drawing was useful as a predictor of future success in industry.

The pressure from the industrialization of the United States made art a required subject in the Boston Schools by 1864 and in Massachusetts in 1871, under the leadership of Walter Smith.[3] For two decades, 1860 to 1880, art was in the service of industry. However, before the close of the century, the Child Study Movement, spearheaded by G. Stanley Hall and Edward L. Thorndike, gave art education a new value base. By 1900 art had become a means for understanding children's development and for increasing their awareness of beauty. Arthur Wesley Dow and Denman Ross[4] pursued the idea that design would increase appreciation. "The Picture Study Movement" furthered this concept. The study of masterpieces would sensitize the child to the beautiful, as well as develop the child's moral virtues. By the 1920's, the child-centered movement in general education, fully focused on self-expression and originality, was being expounded by Hughes Mearns[5] and his contemporaries.

In the 1930's, both Canada and the United States were in the throes of a depression. The American school system was called to play its role with respect to society in distress. The Owatonna Project,[6] sponsored by the University of Minnesota, provided a new value base, "art as a way of life." This project emphasized three prominent values. First, there was no distinction between the useful and fine arts; secondly, the relationship of arts with everyday living was stressed; and lastly, the development of aesthetic discrimination was attempted.

In summary, art as the development of the child's latent creativity and art as a way of life, were the two most important values in the professional literature of art education in the thirties.

In the 1940's, the sustained emphasis on creativity remained. Art education prompted a "materials approach" to teaching.[7] Art from scrap, art as an emotional release, and art product as a psychological tool all found their way into the nation's schools. Victor Lowenfeld, Sir Herbert Read, Victor D'Amico et al., contributed in making art education a field of legitimate scientific study. The artistic value base was increased to include art as a leisure activity as well as art as a consummatory function (i.e., decoration).

By the 1950's, several well established value orientations were recognized. Despite the occasional reference to John Dewey and visual problem solving,[8] the greater part of research stressed creativity, using behavioral psychology as its investigative mode. The success of the Russian spacecraft, Sputnik (1957) further served to place the central aim of art in the service of creativity in the sciences.[9] Guilford, Barkan, de Francesco, and Beittel placed their efforts behind the continued emphasis on creativity.

In the 1960's the influence of Jerome Bruner made art educators question the validity of creativity as the central position in the art field. Such individuals as Feldman, Efland, McFee, Lanier and Eisner offered new value orientations. Art education for visual and perceptual literacy, environmental design, integrated art and aesthetic education became the new topics of discussion.

In the last decade, aesthetic education has become a prominent new addition to value positions in art teaching. Over 60 percent[10] of the articles in Studies in Art Education since 1965 have devoted themselves to this topic. In March 1967, an entire issue of Art Education explored the subject, and a further boost to aesthetic education came with the publication of Guidelines, by CEMREL Inc.,[11] in 1970.

1.2 The Problem of Definition: Historical Perspective on Aesthetic Education

The emphasis on the critical and cultural aspects of art is not a new development. Value positions mentioned in the previous section (picture study, art history, art appreciation and art judgment) have all contributed to the concept of "aesthetic education." It is the intent in this section to give some notion to the reader of the historical genesis of the term.

Towards the close of the nineteenth century, beauty was the value most assiduously pursued. The concept of "decoration" as a method of cultivating sensitivity had enjoyed some vogue; then, in 1899, the appreciation of beauty as a major objective of art education came into being; and finally, Charles E. Norton, in 1898, introduced art into Harvard, so establishing the arts' historical importance and raising art to the level of an academic subject.[12]

The Picture Study Movement outlined two value distinctions.[13] The first was art's potential to train the mind in matters of morals and tastes through the study of themes in "great" works of art. Secondly, the Picture Study Program developed the necessary material or attitudes to be applied in art production. By studying the art works of great men, who asserted moral truths through their art, children were told to equate the moral with the beautiful. Technical values, introduced by W. Dow, helped the children with the study of the elements of art (composition, color, balance, etc.).

The Prang Company[14] published a series of textbooks (1908) designed to assist the teachers in dealing with art history. However, the true pacesetter was Applied Arts Books (known now as School Arts). Their concern for art appreciation was limited, giving all their concern to "how to" rather than "why to."

In the 1920's a new attitude towards appreciation grew from the progressive movement in art education. Emphasis was on process, experience, self-expression and creativity. Appreciation became a by-product.

The Owatonna Project revived an interest in what was called "aesthetics." In 1941, Ziegfeld,[15] influenced by the values expressed in this project, wrote Art Today. He emphasized the aesthetic dimension of everyday living. Art in the home, community, religion, industry and commerce was stressed. Since that time, until the last decade, art education has focused on the teachings of Lowenfeld, Read, D'Amico et al. where emphasis has been placed on other values. The current popularization of "aesthetic education" has its genesis in what may be called "the affective revolution."[16] Both terms deserve more detailed scrutiny.

1.3 The Current Definition of Aesthetic Education

The conceptual model of "aesthetic education" has undergone both an evolutionary and historical modification since its acceptance as a viable value base by the professional community. It is the intent in this section to define the term "aesthetic education" as it first appeared in the periodical Art Education, and as it is currently perceived in this same magazine.

The earliest hint that there might be a shift in emphasis in art education towards what is currently known as "aesthetic education" was in Manuel Barkan's[17] "Transition in Art Education" (1962). Barkan outlined three value orientations which art education had adopted as its epistemological base. The first revolved about how a child is to be treated. Either he is to be treated as an "artist" or art is to be a subject taken to make him more well-rounded. The second concern was the problem of what criteria should be used for understanding and judging works of art; and finally, there was a critique of the then popular "materials" approach to art education.

In order to resolve these issues, which had arisen from the historical legacy and from the influence of Bruner, Barkan synthesized all three concerns by revolving art education around the roles of artist, historian, and critic.

Art history and criticism, he maintained, were the new sources of impetus for art programs and he supported his statement by referring to the publication in School Arts of an article called "Understanding Art" (1957). The solution was to "teach towards aesthetic sensibility" and not place all the emphasis on media which tended to give art education an anti-intellectual climate.

Vincent Lanier[18] (1963) was more specific as to the meaning of "aesthetic education." Presenting an overview of value positions, much like Barkan had previously done, Lanier advocated art education for "aesthetic experience." "Visual aesthetic experience" was a modification of Barkan's emphasis on art appreciation and criticism. Aesthetic experience, Lanier claimed, was the true activity of art. That activity was to objectify emotional meaning, a position maintained by John Dewey in 1934,[19] but apparently forgotten by the art educators of the fifties.

During the NAEA 8th Biennial Conference (1965),[20] a more definitive statement as to the meaning of "aesthetic education" was given by Harry S. Broudy.[20] Broudy's arguments were based on the following assumptions. First, Broudy established the value of the arts by arguing that they were distinctive and worthwhile for everyone, because they shaped people's values. Choice and feeling were related to one another. Aesthetic education could aid in shaping these aesthetic values. Art education which aimed specifically to train the "artist" or cater to the talented, deserved to be re-defined as "special" education.

Broudy's second assumption for the establishment of "aesthetic education" was the need to establish "authentic judgments". Authentic judgments were those types of judgments which all experts would agree to be the correct method of criticism.

Only serious works of art should be studied in "aesthetic programs," was Broudy's third assumption. Such works were more complex and "authentic" and hence, more likely to provide aesthetic experiences and introduce connoisseurship.

Broudy's final assumption grouped together the visual arts, drama and music because of the time involved in their study. The goals of aesthetic education were to teach sensitivity, aesthetic judgment, aesthetic skills, and to provide opportunity for creative performance. This was to be aided by using only classical works which were high in aesthetic quality and high on extra-aesthetic qualities.

Art Education (1967)[21] provided a forum to discuss the theoretical aspects of aesthetic education. Ralph Smith, H. Broudy, Cyrill Burt, Monroe Beardsley, Virgil Aldrich and D. W. Gotshalk voiced their opinions as to the nature of "aesthetic education."

Ralph Smith[22] took a leading role in developing aesthetic education's ideology. He stated that the principles of aesthetic education were concerned with perceiving, noticing and feeling the qualities of a work of art. This consisted of aesthetic enjoyment, appreciation and judgment. In short, Smith's model is based on aesthetic criticism. "Learning how to appreciate works aesthetically means learning to judge, describe, explain, interpret and evaluate their special significance."[23]

Cyrill Burt (1967)[24] reported on the psychological aspects of aesthetic education. Psychological studies showed that everyone was capable of experiencing to some degree the aims of aesthetic education in every direction. However, Burt said that a program had to be adapted not only to the actual age, but also to personality interests and aptitudes. This called for individual observation and sympathetic study which later led Kaelin[25] (1969) to develop an existentialist basis for aesthetic education. Burt's psychological background is evident in his mention of "aesthetic experience" as being central to aesthetic education. He defined this aesthetic experience as a cognitive process, "a mode of awareness of perception and apprehension." The task of aesthetic education was to strengthen this aesthetic apprehension.

Gotshalk[26] (1967) gave the same treatment to aesthetic education as had Broudy and Burt. He felt that its primary directive was the development of sensitivity to aesthetic values and the expansion of this sensitivity in all directions.

Gotshalk thought that subtleties and diversity of aesthetic experiences would be increased by using fine art objects which offered more chances for the occurrence of aesthetic experiences. Studying these objects along four dimensions: form, function, expression and materials, would awaken aesthetic responses among individuals and hence, contribute to the culture at large.

Finally, Justin Schorr[27] (1967) pointed out that the domain of aesthetic education had to be outlined, aesthetic potential discussed, teacher training assessed, the subjectivity of judgments discussed, but the question of morality had been avoided. None of the above writers endorsed aesthetic education as the central concept for art education. Its role was to be a supplemental one to the programs then in existence.

In summary, until March 1967, as reported in Art Education, aesthetic education had had three directions. Aesthetic education should be based on the model of artist, historian, and critic (Barkan) or the model of the connoisseur (Broudy) or simply the critic (Smith). All three directions had the following underlying assumptions: aesthetic education should employ aesthetic theories as their foundations; aesthetic education should focus on visual and sensitivity training; and lastly, programs should provide aesthetic encounters resulting in "aesthetic experiences."

The evolution of aesthetic education began to grow as more articles began to appear in Art Education. Albert Tsugawa[28] (1969) gave a history of the term "aesthetic." Kaelin[29] (1969) questioned the use of behavioral objectives as a method of interpreting the social goals of aesthetic education.

Kaelin's emphasis was existential. His concept of aesthetic education has been termed a process of aesthetic communication where the artist projects his personal and unique values into the objects he creates. Criticism becomes the description of the product of aesthetic awareness. Communication occurs when verbal exchanges are made between the creator and the teacher so that both may have similar visions (understandings).

Kaelin introduced three pedagogical tools which enabled the teacher to understand a child's vision: autonomy, relevance and completeness. By autonomy he meant the aesthetic experience which occurred between the audience and the artist through his work; relevance referred to the restrictions on the responses of both artist and audience, while completeness referred to the closure of aesthetic experience in personal judgment. The task of the teacher became one of understanding the child's vision of expression and of guiding the child and offering alternatives for expressing himself. Evaluation and success of teaching was measured by how close the child came in overcoming his own handicaps and towards what ends he structured his own significant universe.

The question of aesthetic education took its current form in 1970, when Manuel Barkan (head of project), Laura Chapman and Evan Kern, were instrumental in publishing the first curriculum guide, Guidelines, a CEMREL product. This project made explicit one alternative for "aesthetic education," which was to support the central responsibility for general education in providing for personal development, and two subsidiary responsibilities of transmitting the cultural heritage to each new generation and maintaining and transforming the society.

1.4 Guidelines: A Brief Outline of Aims and Philosophy

Guidelines[30] was a document which aimed to synthesize various ideas which had taken form since 1962. The developers based their entire program on the assumption that aesthetic experience was intrinsically good. Their main aim was to increase the student's capacity to experience aesthetic qualities in man-made and natural objects and events in the environment. The second assumption was that if students had artistic encounters with the arts and the environment, their individual and personal growth in aesthetic sensibility would increase. Developed in three phases, the first phase outlined foundations;[31] the second phase produced the materials;[32] and phase three was to be an evaluation of the entire project.

Guidelines was, in essence, just that, a "guide." It was designed so that teachers could develop their own units by specifying their own objectives, materials, target population, and curriculum base (i.e., behavioral, problem solving, language or historical). Special sections and appendices for sources and concepts, plus a phenomenological method of criticism, were included.

CEMREL, as a total project, was a development of six broad units. "Aesthetics in the Physical World" was meant for kindergarten and first grade children. It served as an introduction to the fundamental elements of perception, such as light, sound and motion. "Aesthetics and Art Elements" dealt with concepts specifically relating to elements in the environment as well as works of art. This section dealt with the necessary skills for making aesthetic judgments. "Aesthetics and the Creative Process" dealt with creative processes, the organization of elements through works of art. "Aesthetics and the Artist" was concerned with an in depth study of the role of the artist and with the creating of art works. "Aesthetics and Culture" and "Aesthetic Environment" were recently developed in Phase II, spearheaded by Stanley S. Madeja[33] (1975). This package described the exploration of aesthetic elements utilized by various cultures, and the similarity and differences of aesthetic values between cultures. This latter unit dealt with the examination of personal and public spaces, the effects of technology and the inter-relatedness of functional and aesthetic concerns.

1.5 Developments in Aesthetic Education as Reported After the CEMREL Project

David Ecker[34] (1971) was a major contributor to the CEMREL project. Ecker defined four alternatives for aesthetic education: the behavioral base; experiential base; cognitive base; and finally, the linguistic base. The behavioral base curriculum called for a series of descriptions of discrete terminal behaviors. Learning was defined as the acquisition of knowledge as defined by these behaviors. Hence, all learning outcomes were determined prior to the learning activity.

The experiential base, a problem solving approach, was adopted where student experiences provided the grounds for judgments. In this case the artist was the original model but gave way to the aesthetician or art critic when the product was finished.

The cognitive base employed the general educational objective of art appreciation. Materials provided by the sociologist, the psychologist, the anthropologist and the historian served as major components. The art critic and the art historian's rules and methods of criticism could be learned by students. Knowledge of content, technique and history were essential both to making of art and appreciating it.

The fourth and final alternative, the linguistic base, required the acquisition of a range of skills necessary in talking about art. Since the making of judgments required the discipline of language, refining, explaining, describing, hypothesizing, interpreting and elucidating were to be the techniques of aesthetic education.

Ralph Smith,[35] the editor of the Journal of Aesthetic Education (1966) also contributed to the CEMREL project (1969). Smith defined aesthetic education in four ways. Aesthetic education could be any kind of education in the arts; also, a particular approach to the arts instruction which stressed the refinement of a special kind of aesthetic experience, judgment, attitude, and form of understanding or way of knowing. It could also mean any integrated art or humanities program which might also stress team teaching. Finally, aesthetic education might be the development of sensitivity to the aesthetic aspects of the environment or to any object whatsoever. Smith's own particular view seemed to favor a definition which called for a refinement of taste.

In the last five years the debate as to the nature of aesthetic education has continued. Madeja[36] (1972) and Madenfort[37] (1973) both agree that aesthetic education should develop a student's ability to "experience the world as it is given in all the immediacy of its sensuousness, without the mediation of concepts.".

Martin Engel[38] (1975) adheres to Smith's first category with an experiential base while Merle Flannery[39] (1972, 1973) points out that there are two contending concepts of "aesthetic education." The first generally means the study of theories about nature of beauty and art, or the study of formal aspects of art works. The composition, the technique, the media used, the history of the circumstances surrounding the work's creation form the knowledge acceptable under this type of education.

The other view has nothing to do with taste, beauty, design, like or dislike, judgments, or concepts. It states that "aesthetics" is the science of "sensuous knowledge." Aesthetic education in this realm is the study of the keyboard of human feelings and the extension of these human feelings.

Donald Arnstine[40] (1973) concurs with the model of the promotion of understanding, appreciation and increase of sensitivity to artistic features. The same view is held by Ronald Neperud[41] (1973) though he feels that critical judgments need to be expanded towards the environment.

The debate continues. Lanier[42] (1974) rejects the model of artist, historian, and critic which was proposed by CEMREL. He argues that an artist cannot promote aesthetic experience because he does not necessarily understand it. Historical knowledge does not help in understanding aesthetic experience, nor does insightful criticism, because it follows the aesthetic experience. Lanier maintains that the only proper model is the aesthetician, because it is his role to clarify aesthetic response. Aesthetic education, in Lanier's terms, would, in contrast, start "by exploring the nature and function of all aesthetic response and in particular that response to visual art stimuli." A proper aesthetic education would focus on the question in its crudest form. "What happens to us when we react to art?"

1.6 Summary

Generally speaking, the issue of "aesthetic education" in the past two decades has centered around two distinctive camps. One group of art educators feels that aesthetic education can expand the student's "sensuous knowledge" through "aesthetic experiences." Aesthetic education should provide the experiences by basing its curriculum on the role of the aesthetician. The other camp is more pragmatically orientated. They too feel that the student's aesthetic awareness should be increased, but the curriculum should be based on experiences as artist, historian, and critic. These three roles provide the necessary experiences to achieve sensuous knowledge. Certainly it is this latter group which has made the largest contribution to aesthetic education. However, the results of their program (i.e., CEMREL) have not yet been evaluated.

1.7 Initial Recognition of the Problem

Having read this far, the reader may be conscious of the same feelings of uneasiness which overtook the writer at this point in his research. Had art educators truly reflected a cross-section of contemporary aesthetic opinion, in offering but two alternative bases for aesthetic education? Were there other paradigms which might prove equally productive and offer an equally valid base for criticism? Would a more detailed study of the material appearing over the past seventeen years in Studies in Art Education, the research journal of the National Art Education Association, uncover further (and more specific) anomalies? The next chapter addresses itself to this latter question.

Footnotes - Chapter One

[1] E. Eisner, Educating Artistic Vision (New York: MacMillan Co., 1972), Chapter XIII, pp. 299-325. In this chapter Eisner states:

> "Art education is inextricably tied to education at large. As society has altered its domain for and expectations of education, so too has it altered its conception of the function that art education is to perform." (p. 299)

[2] Fred Logan, The Growth of Art in American Schools (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1955).

[3] For a clear and concise development of art education in early America, the reader is referred to, B. I. Forman, "Early Antecedents of American Art Education: A Critical Evaluation of Pioneer Influences," Studies in Art Education 9(2), 1968, pp. 38-51 and R. L. Jones, "Aesthetic Education: Its Historical Precendents," Art Education 27(19) (December 1974):13-16.

[4] A. W. Dow, Composition (New York: Doubleday, Doran and Co., 1913).

[5] E. Eisner and David W. Ecker, "Some Historical Developments in Art Education," Concepts in Art and Education, an anthology by George Pappas (London: Collier-MacMillan Limited), pp. 12-25.

[6] Vincent Lanier, "A Plague on All Your Houses: The Tragedy of Art Education," Art Education 27(3) (March 1974):12.

[7] E. Eisner, and David W. Ecker, "Some Historical Developments in Art Education," Concepts in Art and Education ed. by G. Pappas (London: Collier-MacMillan Ltd.), p. 17.

[8] John Dewey, Art as Experience, 17th ed. (New York: Capricorn Books, 1958),

[9] Lanier, op. cit., p. 14.

[10] This figure comes from a tally made by the author of the articles written in Art Education since 1965.

[11] M. Barkan et al., Guidelines, published by (CEMREL) Central Midwestern Regional Educational Laboratory Inc. funded by U.S. Office of Education, Dept. of Health, Education and Welfare, 1970.

[12] This development may be found in Elliot Eisner's Educating Artistic Vision.

[13] R. L. Jones, "Aesthetic Education: Its Historical Precedents," Art Education 27(19) (December 1974):15.

[14] For an interesting expose on the Prang Company refer to C.S.E.A./S.C.E.A. Research Journal 4 (January 1974).

[15] Edwin Ziegfeld, "The Owatonna Art Education Project," Western Arts Association Bulletin 20(4), 1936, pp. 54-58.

[16] Recent writings in Studies in Art Education tend to see the 1970's as an "affective revolution" since there is a thrust in the direction of aesthetic education. The 1960's were termed a "cognitive revolution," in deference to Bruner's structuralism.

[17] Manuel Barkan, "Transition in Art Education: Changing Conceptions of Curriculum," Art Education 15 (October 1962):12-18.

[18] Vincent Lanier, "Schismogenesis in Contemporary Education," Studies in Art Education 5(1), 1963, pp. 10-19.

[19] Dewey, op. cit.

[20] "NAEA 8th Biennial Conference, April 4-9, 1965," Art Education 18(3). In this issue see, Harry Broudy, "Aesthetic Education in the Secondary School," pp. 24-30.

[21] Art Education 20(3) (February 1967).

[22] Ralph Smith, "The Assent to Aesthetic Education," Art Education 20(3) (February 1967):8-12.

[23] Ralph Smith, "Guest Editorial: Aesthetic Education," Art Education 20(3) (March 1967):9-10.

[24] C. Burt, "The Psychological Aspects of Aesthetic Education," Art Education 20(3), 1967, pp. 26-28.

[25] Eugene Kaelin, "Isness and Oughtness," Art Education 21(1) (January 1968):6-10.

[26] D. W. Gotshalk, "Requirements of a Domain Interpretation," Art Education 20(3) (March 1967):11-23.

[27] Justin Schorr, "Aesthetic Education for a Change," Art Education 20(9) (December 1967):41-44.

[28] A. Tsugawa, "The Nature of the Aesthetic and Human Values," Art Education 21(8) (November 1968):9-15.

[29] Eugene Kaelin, "Are 'Behavioral Objectives' Consistent with Social Goals of Aesthetic Education?" Art Education 22(8) (November 1969):4-11.

[30] Manuel Barkan et al., Guidelines, a CEMREL project.

[31] For an informative critique of Guidelines see Arthur D. Efland, "The Transition Continued: The Emergence of an Affective Revolution," Studies in Art Education 13(1) (Fall 1971):13-25.

[32] For curriculum development in the phase I of CEMREL see, David Ecker, "Playing the Aesthetic Education Curriculum Game," Studies in Art Education 13(1), 1971, pp. 26-39.

[33] Stanley Madeja, "The CEMREL Aesthetic Education Program: A Report to the Field," Art Education 26(6) (September 1973):10-13.

[34] David Ecker, "Defining Behavioral Objectives for Aesthetic Education," CEMREL U.S. Office of Education, Dept. of Health, Education and Welfare, pp. 1-51.

[35] Ralph Smith, "The Year 2000 and Aesthetic Education," Art Education 25(7) (October 1972):14-17 and "Art and Aesthetic Statesmanship in American Education," Art Education 23(6) (June 1970):12-15.

[36] Stanley Madeja, "Aesthetic Education: An Area of Study," Art Education 24(8) (November 1971):16-19.

[37] Madenfort thinks a student should experience sensuous phenomena through (1) the living body and the world, (2) bodily motion and emotion, (3) as a translation of the features the arts have in common, (4) a multiplicity of sensuous phenomena, (5) through the creative art of expression, in D. Madenfort, "Educating for the Immediately Sensuous as a Unified Whole," Art Education 25(3) (March 1972):6-11.

[38] Martin Engel, "Aesthetic Education: The State of the Art," Art Education 28(3) (March 1975):15-20.

[39] M. Flannery, "Aesthetic Education," Art Education 26(5) (May 1973):10-14 and "Images and Aesthetic Consciousness," Art Education 27(3) (March 1974):4-7.

[40] D. Arnstine, "The Aesthetic as a Contact for General Education," Studies in Art Education 8(1), 1967, p. 13.

[41] R. W. Neperud, "Art Education: Towards an Environmental Aesthetic," Art Education 26(3) (March 1973):7-10.

[42] V. Lanier, "A Plague on All Your Houses: The Tragedy of Art Education," Art Education, 27(3) (March 1974):14.

CHAPTER TWO

An Examination of Studies in Art Education

2.1 Statement of Intent

The purpose of this chapter is to trace and delineate the ontological, epistemological and the axiological foundations of aesthetic education as reported in the research journal, Studies in Art Education. Different research paradigms have provided the necessary epistemological justification for the type of aesthetic program supported; curriculum proposals have provided the necessary ontological structure which in turn, supports the axiological position maintained by a particular art educator.[1] It is for this reason that articles which deal with research directions, art structure and curriculum development, which may make no explicit reference to particular aesthetic programs, are the subject of investigation in this chapter.

If Studies in Art Education is assumed to be a reliable source for voicing the concerns art educators have, then this chapter will be an accurate reflection of those concerns. Articles covering all of the journal's life (1959-1976) have been examined and categorized. A survey taken by the author, shows that approximately one third of all articles in Studies in Art Education have dealt with aesthetic education. Furthermore, if only the last decade is reviewed, two thirds of all articles have dealt with aesthetic education. Such descriptive evidence is indicative of the concern art educators have towards aesthetic education as a viable direction for art education.

This chapter will then present a categorization of all such aesthetic positions. It will be shown that two major currents in aesthetic education are explored, one characterized as an education in sensuous knowledge; the other as education in cognitive knowledge. A third current, eclectic in nature, attempts to bridge these two orientations. The chapter will conclude with the presentation of a chart, which attempts to present visually the findings of this chapter.

2.2 Identification of Positions in Art Education as Presented in STUDIES IN ART EDUCATION

Since the 1959 Fall issue of Studies in Art Education, two main epistemological research paradigms have emerged. The first, revolving around behavioral psychology, is commonly characterized by logical-positivist method;[2] the other has included experientialism and phenomenology and later, participant-observation and case study.[3] The former paradigm governed much of art research in creativity, while the latter was adopted to provide the epistemological base for contending and conflicting axiological positions in aesthetic education.

The behavioralist research paradigm governed, and still does govern, much of the reported research. However, even in the first issue there was a prediction that each research paradigm would be at odds with the other,[4] a prediction which has continued to have some validity.[5]

The same sort of questioning concerning the direction of education was raised by Frank and d'Arcy Hayman[6] but no definitive programs or options were proposed. Probably the most unusual attempt to synthesize the methodology of behavioralism and aesthetic values was attempted by Ecker[7] who endorsed the idea that teaching machines should be used to teach style through a systematic program of skill acquisition. A more recent integration of behavioralism and affective research has been attempted by Wieder[8] (1976).

Ecker's thesis (1962), "machines could be used to teach art," raised an interesting moral question. Teaching machines represented the apotheosis of the behavioralist model of education. Systematic learning, efficiency and gradual acquisition of skill, regurgitation, memorization, what Bernstein has called "collection code" education,[9] could be achieved. The stark contrast between teaching machine methodology and idiosyncratic responses reflected the two ends of a continuum, one end grounded in mechanism, the other in the trappings of the "affective revolution."[10]

In the 1960's creativity paradoxically had developed its epistemological tradition in positivism and an ontological view of the child as a machine.[11] The researcher's stress on cognitive processes, and his statistical manipulations of data into predetermined categories was however challenged by a new axiological position. Typical of many ideas which challenge the status quo, it had an obscure epistemology and ontology. The Weltanschauung needed to be fully defined and adopted. A new view of reality and the nature of man had to be defined. This new value orientation, termed "aesthetic education," stressed process, experience, appreciation and criticism and veered away from production.

Two currents in aesthetic education may be identified in Studies in Art Education. The first current may be characterized by a Weltanschauung which has phenomenology as its epistemological base and an existentialist ontology. Within such parameters, criticism is more formalistic, dealing with psychological statements about the art work in isolation to other criteria. It is an idealist position with an ideographic research orientation, attempting to identify and explain subjective responses to works of art.

The other position is more contextualist and naturalistic. Accepting cognitive activities as the basis for aesthetic education, it assumes that there is a teachable body of knowledge in art. Furthermore, it assumes that explanations of meaning of art works and rules of criticism may be deduced from the analysis of language used by art critics. This position draws its epistemological base from Wittgenstein and has its ontological roots in logical-positivism. In this sense, a change of emphasis occurs from production to criticism, but structural changes are initiated.

Both positions were over-reactions to the behavioralist paradigm. However, the former, more idealist position, represents a rather radical stance; the latter current is more rationalistic. All art educators who have formulated a foundation for aesthetic education occupy positions favoring the position of phenomenology-existentialism, with its stress on individualism, or Wittgenstein's logical-positivism.

Nevertheless, some hold positions which may be categorized as belonging to a "middle ground" current; positions which attempt to reconcile and synthesize both the phenomenological-existential and and logical-positivist positions by specifying instances when either/or paradigms should be employed. Programs based on Dewey's pragmatism would be so considered. Since "inquiry" and experience is necessary for the testing of truth, and all ideas, criticisms, facts are considered hypotheses in Dewey's framework, all being subject to experience, the translations of his philosophy would lean towards individualism and towards the relativity of truth. However, when Dewey's aesthetics are translated into a methodology, a variation of logical-positivism is employed, with the realization that the results obtained would be personal and individualistic.

The underlying epistemology of aesthetic education was made explicit because of two conditions. The first condition saw Eisner and Ecker become editor and co-editor of Studies in Art Education (Fall 1963). Both men presented positions which were polar opposites.[12] This critical combination allowed for a more rigorous discourse which resulted in selections of articles which raised problems of art appreciation[13] and art discipline.[14] The second condition was Eisner's realization that there were other alternatives to the acquisition of knowledge besides "Vienna Circle" methodology.

> Yet I see neither need or justification to reserve knowing to the scientific. Indeed scientific inquiry from my point of view constitutes only a small portion of how man came to know ...[15]

2.3 Early Speculations

Vincent Lanier's "Schismogenesis in Contemporary Art Education"[16] was a landmark article for aesthetic education. "Schismogenesis" was Lanier's catch-all term describing art education's state of chaos. Lanier's solution to schismogenesis was a new axiological position; art education for visual aesthetic experiences.

> What is meant by 'visual aesthetic experiences'? Let us start by stating that the activity of art involves the act of making or looking at an object of art; a physical object made by man for the purpose of objectifying emotive meanings ...[17]

Lanier does not make explicit the nature of aesthetic experience, nor is there evidence of his ontological position. Still, the aesthetics of John Dewey would seem to be the tacit philosophical justification for such a direction.

Aesthetic education, under Lanier's premise, is training for aesthetic experiences for the acquisition of sensuous knowledge. This thrust which Lanier introduced was translated into a more cognitive epistemology by Ecker.[18] Ecker's dissatisfaction with Lowenfeld's doctrines and the separation of the affective from the cognitive domain, the separation of "is" from "ought" and fact from value, as well as means from end, led him to a resolution through the translation of Dewey's aesthetics as problem solving education or "qualitiative thought" education.

> The distinction I propose, while accepting a naturalistic account of relationships between fact and values, is located in the experimentalist philosophical orientation, which holds that values are created by men in order to meet their problems and needs.[19]

A similar program of problem solving was discussed by Templeton.[20] Unlike Ecker, Templeton is an idealist, not a pragmatist. He argues that structure is fashioned by the mind as the learner goes throug a "search" to structure his world. Using the Piagetian distinction of defining attributes and criterial attributes,[21] he claims that a child structures his world when he encounters his environment. These encounters are not modified until the child's "private" world matches the "public" world. Encounters (problem solving) become searches to confirm or modify, or expand his criterial attributes. In order to translate these into aesthetic education, Templeton suggests that the historian and critic be examined for their particular search models. Korzenik,[22] also agreeing with a problem solving approach, assumes that the child's product is the response to a problem he had in mind. Korzenik expands this idea to include speech and movement which, if examined, also help to disclose the nature of the problem.

Ecker's position and Lanier's position presented early exemplars of the two aforementioned positions.[23] Lanier's aesthetic program leans towards the affective domain.[24] It claims that encounters and experiences with art lead to aesthetic experiences which enable the student to gain sensuous knowledge. Ecker's program leans towards the cognitive domain. Tasks and problems are posited for the achievement of aesthetic knowledge.

Hausman's article,[25] appearing in the same issue as those of Lanier and Ecker, presents a further example for such classification. Hausman concerns himself with the historical dimension of art. Tradition and the craft of art should be used as the basis of aesthetic judgments, rather than placing emphasis on the expressionistic and spontaneous methods then in vogue. In this respect, Hausman leans towards the cognitive domain.

2.4 The Affective Current

Kaelin[26] presents an existentialist ontology for aesthetic education. His position may be analyzed as neo-pragmaticism. To solve the difficulty between the idealist tendencies of Croce and Collingwood and the linguistic or analytic theories of Beardsley and Wittgenstein, Kaelin offers his own position.

> My own claim is that the thesis of qualitative problem solving deriving from the aesthetic theory of John Dewey needs further amplification in an existential, phenomenological concept of an aesthetic object for a complete, workable theory of education in art.[27]

Kaelin's second article[28] in Studies in Art Education is more definitive in its attempt to define an existentialist aesthetic education. Kaelin's radical individualism rejects sociological perspective. Any correlation between social class and certain types of aesthetic values is dismissed.[29] Social scientists, in his view, are unable to interpret their correlations, and give criteria for aesthetic choices. The element of "over-determinism" set in pedagogical theories had, in his view, no justification.

Martin Heidegger's ontology and Jean-Paul Sartre's distinction between individuals who question their existence (pour-soi) and those who are passive receivers of their environment (en-soi), provide an existentialist rationale for a program which stresses the autonomy of the individual. His program strives to do this by beginning "where the students are at" and avoiding the teacher's own value positions being imposed on the students. Kaelin is obviously indebted to this view in setting out his own position. The teacher, is this scheme, acts like a critic. It is his job to explain the student's own reactions to his own expressions through dialogue. This dialogue requires the teacher to find a set of aesthetic categories which will enable him to communicate similar reactions to the expressions so that a common world-view would be understood between teacher and student.[30] Students involved in the program are encouraged not to be mere assimilators of culture (en-soi) but to surpass culture by making their own contribution to it (pour-soi). This expression should be of significance for him about the nature of the world he lives in.[31]

If Kaelin provides the ontology, Stumbo[32] translates this into a methodology. Drawing his ontological framework from Sartre, Stumbo employs Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology to translate "aesthetic experience" as two phases; "pre-reflective experience" and "reflective experience." Significant meanings occur during either phase, whether the object is present or not. Stumbo assumed that not all students could handle a reflective analysis without having some subjective and objective foundation,[33] and advocated a three phase program to provide such a foundation. Children were to be taught to analyze their subjective and objective experiences by "taking them apart" and reflecting on them. This program, like Kaelin's, was aimed at the individual, and was highly formalist in its approach to criticism and teacher participation. The teacher's role was to help students describe and understand certain levels of meaning in their artworks.

The phenomenological viewpoint receives further support from Thompson[34] who attempted to criticize Berlyne's empirical behavioralist approach to perception by offering the "experiential" base as an alternative. Thompson points out that Berlyne omits two considerations in his research. The first is that perception differs within the context that the object is perceived and secondly, perception is dynamic hence cannot be studied in isolation but must be related to the whole situation, or phenomenologically.

Aesthetic programs like Kaelin's, Stumbo's and Thompson's, in which ontology is derived primarily from the French Existentialist Movement[35] and from the phenomenology of Husserl or Merleau-Ponty, assume that aesthetic experience is highly individualistic. The teacher's role (as critic) becomes one of understanding the expressed product or criticisms made by the student with the specific intent to provide other choices and further explanations for these endeavours. Kaelin's is the most dogmatic of this type of formalism, dismissing the intentions of the student as misleading in the teacher's analysis. Stumbo's program is less formalist. His reflective and pre-reflective stages include more criteria and tend to lean towards contextualist criticism.

Description of the artwork by the student in Stumbo's program is done on two broad areas: the level of integration and the level of complexity. The first level refers to the symbolism which may be found in the art object; the second level refers to the details in the work. Since this kind of phenomenology does not have a sociological perspective, programs developed from it tend to fall into Subjectivism[36] where no definitive criteria are given for criticism. The program tends to be reductionist, wherein stress of evaluation, criticism, choice, are all directed towards the formal elements in the art work. Furthermore, they view the child as a unique and autonomous individual who should be an active translator of his environment through his artwork or through the appreciation of artworks. The teacher, as critic, views such responses and encounters as autonomous and individualistic. It is his/her role to provide available choices and alternatives to the child through dialogue. They all assume that aesthetic experience is a real phenomenon which may be analyzed, either through dissection into pre-reflective - reflective - projective phases or some other such division. Furthermore, criticism tends to be highly formalist since it is the child's artwork or the child's personal response which is taken in isolation and analyzed.

Newman's program[37] is an example of a curriculum which leans towards the purely affective domain. He maintains that an individual who refuses habitually to put experience into conventional categories is said to be "realizing experience" or in Dewey's terms, "aesthetically apprehending." Aesthetic education, in these terms, can be employed to understand and appreciate the culturally different because art is an intuitive apprehension. Newman's basic thrust is therefore a contention that the intuitive mode of apprehension, which is inherent in aesthetic perception, becomes critically necessary for participating in a non-prejudicial appreciation of others. Bigotry and prejudice can be eliminated by the interjection of the non-discursive intuitive mode by apprehending the human condition as it is interpreted within different art works of other cultures.[38]

Lanier's canalization program[39] tried to inject a more contextualist approach to art criticism and art appreciation, while still preserving the idiosyncratic response of the individual student and avoiding Kaelin's accusations of over-determinism. Lanier also begins, "where the kids are at," but further assumes that they possess an appreciative milieu of their own to which they respond with critical judgments. Art criticism would revolve around objects which the children like, rather than being inculcated by adult-formulated standards of taste.

Efland's concept[40] of aesthetic education is similar to Lanier's canalization program. Aesthetic education is education in values or attitudes, wherein teachers attempt to influence the aesthetic preferences held by the students. Teaching would help students with the significance of their encounters, so that they could compare their feelings and make "good reasons" for judging these encounters. Such an education would result in "valuing" as a behavior where choices are made between competing value systems. Efland does not accept Bruner's concept of education as the model for this program because of his cognitive orientation.[41]

In summary, art educators like Efland, Newman, Lanier view aesthetic education as education in sensuous knowledge achievable through aesthetic experiences. Their criticism is generally contextualist and they draw their ontology from the aesthetics of John Dewey.[42] Aesthetic education is treated as intuitive, and the function of art as expressive.

2.5 The Cognitive Current

The other major current which is in direct conflict with the interests of the behavioralist model for creativity and the existentialist model of aesthetic education is represented by Barkan, Marantz, Broudy, Kern and Dimondstein, Hausman and Smith. Their epistemological base is borrowed from Jerome Bruner's thesis of "role-playing."[43] Such programs assume that there are correct methodological procedures which should be followed to learn an acceptable body of knowledge which has been "approved" and sanctioned by the "professional community." In this respect, only well known and historically established works of art are discussed, criticized and emulated. (If not the work itself, then the style, approach or content is encouraged.)

Barkan,[44] in his enthusiasm to oppose the "creativity" orientation, founded his curriculum model on the artist, critic, and historian triad: three roles representing desired behavior. Furthermore, he advocated the use of teaching packages and ordered curriculum materials. In this regard, it is true that Barkan leaned heavily towards the logical-positivist tradition; nevertheless, his program called for qualitative change and at least one writer in Studies in Art Education has alleged that his major work, Guidelines (1970), is too cognitively orientated.[45]

Broudy's program[46] is founded on the role of the connoisseur. Judgments and criticisms are only directed towards serious or "high" art. It is these judgments which require refinement, whereas common day perception of things requires no such refinement. Aesthetic perception is teachable because aesthetic qualities may be identified more or less systematically when an aesthetic object is examined. Broudy's approach is highly formalist. Training for the recognition of formal properties is primary. Interpretation, criticism, and art history follow after training in perception has been accomplished.[47]

Kern[48] leans to a more affective aesthetic program. In many respects, his program is a synthesis of Broudy-Barkan and Lanier. Rejecting Broudy's connoisseur model and Barkan's triad as too scholarly and unreasonable an approach, he offers a collector-gourmet model as the alternative. As gourmets, the children seek out experiences which are high in aesthetic qualities and as collectors, they try to maintain an aesthetic environment which is rich with aesthetic experiences. Kern's proper function for aesthetic education in the 1970's is to have students develop the capacity to judge critically and actively seek out significant aesthetic experiences. In this respect, Kern introduces a much broader perspective as to what may constitute aesthetic experiences for children. Non-art sources, popular art, music and the environment become potential sources for aesthetic experience.

Marantz,[49] Kern, Broudy and Barkan all agree that artistic production is but a small part of the experiences a student should have with art. The stress is on appreciation; the aim, to develop critical "aesthetic consumers" by increasing aesthetic sensitivity through structured programs based on a connoisseur model, or gourmet-collector model or on the critic model or on Barkan's triad: artist, critic, and historian. Although the stress is now on cognition, Dewey is still the ontological base for these programs. He emerges as a leader just as he did for the affective group.

Dimondstein[50] may be classified as belonging to the above group, but Langer supplies the underlying aesthetic foundation for Dimondstein's assumption that there is a structure in aesthetic education analogous to mathematics and social studies. Using the aesthetics of Langer and Read to describe particular art forms and art processes, she recommends that each endeavour (i.e., sculpture, painting, architecture) be defined by covering four areas:

definition and description, characteristics, experience, and art elements.[51] Such a view offers a closed system to the definition of the arts and its structure is highly formalist.

The most influencial exponent of the preceding current has been Ralph Smith. Not only has he contributed to Studies in Art Education regularly, but he is editor of his own journal, Journal of Aesthetic Education (1966). Smith represents the antithesis of the existentialist-phenomenological position.

Smith's definition of aesthetic education is entirely based on the role of the critic. Rejecting Bruner's thesis on principle[52] Smith insists that aesthetic education concern itself with the method of criticism. The role models become the enlightened critic or the reflective beholder. The enlightened critic is one who has proficiency in language and the reflective beholder should acquire this same proficiency.

Smith contends that criticism should involve interpretation, description, analysis and evaluation.[53] As paradigm cases, he refers to Sibley[54] and Beardsley.[55] Both aestheticians maintain that the total meaning of the art object may be ascertained from the artwork alone. In this respect they maintain an absolutist position and a formalist orientation. The artist's intention, the cultural milieu, the historical perspective, are not involved in this brand of criticism. Knowledge of symbolism in the art work is important, but references to outside sources about the work are inadmissible. Linguistic analysis of critics' statements is the methodology employed.

Smith strengthens his position by applying current psychological theory to his method of linguistic analysis. Current psychological theory hypothesizes that there are three stages of cognitive growth, each mode possessing information and representing ideas. (Smith calls these enactive, symbolic and iconic stages-terms which reflect Bruner's epistemology.) Aesthetic judgments can be compared to these phases of cognitive growth.[56] Therefore, criticism in aesthetic education should increase in complexity as the child progresses through these stages.

Smith's[57] approach to the teaching of art-historical structure is contextualist, particularly in his early writings, where he condones causal explanations for historical developments and shuns probablistic explanations for individual works of art. He accepted Bruner's thesis, building aesthetic education around the model of the historian whose role was to classify, define, describe, explain and interpret works of art.

A variation of Smith's theme was presented by Richard Munson[58] who proposed to re-examine Gustaf Britsch's theory as a potential base in art education. Britsch, a neo-Hegelian,[59] treats art history as a "record of what has been visually understood." Art transcends all stylistic and historical limitations because for Britsch, it is created form, not imitated form. Only man-made, creative forms are subject to artistic structure.[60] This artistic structure goes through transformations: from simple to complex, from outer to inner form and from homogeneous to heterogeneous. The child, he maintained, goes through the same process. The difference between the artist and child is that the child is unsuccessful at unification in his earlier stages. But as he progresses through the stages of growth, "unmeant" perceptions change to "meant" perceptions of his environment.[61]

Munson accepts this development but strives to make it less linear and less of a closed system approach by listing a number of criteria which would influence each of the three stages.[62]

2.6 The Middle Ground

There are many positions which attempt to synthesize or delineate instances when either of the two currents should be utilized. As such, many programs are eclectic and lie in a "middle ground" position. Ecker's problem solving position will be included in this grouping, along with those of Arnstine, Villemain, Bradley, Bingham, Davis and Eisner. All may be further characterized as having a greater or lesser skewness, either towards the affective domain or the cognitive domain.

Villemain[63] maintains that historically aesthetic theory has not provided the necessary methodological principles for aesthetic education. Characteristically, aesthetic experience is not subject to rules, formal controls, nor regulative methodology. Villemain argues that the affective domain, although distinct from the cognitive, is subject to the same methods, controls and formal properties. Neither domain is self-sufficient. Both should be included in general education, but in a predictive mediated manner. Each subject should have cognitive-affective orderings.[64]

Villemain's solution to affective-cognitive orderings in the classroom, is to outline a spectrum of moods. The qualitative predominance mood occurs when the affective domain is predominant in the classroom; while theoretical predominance occurs when there is a "law of gravity" in the classroom. When both situations are at equal odds, a relationship of "reciprocity" exists.

Villemain leans heavily towards a behavioral model of education. He assumes that there is discursive knowledge in the fine arts which teachers should emphasize. The cognitive element of art criticism should be included in the fine arts curriculum so as not to overlook "theoretical predominance." Likewise, scientific pursuits should not overlook "qualitative predominance." Therefore, "it is a matter of emphasis when we methodologically distinguish between education in art and in science."[65]

Bingham[66] endorses Villemain's argument. Concept learning through visual means is possible provided a Piagetian biological model is deduced where the relationships between the cognitive-affective domains might be plotted. She realizes that such research is, however, a long way coming.

Davis,[67] like Villemain, maintains that a curriculum should have predictability and rules. He argues that the stress on behavioral objectives has been misguided. Rather than concentrating on the form that behavioral objectives should take, Davis insists that one should concentrate on the behavior of the student. In this way the relevant behaviors in art education could be identified and a typology of useful behaviors differentiated. Internal behaviors, which were not directly visible, could be classified as high or low intensities by overt expressions. The art specialist has to be able to "read" these expressions and compare them on a probability continuum.[68]

Unlike Stumbo, whose position is clearly phenomenological, Bradley[69] tries to synthesize the phenomenological viewpoint and the behavioralist model into what he calls "encounterability."[70] Leaning more towards the existentialist-phenomenological viewpoint, Bradley advocates an individualistic approach which has a feedback loop. This cybernetic model allows the learner to reinforce his own learnings continually once an art encounter has been experienced. Evaluation and direction are decided by the learner. There is no sequencing in such a program and objectives remain subjective and flexible.

In this phenomenological encounter, Bradley states that general objectives may be useful for "encounterability." Such objectives are for outcomes which may appear on different levels, hence, generalizations about group behavior are rejected. These general objectives are important to the development of encounterability in the early stages, but become less important as self-projective techniques developed by the student take over.

Studio production becomes the main factor in this scheme. History, criticism and appreciation become the means by which students develop the ability to have meaningful encounters and expressions.

Arnstine[71] maintains that aesthetic qualities are found in common experiences. However, because people have a practical or intellectual orientation to the world, they become insensitive to form. In this aspect, Arnstine leans towards the affective point of view. Interest, distance[72] and aesthetic attitude become the necessary conditions for aesthetic education.

Arnstine's program encourages children to produce and appreciate works which are of interest to them. Art experiences are organized so that aesthetic qualities are recognized in popular culture and in common objects of daily experience.[73] The role of the teacher is an aesthetic consultant for the school, so that lectures, demonstrations and lectures become more interesting. Furthermore, by examining the function of form of everyday objects, Arnstine's program tries to make connections between aesthetic and political, sociological and economic considerations.

Arnstine opposes research which slots children into categories or classifies them into fixed personality types.[74] He rejects research in mental health, emotional adjustments and other such activities which belong to the province of psychology and not art education. His program stresses process, not product and as such research should be directed to aesthetic attitude and to the way a perceiver feels about an art work. Arnstine clearly used John Dewey's philosophy as his aesthetic foundation.

The final "middle ground" position presented is that of Elliot Eisner. His position is not made explicity in Studies in

Art Education but his fervent opposition in editorials to the behavioralist position places him away from logical-positivism.

His concern with the Kettering Project implies an advocacy of packaged materials. However, Eisner uses expressive objectives[75] which allow for open-ended answers and unpredictable behavior.

Eisner's typology for creativity[76] and his paradigm for analysis of visual problem solving[77] place him as a follower of John Dewey. This is further verified in a recent article on certain educational myths.[78] However, in his most recent article in Studies in Art Education, Eisner accepts a "communication theory" of aesthetic education.[79] All arts, he maintains, can be decoded and encoded. A contextualist position is maintained when he discusses the conventional, representational and connotative symbols but he resorts to formalism when reviewing "qualitative" symbols. "Qualitative symbols" are a matter of physiognomonic perception. Syntax and symbols change due to the introduction of new media and it is new media which children should use in schools to find new "qualitative symbols."

A summary of the various axiological positions was given by Ecker[80] when he was affiliated with CEMREL's curriculum development program. Four foundational "bases" were identified: the behavioral base, the experiential base, the cognitive base and the linguistic base.

The behavioral base predicates a curriculum which has discrete terminal behaviors which are arrived at through a series of learning activities. Villemain and Barkan would support such a program. The Kettering Project and phase two of CEMREL produced such material.

The experiential base consists of a curriculum based on problem solving. Certain concepts and skills are applied and learned through this method. The artist is used as the model during the performance but later the model changes to that of the critic. Such a base, argues Ecker, represents a translation of Dewey's pragmatism.[81]

The cognitive base maintains that art appreciation is the prime objective of the aesthetic program. Art critic and art historian are the exemplars. Knowledge of content, technique and history are required. Smith is the exemplar of such a position.

Finally, Ecker identifies the linguistic base, which produces a range of skills in language. These skills include dialogue and description, where stress is on sentence structure and the use of metaphor and simile. Smith advocates this program; Dobbs[82] has argued in the same vein.

2.7 Summary

Twenty-three positions have been characterized as representing two major Weltanschauungs in aesthetic education.[83] These have been termed the Affective Current and the Cognitive Current. Furthermore, a number of positions have been characterized as "middle ground" whose curriculum structures are eclectic but skewed to either side of the two broad currents. Ecker's position has been designated as the middle position, incorporating equal integration from both currents. It is cognitive to the degree that the intellect is used for ordering qualitative elements.

The cognitive current places its emphasis on intellectual pursuits in criticism, linguistic analysis and ordered sequencing, while the affective domain places its emphasis on aesthetic experience, aesthetic attitude and the acquisition of sensuous knowledge from the "naive observers" viewpoint.[84]

The affective current draws its ontology from existentialism and its method from phenomenology. It sees the child as an autonomous individual capable of expressing and translating his environment through active free choice. Stress is placed on objects which are of interest to him. Furthermore, because man lives marginally, concerning himself with economic and pragmatic concerns, he does not experience the objects around him to their full aesthetic potential. Aesthetic education, therefore, should make him realize and actualize this potential.

This affective current is further characterized by its stress on process, not product. It leans towards formalism, stressing the individual's responses to aesthetic objects that he criticizes and makes.

The cognitive current draws its ontology from logical-positivism and its methodology from Wittgenstein and Monroe Beardsley. It sees the child more as a machine; a passive interpreter and learner of methods of criticism who applies them to well known and historically sanctioned art works. It assumes that there are definite rules and methods that may be learned and a body of knowledge, as defined by the professionals in the field, which can be structured and sequenced.

This logical-positivist current is further characterized by its stress on product; product as either the language of art criticism or the written product. It is highly formalist; both Beardsley and Wittgenstein argue for the intentionalist and affective fallacies.[85] However, Smith is more a contextualist. Social milieux, artist's intentions, historical evidence are considered helpful but not of primary importance in art criticism.

2.8 The Cognitive/Affective Continuum: Horizontal Axis

Chart 1 presents visually a summary of sections 2.3 to 2.6. The affective domain and the cognitive domain represent a horizontal continuum, and Kaelin and Smith are place at opposite ends. Smith's axiological position presents a qualitative change from the "creativity" position and is placed at the cognitive end. Kaelin presents a radical individualism, hence he is placed on the affective end. The line underneath represents criticism which moves from formalism (Kaelin's existentialism) towards contextualism (Dewey) and then back to formalism (Smith).

Kaelin, Stumbo, Thompson represent the phenomenological-existentialist position. Lanier, Newman, Efland are exemplars of the "affective domain" which draws on Dewey's aesthetics for a

CHART 1

A Categorization of Axiological Positions in Aesthetic Education


Towards Structuralism
Middle Position
Towards Formalism
Kaelin
Stumbo
Thompson
Bradley
TRANSITION
Lanier
Efland
Newman
Ecker
TRANSITION
Villemain
Bingham
Eisner
Davis
Arnstine
Kern
Dimondstein
Munson
Marantz
Barkan
Broudy
Smith
Towards Affective Orientation
Towards Cognitive Orientation

foundation. These are ranked according to the degree to which they have an affective or cognitive element.

Bradley is representative of a phenomenological "middle position." Arnstine, Ecker, Eisner, Davis, Villemain are representative of middle positions which also draw their ontology from Dewey. Positions to the left of Ecker lean towards the affective domain; positions to the right lean towards the cognitive domain. In this respect Ecker and Villemain are the middle eclectic positions.

Kern, Marantz represent positions which are representative of the cognitive domain. Both have translated Dewey as a role function. Dimondstein adheres to a semiotic theory; Munson, a neo-Hegelian position; Broudy and Barkan have translated Dewey into behavioralist terms; while Smith uses Beardsley and Sibley as his foundation.

In order to make a distinction between formalism presented by the "cognitive grouping" and the formalism presented by the "affective grouping" the term "structuralism" will be assigned to the latter group.

The meaning of structuralism here follows its phenomenological description given by Piaget.[86] It is characterized by three criteria: wholeness, self-regulation and transformation. Wholeness means that the elements of the structure are subordinated to laws; self-regulation refers to the autonomy, self-maintenance and closure of a structure; and transformation refers to a temporal process subject to transformational laws internal to the work. In short, structuralsim is a "system closed under transformation."[87] The inclusion of transformation, as part of the definition of structuralism distinguishes the latter from a strict formalism, which treats structure as a static form.

The Horizontal Axis, however, tells only part of the story. Though these several positions have now been catalogued, the criteria which govern their epistemological and ontological characters have not yet been discussed. This, then, becomes the business of the following chapter.

Footnotes - Chapter Two

[1] Donald Arnstine, "Art, Experience, and Evaluation: A Philosophic Inquiry," Encyclopedia of Education, Vol. 1 (New York: MacMillan Co., and the Free Press, 1971). Arnstine points out that programs in art education can be remarkably different depending on what theories form the foundation of the art program.

> "Just as programs in art education differ widely, so do families of aesthetic theories. It can be seen that each school art program finds justification and guidance in a particular type of aesthetic theory; each theory, in turn, tends to emphasize a different aspect of art." (p. 320)

[2] The positivist tradition or what Habermas (1972) calls "empirical-analytical" methodology is characterized by a methodology which prejudges the meaning of statements and establishes rules for constructing nomothetic theories and for critical testing. It seeks to predict behavior and control knowledge. See J. Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971), p. 320ff. A skeletal analysis of the behavioralist tradition is given by C. Wieder. Wieder characterizes this approach as 'hard', which refers to each one of the following.

Child/Learner
- discounting of individual learner differences
- focus on similarities among individuals
- compartmentalization of learner types

Instruction
- essential or fundamentalist
- depth and specialization
- student made to accommodate the curriculum
- convergent sequencing of units of instruction
- teacher as authority figure
- anxious environment
- uniformity of methods and materials

Curriculum
- systematic consideration of subject matter
- departmentalization of learning
- norm-referenced, comparative evaluation

Educational Effects: The Student Learns
- rule following ("discipline")
- reliance on authority
- disvalue of alternatives and differences
- the information
- the modes of doing the subject
- self denial and repression
- "hands off" attitude toward the environment

See, Charles Wieder, "Alternative Approaches to Problems in Art Education," Studies in Art Education 17(1), 1975, p. 22.

[3] The experientialist position is synonymous with phenomenology in most journal articles in Studies in Art Education. In turn, phenomenology becomes synonymous with "descriptive" research and the aesthetics of John Dewey. It is for this reason that art educators have termed this position too obscure for research. The most definitive statement of the particular phenomenological view used was given by Stumbo, who adhered to the phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty. See H. Stumbo, "Changes in Meaning Following Phenomenological Analysis," Studies in Art Education 12(1) (Fall 1970):50-60. Participant observation as a research methodology first appeared in Studies in Art Education in 1972. See Pohland's article, "Research: Participant Observation," Studies in Art Education 13(3) (Spring 1972):4-15. While case studies were introduced in the same journal in 1976 by J. Morris. See his article, "An Alternative Methodology for Researching Art Attitudes and Values," Studies in Art Education 17(1), 1975, pp. 25-32. Participant observation and case study research methodologies have been classified as ideographic and categorized as "soft" by C. Wieder. "Soft" refers to,

Child/Learner
- appreciation of and respect for individual student
- focus on the unique and the particular
- wholistic conception of child

Instruction
- child centered
- breadth of exploratory experiences
- learning activities grow out of student (or teacher) needs and interests
- lack of explanations of expectations and methods
- anxious environment

Curriculum
- non-sequential
- non-developmental
- non-evaluational

- Educational Effect
  - self-reliance and self-protection
  - self-expression or exhortation of personal meanings
  - divergent thinking
  - skills of social interaction and manipulation

See, C. Wieder, "Alternative Approach to Problems in Art Education," Studies in Art Education 17(1), 1975, p. 22.

[4] The first issue was chiefly concerned with the nature of research, with Hausman, Kaufman, Biettel, Logan and Lanier all agreeing that art research should be more scientific. Lanier expressed their views.

> "It is necessary for us to base our progress on verified factual information, rather than on individual, subjective judgments."

Vincent Lanier, "Implications of the Concept of Action Research," Studies in Art Education 1(1), 1959, pp. 38-49. However, Feldman in the same issue had other inclinations. He argued that aesthetics and art education had two different research interests. Art education was interested in aesthetic response in the context of teaching, while aesthetic research was interested in adding knowledge about "art." He further speculated that eventually the field of aesthetics would become a part of art education. Edmund Feldman, "Research as the Verification of Aesthetics," Studies in Art Education 1(1), 1962, pp. 19-25.

[5] With the Fall, 1960 issue, Ken Beittel became its co-editor. Beittel's policy, which he made explicit in another editorial, (Kenneth Beittel, "Editorial," Studies in Art Education 2(2), 1961, pp. 3-6.) was a concern for good positivistic studies. As a consequence, Studies in Art Education ran fourteen major articles out of twenty-two (66 percent) which dealt with creativity based on empirical research adopting the behavioralist methodology. McFee continued to raise the research issue.

> "At this moment, mankind appears to be seriously evaluating his raison d'etre. Values, attitudes and practices are being questioned on every-hand. Art is one of man's most important means of self-reflection, evaluation and communication."

June McFee, "Research in Art Education," Studies in Art Education 2(1), 1960, p. 19.

[6] Hayman d'Arcy, "Art: An Integrating and Intensifying Life Force," Studies in Art Education 1(2), 1959, pp. 18-21. d'Arcy makes mention of aesthetic theories of Dewey, Croce, Collingwood and Gotshalk but made no attempt to bridge their concepts with art education. L. Frank, "The Role of the Arts in Education," Studies in Art Education 1(2), 1959, pp. 26-34. Frank, on the other hand, raised a question which could pass as a form of aesthetic education.

> "...should art education orient the student to major intellectual and scientific developments? Should art guide him to see how all the arts under exploration, experimentation ...?"

Frank's answer to this question was a program where art was a communication of new ideas through visual means. This was the task of aesthetic experience. Although Frank pays attention to the phenomenon of "aesthetic experience," he uses it as an analogy for "psychological vitamins," which are taken by the students so that the program functions properly. His true art program called for teaching cognitive concepts and in his case these concepts would be similar to scientific ones. Frank's program, therefore, falls under the rubric of behavioralism and creativity.

[7] David Ecker, "Teaching Machines and Aesthetic Values," Studies in Art Education 3(2), 1962, pp. 8-15. Ecker concludes that teaching machines can teach a given style and a given content but qualifies this statement by questioning whether this should be the desired end for art education. Ecker's stress is on the acquisition of skill and production rather than appreciation.

[8] C. Wieder, "Alternative Approaches to Problems in Art Education," Studies in Art Education 17(1), 1975, pp. 17-24. Wieder tries to characterize a position which incorporated the "tough" line of research (behavioralism) and the "soft" line of research (ideography) into a synthesis. He calls this the "tough" line of research and it is presented below.

Child/Learner
- respect for individual student
- concern for diagnosis, conceptualization and accommodation of individual learner differences
- appreciation of both universal and unique cognitive and affective characteristics

Instruction
- depth, breadth and emergent instruction
- synchronization of student interests, capabilities and aptitudes, and the content of and approach to the subject matter

- student's option to abstain from activities
- two way teacher-learner respect
- diversity of instructional means

Curriculum
- systematic exploration of both subject matter and student learning variables
- flexibility of design to accommodate both varying teaching strategies and a range of learning styles

Educational Effect
- self-awareness, assertiveness, responsibility and self-evaluation
- respect for individual differences and diversity of thinking styles
- convergent and divergent inquiry skills
- critical thinking. (p. 22)

[9] Basil Bernstein, "On the Classification and Framing of Educational Knowledge," Knowledge and Control, ed. F. D. Young (New York: Collier-MacMillan, 1971).

[10] A. Efland, "The Transition Continued: The Emergence of an Affective Revolution," Studies in Art Education 13(1) (Fall 1971) :13-25.

[11] See for example, Elliot Eisner, "Do Behavioral Objectives and Accountability Have a Place?" Art Education 26(5), 1973, and Elliot Eisner, "Educational Objectives, Help or Hindrance," Art Education 15(6), 1974, and Elliot Eisner, "Toward a New Era in Art Education," Studies in Art Education 6(2) (Spring 1965):54-62. Although others have made clear distinctions as to the mechanistic ontology of positivistic research, Eisner is the most notable opponent of its view in Studies in Art Education.

[12] In their editorials, both Eisner and Ecker critique each other's position. See, Elliot Eisner, "On the Impossibility of Theory in Art Education: An Editorial," Studies in Art Education 5(1), 1963, pp. 4-9, and David Ecker, "Editorial: On the Possibility of Theory in Art Education," Studies in Art Education 6(2) (Spring 1965):1-6.

[13] The Fall 1962 issue of Studies in Art Education shifted its emphasis from creativity to art appreciation. Lansing's editorial raised the question whether the S-R model for art research was valid. Also, criteria for being an "expert judge" were questioned. Feldman raised the social question whether a critical audience is needed for appreciation. There was a more contextualist notion introduced with

Feldman's stress on Zeitgeist and the social content of art. Smith made a plea for the place of art historical knowledge in the art program. Both Miles and Frost studied aesthetic decisions, basing their study on the assumption that group responses and individuals will not change their judgments of particular values over time. Finally, in the same issue, Jeanne Orr outlined the first "aesthetic" curriculum in Studies in Art Education. Jeanne Orr, "An Experimental Program in the Visual Arts," Studies in Art Education 4(1), 1962, pp. 56-70.

[14] The Spring 1963 issue ran three articles questioning whether art education was a discipline. Manuel Barkan, usually assumed to be the founder of "Aesthetic Education" presents a conservative viewpoint, while Kaufman takes issue with the misleading interpretation of John Dewey's, Art as Experience.

> "The only tangible proof of art, its realization in some concrete form, has been downgraded. The thousand-and-one techniques practiced in the classroom, from paper-mache globe making to enameling tie pins, from finger painting to tempera painting, from crayon resist to pot making, all have a similar significance of creative experience. Though there is talk of critical awareness, discrimination, meaningful expressiveness, evaluation, judgment and aesthetic criteria, there is little evidence of their working in the overall picture." (my emphasis)

Irving Kaufman, "Art Education a Discipline?" Studies in Art Education 4(2), 1962, p. 22. The discouragement voiced by Kaufman is also voiced by Smith, "The Liberal Tradition in Art Education," Studies in Art Education, 4(2), 1962, pp. 35-44. Leaning towards cognitive processes, Smith calls aesthetic experience unhistorical and observes a need for a more intellectual foundation in art education. This intellectual side should come from a historical perspective.

[15] Elliot Eisner, "On the Impossibility of Theory in Art Education: An Editorial," Studies in Art Education 5(1), 1963, pp. 4-9.

[16] Vincent Lanier, "Schismogenesis in Contemporary Education," Studies in Art Education 5(1), 1963, pp. 10-19. This article is most often quoted as introducing the axiological position of aesthetic education.

[17] Ibid., p. 15.

[18] David Ecker, "Some Inadequate Doctrines in Art Education and a Proposed Resolution," Studies in Art Education 5(1), 1963, pp. 71-81. Ecker's pragmatic approach to aesthetic education suggests that the artist's thoughts do not follow a strictly logical and instrumental means-end sequence and are instead directed by a pervasive "quality."

[19] Ibid., p. 76.

[20] David Templeton, "The Learner's Search: Beginnings of Structure in Art," Studies in Art Education 12(3) (Spring 1971) :23-30. Search areas include subjects, themes, ideas, art forms, styles and cultural idioms.

[21] Defining attributes are those conditions which society imposes, while criterial attributes are those a child assigns to his environment. Attributes in the Piagetian sense is a term for qualities associated with objects which are defined not only by the physical configuration of matter but also by the social uses of matter. Such social uses are subject to change depending on the employment of the object. This development adds a further dimension which McFee's P-D theory does not delineate, Efland's analysis of learning "sets," which change depending on the stimulii attended, overlooks the social attributes that objects have. See, Arthur Efland, "Perception - Delineation Theory Modification," Studies in Art Education 8(2) (Spring 1967):66-86.

22. D. Korzenik, "Creativity: Producing Solutions to a Problem," Studies in Art Education 17(2), 1976, pp. 29-35.

[23] Manuel Barkan is generally credited as the founding father of "Aesthetic Education" in the logical-positivist tradition. He based his aesthetic education on the artist, historian, and critic model, following J. Bruner's thesis. Studies in Art Education recognized his contribution after his death, by devoting an issue in his memory. See, 13(1) (Fall 1971). It is for this reason that Ecker is presented as the exemplar of the cognitive point of view. The author acknowledges the fact that Barkan's A Foundation For Art Education (1957) and Guidelines (1970) have contributed in establishing aesthetic education.

[24] The affective domain is characteristic of the phenomenological-existentialist viewpoint where the 'inner' or subjective psychological view is sought. The cognitive domain is characteristic of the logical-positivist viewpoint where the stress is on intellectual, logical and deductive logic.

[25] Jerome Hausman, "Contemporary Art and Art Education," Studies in Art Education 5(1), 1963, pp. 82-91. Hausman writes,

> "I would give balanced emphasis to the craft of art, rather than sole emphasis upon the expressionistic and spontaneous tendencies now in vogue. Students, at whatever level they are working, should gain some sense for the great tradition of man's craving and incising in stone; his chasing, hammering and engraving in mental; ..." (p. 90)

[26] Eugene Kaelin, "Aesthetics and the Teaching of Art," Studies in Art Education, 5(2), 1963, pp. 42-56.

[27] Ibid., p. 43.

[28] Eugene Kaelin, "The Existentialist Ground for Aesthetic Education," Studies in Art Education 8(1) (Autumn 1966):3-12. For a clearer analysis of his positon refer to, "Are 'Behavioral Objectives Consistent with Social Goals of Aesthetic Education?'" Art Education 22(8) (November 1969):4-11, and "Aesthetic Education: A Role for Aesthetics Proper," Journal of Aesthetic Education 2 (July 1968):22-39. His major work is An Existentialist Aesthetic (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1962). Also see his article, "Isness and Oughtness," Art Education 21 (January 1968) :6-10.

[29] Eugene Kaelin, "The Existential Ground for Aesthetic Education," Studies in Art Education 8(1) (Autumn 1966):6. Kaelin thinks that middle class teachers should be able to teach lower class value groups, and notes,

> "If the correlation of aesthetic values and socio-economic strata is to be any worth in the instruction of art and its appreciation, one should be led to expect the same kind of correlation between "high culture" and "upper classes."

[30] Ibid., p. 11. By communicating with the student about his own universe as an appreciator, the teacher-critic can offer clear alternatives to the student's means and manner of expressing himself.

[31] Ibid., p. 9. Kaelin's formalism is evident when he concerns himself with the intentionalist and affective fallacies:

> "We need not commit the intentional fallacy here. We need not assume that the art work of the student 'means' what the student wanted to express. If we are to communicate with him at all, we must start our criticisms with what he has actually expressed, with the quality of his ordering of qualities."

[32] Hugh Stumbo, "Three Bases for Research and Teaching," Studies in Art Education 9(2) (Winter 1968):21-30. In this early article Stumbo offers a "projective approach" where the objective and subjective distinction is blurred through the recognition that no experience is a pure either/or situation. His major development may be found in, H. Stumbo, "Changes in Meaning Following Phenomenological Analysis," Studies in Art Education 12(1) (Fall 1970):50-60.

[33] Stumbo's program is a three phase teaching procedure: (1) an expansion of subjective feelings and emotions, (2) expansion of objective knowledge, (3) expansion of aesthetic experience (reflective analysis). Phase 2 emphasis is on scientific inquiry in the classroom where hypothesis testing is used; while phase 3 is akin to Sartre's existentialist psychoanalysis (examination of products of choice).

[34] Stuart Thompson, "Complexity in Perception: An Explanation in Phenomenological Terms by Psychology, With Some Parallels in Aesthetic Philosophy," Studies in Art Education 14(2) (Winter 1973) :3-14. John Dewey's aesthetics have been called experientialism rather than phenomenology.

> "In studying complexity in perception, then, somethings spiritually akin to 'experimentalism' will be implied when speaking of an explanation in 'phenomenological' terms."(p. 3.)

[35] Mikel Dufrenne's work, Phénoménologie de L'Expérience Esthétique, (1953), translated into English by Edward Casey (1973) represents a landmark in phenomenology. Dufrenne translated the French existentialist movement into the phenomenology of aesthetic experience. Mikel Dufrenne, Phenomenology of Aesthetic Experience, trans. E. Casey, (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973).

[36] Subjectivism, as used here, is a theory of knowledge which places all truth on the individual. If each person is so unique in every way, as the existentialists state, then the individual makes his own values, and his own truth.

[37] Arthur Newman, "Aesthetic Perception and Human Understanding," Studies in Art Education 14(1) (Fall 1972):3-7.

[38] The concern for a non-prejudicial and less "high brow" approach to the language of art is advocated by Jack Hobbs, "The Problem of Language and Values in Aesthetic Education," Studies in Art Education 15(1) (Fall 1973):5-9.

[39] Vincent Lanier, "Talking About Art: An Experimental Course in High School Art Appreciation," Studies in Art Education 9(3) (Spring 1968):32-44. Lanier's program consists of "screens" which influence the student's perception of the work of art. These "screens" make his appreciation course more contextualist because they introduce social attitude; cultural view of the art work; relationship to life and historical identification into the concept of criticism. Formalist methods like the recognition of formal qualities in the art work are also included.

[40] Arthur D. Efland, "Transition: Affective Revolution," Studies in Art Education 13(1) (Fall 1971):13-25.

[41] Arthur D. Efland, "Theory and Research in Art Education," Studies in Art Education 6(1) (Autumn 1964):8-13.

[42] Aesthetic theories as related to these programs will be discussed in the next section, hence little explanation is made here about this assertion.

[43] Jerome Bruner, Process of Education (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1961). Bruner's influence in the 1960's need not be explicated here; however, it was his influence which helped to formulate Barkan's aesthetic education curriculum based on the role of the artist, historian and critic models.

[44] In L. Chapman, "A Second Look at a Foundation for Art Education," Studies in Art Education 13(1) (Fall 1971):40-49, she traces the development of Barkan's conception of artist, critic and historian as offering foundational roles for aesthetic education. In a Foundation for Art Education (1955) Barkan advocated a policy of experimentation by groups of teachers to solve curriculum problems, however, in the "Seminar on Reserach and Curriculum Development" (1965), he felt that "packaged" formats like those of science and mathematics would bring about change. In this respect Barkan leaned towards a positivist type of philosophy, assuming that art education had a structure translatable through learning packages.

[45] Arthur D. Efland, "The Transition Continued: The Emergence of an Affective Revolution," Studies in Art Education 13(1) (Fall 1971):13-25. Efland makes two criticisms of Guidelines:

1. Based on the assumption that aesthetic experiences are intrinsically good, Guidelines' directions for the ordering of artistic encounters are highly cognitive. Students are asked to appraise, analyze, argue, and discover and characterize material given to them in an ordered presentation.

2. The focus is placed on the art object and not on what is felt and undergone by the learner.

[46] Harry Broudy has not been published in Studies in Art Education. However, Kern has contrasted his program with that of Broudy's, in Evan Kern, "Proper Function of Art Education in the 1970's," Studies in Art Education 12(1) (Fall 1970):4-10.

[47] Broudy's value position with regard to aesthetic education is clearly exemplified in an address given to the Conference on the Foundations of Education, Lehigh University, March 28, 1974. It is reprinted in: "Arts Education as Artistic Perception," in Curricular Considerations for Visual Arts Education: Rationale Development and Evaluation, ed. G. Hardiman and T. Zernich (Champaign, Illinois: Stipes Publishing Co.,), pp. 14-22.

[48] Evan Kern, "Proper Function of Art Education in the 1970's," Studies in Art Education 12(1) (Fall 1970):4-10.

[49] Kenneth Marantz, "Indecent Exposure," Studies in Art Education 6(1) (Autumn 1964):20-24. Marantz was one of the earlier writers advocating an aesthetic program based on Bruner's epistemology. Marantz stressed the appreciative side of aesthetic education, basing his curriculum on the model of the critic.

[50] Geraldine Dimondstein, "A Proposed Conceptual Framework in the Arts," Studies in Art Education 10(2) (Winter 1969):6-11.

[51] Any art form may be defined by the following four areas.

1. Definition and description of the art form, using Langer's and Read's aesthetics

2. Distinguishing characteristics of the art form listed

3. Experiential approach, that is, body sensations need to be registered

4. Art elements involved in the particular art form listed

[52] Ralph Smith, "Images of Art Education," Studies in Art Education 7(1) (Autumn 1965):56-61. Smith advocates teacher training in the language of criticism;

> "...classroom discourse moves from statements about the make-up and clarification of the meaning of terms in a variety of critical statements, [where] the image of the pupil is that of a critical thinker, or even philosopher And to teach the pupil to analyze works critically, or to philosophize about them, requires some knowledge of logic, aesthetics and art history. (p.55.)

[53] Ralph Smith, "Aesthetic Criticism: The Method of Aesthetic Education," Studies in Art Education 9(3) (Spring 1968):12-31. Description involves naming, identifying and classifying non-aesthetic features while interpretation involved meaning and evaluation for an assessment.

[54] Sibley's criticism as a paradigm case for criticism includes seven tacit dimensions and explications: (1) pointing out non-aesthetic features, (2) pointing out aesthetic features, (3) making use of metaphors and similies, (4) making use of comparisons and contrasts, (5) making use of repetition and reiteration, (6) making use of expressive gestures, (7) making use of analogies between aesthetic and non-aesthetic features.

[55] R. Smith, "Cultural Services, the Aesthetic Welfare and Educational Research," Studies in Art Education 16(2), 1975, pp. 5-14. Smith draws on Beardsley's aesthetics often, but it is in the above articles that this relationship is strongest and most visible.

[56] Ralph Smith, "Psychology and Aesthetic Education," Studies in Art Education 11(3) (Spring 1970):20-30.

> "The refinement in the capacity to make and support aesthetic judgments of various sorts is especially important, of course, during the third phase of cognitive development, the symbolic, which appears at about the 7th grade or with the onset of adolescence." (p. 25.)

[57] Ralph Smith, "The Structure of Art-Historical Knowledge and Art Education," Studies in Art Education 4(1), 1962, pp. 23-33.

[58] Richard Munson, "The Gustav Britsch Theory of Visual Arts," Studies in Art Education 12(2) (Winter 1971):4-17. Bustav Britsch's theory is also explicated in, Wayne Anderson, "A Neglected Theory of Art History," Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism (Summer 1962). Hereafter, this will be designated as JAAC.

[59] Britsch's theory of art history may be classified as neo-Hegelian. His art historical stages are very similar to Hegel's unfolding Spirit. In Britsch's case, Spirit has been substituted for "meant" perceptions, which he calls "visual artisting understanding."

[60] Ibid., p. 9.

> "The final rendering becomes the creative product of the artist, who is uniquely an individual, the product of a culture, and heir to an historical epoch and style of which is the visual phenomenon current to that era by means of which unity is derived."

[61] The development of the child is also neo-Hegelian in context. The child goes through the same stages as art does in Hegelian Symbolic Age. A similar triad is used: unconscious symbolism, conscious symbolism and meant or definite symbolism.

[62] These criteria include: color, direction of object, direction of movement, direction in object, spatial extention, depth movement, interrelating figures and ground, change in size, extension in size, etc.

[63] Francis Villemain, "Toward A Conception of Aesthetic Education," Studies in Art Education, 8(1) (Autumn 1966):23-32 and "Democracy, Education and Art," Educational Theory 14(1) (January 1964):1-14.

[64] Ibid., p. 28.

> "The aesthetic or qualitative incompetences of teachers of cognitive subject matters is no doubt a major block to their students' advance in these studies. Similarly, a teacher of painting is inexcusably incompetent in cognitive subject matters if she fosters violations of canons of cognitive adequacy

> when cognitive matters are brought to bear upon the practice of painting.

[65] Ibid., p. 30.

[66] M. Bingham, "Art Education, The Learning Process and the Search for Structure," Studies in Art Education 9(2) (Winter 1968) :5-12.

[67] Donald Davis, "Human Behavior: Its Implications for Curriculum Development," Studies in Art Education 12(3) (Spring 1971):4-12.

[68] Ibid., p. 10.

> "The problem of identifying observable human behavior is, indeed a criteria on which permeates the whole curriculum development process with implications for the statement of objectives, the development of plans for implementing those objectives, and assessment of the achievement of those objectives."

[69] William Bradley, "A Proposal of Marriage: The Concept of Encounterability in Art," Studies in Art Education 12(3) (Spring 1971):13-22.

[70] "Encounterability" is Bradley's term for skill acquisition, vocabulary development and conceptual knowledge about art in history and culture.

[71] Donald Arnstine, "Needed Research and the Role of Definitions in Art Education," Studies in Art Education 7(1) (Autumn 1965):2-17.

[72] Arnstine uses the criterion of distance in the same way Bullough does when discussing psychical distance. The viewer should not be too involved in the aesthetic object otherwise he loses all objectivity. Likewise, the viewer should not be too disinterested, otherwise he does not attend to the aesthetic qualities in the work. See, "Psychical Distance as a Factor in Art and Esthetic Principles," British Journal of Psychology 5, 1913, pp. 87-118.

[73] See D. Arnstine, "The Aesthetics as a Context for General Education," Studies in Art Education 8(1) (Autumn 1966):15. Arnstine's summary statement is,

> "The appearance of aesthetic quality in experience then depends on the posture taken by the perceiver and on the perceived features of what is before him."

[74] Ibid., pp. 13-22.

[75] Elliot Eisner, "Stanford's Kettering Project," Studies in Art Education 9(3) (Spring 1968):45-56.

[76] Elliot Eisner, "Paradigm for Analysis of Visual Problem Solving," Studies in Art Education 3(1), 1961, pp. 47-54.

[77] Elliot Eisner, "Typology," Studies in Art Education 4(1), 1962, pp. 11-22.

[78] Elliot Eisner, "Examining Some Myths in Art Education," Studies in Art Education 15(3), 1973-1974, pp. 7-16.

[79] Elliot Eisner, "Media and the Arts," Studies in Art Education 13(1) (Fall 1971):4-12.

[80] David Ecker, "Playing the Aesthetic Education Curriculum Game," Studies in Art Education 13(1) (Fall 1971):26-39.

[81] At least one art educator has criticized Ecker's view. See, A. Efland, "The Transition Continued: The Emergence of an Affective Revolution," Studies in Art Education 13(1) (Fall 1971):13-25. Efland argues that Ecker's qualitative problem solving lacks any contribution to the aesthetic experience because it is still largely one of cognitive development through specific behavior.

[82] S. Dobbs, "Art Education Communication Problem: Need for a Theory of Description," Studies in Art Education 12(2) (Winter 1971) :28-33.

[83] For a clear and stark realization of the differences in language between the "affective domain" and the "cognitive domain" the reader is referred to: Maynard Gunter, "Langer's Aesthetic View of Non-Verbal Arts: Its Meaning for Art Education," Studies in Art Education 12(2) (Winter 1971):34-41. Basically, Langer makes an

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analysis between four different variables in each "language" and shows how they affect the student in class. The four variables considered were: vocab/syntax vs. particular; and fixed equivalences vs. relational. She concludes that art has a unique semantic mode for expressing meaning which is in direct opposition to the discursive mode of language. This leads to student problems in art.

[84] Curt Ducasse, Art, the Critics and You (New York: The Library of Liberal Arts: Bobbs-Merrill Co. Inc., 1955), pp. 15-38. See Ducasse's chapter "Artist, Amateur and Critic" where he discusses the possibility of a naive observer experiencing the same qualities as a trained professional.

[85] Smith is an adherent to the theories of Wittgenstein, Beardsley and Aldrich, which all represent a linguistic approach to aesthetics. George Dickie does an excellent job of illustrating all three theories. The intentional and affective fallacies may be found in chapter four of his book. G. Dickie, Aesthetics, an Introduction (Pegasus: Bobbs-Merrill Co. Inc., 1971), pp. 56-60 and 95-108.

[86] Jean Piaget, Structuralism, trans. Chaninah Mascher (New York: Harper & Row Pub., 1970), pp. 3-17.

[87] Ibid., p. 8.

CHAPTER THREE

Content Analysis

3.1 Statement of Intent

The horizontal axis on which various art educators have been placed now needs to be complemented by a vertical axis. Its form is determined in part by referring to those aesthetic positions which have been adopted by many of the art educators cited in the previous chapter, to create working models for art criticism and aesthetic education. For art educators do not in the main develop aesthetic theory: rather they apply it to particular groups of clients.[1]

The questions to which the present writer will address himself in this chapter deal with aestheticians and aesthetic theory, and with the degree to which particular aesthetic theories have found popular support among art educators. The following questions will therefore be paramount:

1. Which aesthetic theories underlie the foundations for particular aesthetic educational programs characteristic of affective, middle and cognitive positions?

2. What is the nature of the theory of criticism implicit in each position?

3. Which aesthetic stance is appealed to in establishing each position?

4. Which is the most predominant aesthetic position?

The positions of Barkan, Davis, Munson have been omitted either because their positions are too vague to deduce all of the above information or because their positions do not explicitly state an aesthetic stance. Kaelin, Stumbo, Thompson, Lanier, Efland, Bradley, Arnstine, Eisner, Ecker, Villemain, Kern, Marantz, Dimondstein, Broudy, and Smith will be subject to analysis. Where necessary, articles outside Studies in Art Education will be cited.

A further content analysis of all the articles, on a numerical basis, will be used to determine which aesthetician(s) are most often mentioned and which aesthetician(s) are mentioned least.[2] All articles in Studies in Art Education which specifically deal with "aesthetic education" will be scrutinized for this purpose.

3.2. Method

Content analysis[3] of various articles in Studies in Art Education will be used to detect references to a number of aesthetic positions. Articles outside this journal will be consulted only if evidence cannot be found therein to determine the type of criticism, validity or aesthetic theory implicitly or explicitly mentioned in the work of any one of the above art educators.

A. Coding of Statements

To identify aesthetic theory and criticism, statements will be coded according to the following criteria:

1. Statements in the article which refer to explanations about the phenomena of art, art appreciation and the creation of art

2. Statements in the article which refer to the value of art, art appreciation or creation of art

3. Statements which refer to standards for criticizing works of art

4. Statements in the article which advocate certain teaching strategies along aesthetic lines

5. Statements which mention a specific aesthetician whom the author uses as an exemplar of his program

To determine validity, statements will be coded according to the following criteria:

1. Statements which refer to aesthetic qualities, to be analyzed for implicit or explicit meaning as to how these qualities are determined

2. Statements which specifically state that aesthetic qualities are inherent in the artworks, or in the subject's mind, or in both

All the articles in Studies in Art Education will be scanned for mention of particular aestheticians. A numerical tally will be presented to show which aesthetician(s) enjoy the greatest recognition and which the least.

3.3 Expansion of Categories

The following section will list major categories of aesthetic theories and criticism, together with a list of the criteria for determining the character of these. A typology of positions is presented below which subsumes these categorizations.

A. Typology of Aesthetic Theories

Modern theories of aesthetics have been identified in Weitz,[4] Berleant,[5] Dickie,[6] Rader[7] and Tillman.[8] They include Formalism, Emotionalism, Intuitionalism, Organicism, Voluntarism, Expressionism. For the purpose of this analysis, whenever possible, specific aestheticians will be identified as the "foundational father" of a particular aesthetic teaching program.

The above theories may be grouped into three divisions: expressive theories, semiotic or communication theories and formalist theories. The author acknowledges that art is an "open" concept and hence not all aesthetic teaching programs will be classified as belonging in any one of the three compartments.

Formalist theory considers representation, emotion, ideas and other life values irrelevant to aesthetic perception. It admits to "mediumistic" values (color, lines, combinations of planes and surfaces, etc.) as important. Formal properties alone are relevant and hence, organic unity and rules for evaluating the elements are given. Well known exemplars of this view are Clive Bell,[9] Fry,[10] Parker[11] (Voluntarist Theory), Beardsley,[12] Sibley[13] and Aldrich.[14]

A number of theories agree that form is important for enjoying an artwork but form alone is not enough. "Art as an expression of human feeling" is the common slogan. The Expressionistic Theory of art concerns itself with what the artist experiences and undergoes when he creates a work of art. The artist is stimulated by an emotional excitement whose nature and source is not known until he can find a way to express it, which involves bringing it into being.

Expressionist theories are translated as outer behavior which manifests or reflects inner states. Works of art become expressions of human qualities and in this sense, the work of art can embody "feeling qualities."

Expressionist theories are also known as intuitionalist theories (emotion and form being their defining property). Some writers cite emotion, others ideas, and others cite images as that which is being expressed. Croce,[15] Collingwood,[16] Dewey[17] are the exemplars of this view.

Semiotic or signification theories (also known as communication theories) define art as a symbol of human feeling rather than an expression of it. Works of art are iconic signs of psychological processes taking place in human beings: specifically, signs of human feelings. Langer,[18] Cassirer,[19] and Panofsky[20] are exemplars of this view.

B. Typology of Criticism

The second distinction to be made is the "tendency" towards contextualist criticism and formalist criticism.[21] Both deal with the problem of which aspects of the work of art must be attended to in order to appreciate it. In both cases, the work of art is the centre of focus and is being experienced aesthetically rather than historically, economically or socially.

The formalist view holds that the work can be appreciated through repeated viewing and concentrated attention without the intervention of history, artistic biography or anything else. If such elements are introduced, the work is considered deficient and incomplete. Strict formalism concentrates on the synchronic view of the art object.

Formalist criticism, called New Criticism,[22] or metacriticism, is conceived as a philosophical activity which analyses and clarifies the basic concepts used by critics. In a narrow sense, New Criticism has also been called Contextualism[23] but should not be confused with the definition of contextualism to be presented here.

Structuralism[24] will also be viewed under the formalist "net"; however, it is recognized that structuralism presents an "open system" at the surface or synchronic level, while maintaining a closed system at the diachronic or deep level. Where the distinction is apparent, the term structuralism will be applied.

Contextualism, in contrast, views the work in a total context or setting. As much outside knowledge as possible is condoned, making the total experience of the work richer. A Contextualist position handles the following variables; artistic intentions, style, other works by the artist, study of the age, artist's life, study of artistic intention, history, etc. In short, contextualism is more tolerant of sociological and historical perspectives in criticism.

3.4 Validity in Aesthetics: Axiological Positions

The question as to what is reliable knowledge in the arts presents itself within three broad domains. Aesthetic qualities as perceived in artworks may be entirely in the viewer's mind; aesthetic qualities as perceived in artworks may be inherent in them; finally, there may exist combinations of both. The first view is known as Subjectivism; the second, Objectivism; and the last may be subgrouped into Relativism, Sociological Relativism and Socio-historicism.

A. Subjectivism

The Subjectivist Theory[25] places the aesthetic qualities, felt emotions, given expression, symbols, etc., in the learner's mind. Subjectivism attempts to define expressions in terms of the attitude of subject, or persons. It maintains that aesthetics cannot be a science, since aesthetic values are strictly a matter of individual experiences and are impossible to verify. Aesthetic experience is a subjective measuring stick, with hedonism and emotionalism acting as its ends and its theoretical justification.

Kant's premise that the human mind is endowed with certain categories to experience art are a manifestation of and justification for Subjectivism. "Disinterestedness" is Kant's term for a state which treats aesthetic experience as the emotion of an "aesthetic moment," a universal state measurable by an ideal observer.

There are many different versions of Subjectivist Theory.[26] Some maintain that objects possess a non-natural and non-empirical value property referred to as "beauty," or "aesthetic value," or "aesthetic goodness." In order to identify this property a person must intuit beauty by making subtle discriminations between colors, composition, etc. Beauty is in the eye of the beholder.

A modern exemplar of Subjectivism is C. L. Stevenson.[27] His position differs from intuition and attitude theories and is known as Emotivism, for he claims that reasons which cite some features of a work of art as evidence that a particular evalution is true are claimed as not capable of being true or false. There is no straightforward way of giving reasons, because giving reasons is neither inductive nor deductive.

B. Objectivism

The Objectivist position posits aesthetic qualities in the aesthetic object. Beardsley's Instrumentalism is one exemplar of this view; Dufrenne,[28] for another, posits qualities that pertain to some special reality whose a priori laws may be discovered through intuition.

Part of the Objectivist position is that these empirical qualities are not considered subject to historical and social variation. They provide the sole basis for artistic value. Aesthetic experience is evoked by these objective aesthetic qualities and they also provide the reasoned and logical basis of aesthetic judgment.

Another version of the Objectivist Theory is given by Sibley.[29] Claiming that aesthetic qualities are not condition-governed, Sibley maintains that a summary of what the critic does supplies us with the "proper" framework for criticism.

Virgin Aldrich[30] presents yet another variety of the Objectivist Theory. Aldrich claims that there is an aesthetic mode of perception and a non-aesthetic mode. The aesthetic mode of perception is known as "prehension." Aesthetic qualities are "prehended" in the aesthetic object. Other varieties of this position are given by Greene,[31] Stolnitz,[32] and Joad.[33]

C. Relativism

Relativism conceives values as being an interaction between the object and the experiencing subject. William James[34] formulated the general law of perception.

> "Whilst part of what we perceive comes through
> our senses from the object before us, another
> part always comes out of our head."

The relativist critic further understands that because cultural conditions change and because there exist various kinds of equally intelligent and experienced observers, expert aesthetic evaluations inevitably and justifiably differ. In this respect their position overlaps Stevenson's.[35]

The relativistic position maintains that artistic knowledge is gained through interpretation of visual configurations and relies upon mediation by an interpreter to clarify the meaning. John Dewey's Art as Experience[36] is a prime example of Relativism. Here meaning results from the viewer's experience of an art object. "Personal experience"[37] is determined by referencing knowledge against the object. Different individuals ascribe various meanings to the same art object because each individual has different "habits of mind." Artistic knowledge can be justified by a process of defining terms and supporting them by referring to the work. Validity is determined by agreement in choosing the most strongly supported argument from among the competing alternatives. However, if two alternatives seem equally supportable, both may be accepted.

Gestalt Theory provides a specific basis for relativist adequacy. Rudolf Arnheim[38] examines the pattern creating properties of the human subject as they mesh with some pattern forming characteristic of the perceived phenomenon, operating on the premise that the human organism is connected with the form of the world outside it through isomorphic relationships. A process of selectivity commensurate with what the individual can handle accounts for a progressive synthesis of the most diverse material.[39]

The phenomenological method represents an advance over this position because it effectively acknowledges the influence of past experiences, whereas gestalt psychology does not.[40] It, too, is an attempt to bridge the objective and subjective theories by providing a method to get at the "subjective" view each individual brings to the work of art.

In general, one can say of relativistic criticism that its chief aim is consensus. The function of criticism, according to John Dewey is "the re-education of perception of works of art,"[41] which implies a dialogue geared to persuading others of the "rightness" of a particular critical stance.

Phenomenology, as methodology, is used effectively within relativist theories and existentialist positions since its central assumption is that it is meaning of experiences which structure an individual's reality, not the ontological structure of objects. Experiences may vary from individual to individual because of different backgrounds, different viewpoints, hence different world-views. To deal objectively with the subject's "inner subjectivity" is what Husserl called, "bracketing"[42] and Schutz called "scientific attitude" or becoming a "disinterested observer" in a social context.[43]

The Sociological Relativist position maintains that different social groups will decide on aesthetic matters differently. It is essentially an ethnocentric orientation. If a large percentage of people agree on certain aesthetic values, sociological relativism maintains that there are other social groups on different strata which will surely disagree. In different periods and different times different traits of objects will be deemed as aesthetically valuable. Furthermore, sociological relativism assumes that collective tastes, rather than individual tastes are worth exploring.

Instrumentalism on a group level sees the function of art changing between a particular social group in a given situation and a given class of objects. The sociological view also takes in the possibility that non-aesthetic factors such as moral, political, economic and religious institutions may determine what is aesthetically "good."

Wietz, in his critique of Hamlet in Hamlet and the Philosophy of Literary Criticism (1964) is a modern exemplar of this view. Wietz attempts to show how critics of Shakespeare in various periods have applied "reasons" for their judgments which were paradigmatic for the periods.

3.5 Findings of the Content Analysis

Content analysis took two forms. In the first case, eighteen positions held by art educators mentioned in Chapter 2 were analyzed to determine the extent to which they were indebted to a particular theory or aesthetician, to ascertain the type of critical attack which each preferred, and to find whence each derived his notions of what constituted aesthetic validity.

The results of this analysis are presented below, under the heading Content Analysis #1, with quotations from original sources included as Appendix A and summarized in Table 1. It must be emphasized that this analysis shows predominance of one particular criticism, aesthetic and validity.

The second case involved a tally to determine which aestheticians were cited most often in articles dealing with aesthetic education. The results of this tally are presented under the heading Content Analysis #2, and appears in numerical form as Appendix B and is summarized in Table 2.

A. Content Analysis #1

1. Kaelin, Stumbo, Thompson and Bradley maintain a phenomenological methodology. All four positions tend towards a structuralist orientation,[44] though they operate from different premises. For example, Stumbo's program is an adaptation of Sartre's existentialist psychoanalysis while Bradley posits a cybernetic model of "intrinsic feedback" meshed in a behavioralist model of "encounterability."

2. Kaelin and Stumbo draw their ontology from Sartre and Heidegger and adapt Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology. Thompson employs Platt and Heckhausen as his exemplars of the phenomenological viewpoint; however, he accepts the aesthetics of Virgil Aldrich. Both Bradley and Thompson are in transitionary positions between the phenomenological-existentialism and contextualism.

TABLE 1

Summary of Content Analysis for Eighteen Positions

Art Educator	Affiliate Aesthetician	Type of Criticism	Authority For Validity
Kaelin	Merleau-Ponty/ Sartre/Heidegger	Formalism (Structuralism)	Relativism
Stumbo	Merleau-Ponty/ Sartre	Formalism (Structuralism)	Relativism
Thompson	Aldrich	Formalism	Relativism
Bradley	Kaelin/Stumbo	Formalism (Structuralism)	Relativism
Lanier	Dewey	Contextualism	Sociological Relativist
Efland	Dewey	Contextualism	Sociological Relativist
Ecker	Dewey	Formalism/ Contextualism	Relativism
Newman	Dewey/Langer	Formalism/ Contextualism	Objectivism
Villemain	Dewey	Formalism/ Contextualism	Objectivism
Eisner	Langer/Dewey	Formalism/ Contextualism (New Criticism)	Objectivism
Arnstine	Dewey (Emotivism)	Formalism	Objectivism
Kern	Dewey	Formalism	Objectivism
Dimondstein	Langer	Formalism	Objectivism
Marantz	Dewey	Formalism	Objectivism
Broudy	Beardsley/ Sibley	Formalism	Objectivism
Smith	Beardsley/ Sibley	Formalism	Objectivism

TABLE 2

Frequency of Citation of Aestheticians as Reported in 57 Articles in Studies in Art Education

Aesthetician	Total	Percentage
Dewey	25	44
Langer	7	12
Weitz	6	11
Read	5	9
Beardsley	5	9
Pepper	4	7
Sibley	3	5
Ortega y Gasset	3	5
Croce	3	5
Sartre	3	5
Heidegger	2	4
Merleau-Ponty	2	4
Munro	2	4
Gombrich	2	4
Hauser	2	4
Collingwood	2	4
Bell	2	4
Wittgenstein, Abell, Aldrich, Kant, Santayana, Maritain, Kierkegaard, Bergson, Northrop, Panofsky, Ackerman, Stevenson, Britsch, Fry, Malraux, Pierce	1	2

3. Furthermore, Kaelin, Stumbo, Thompson, and Bradley maintain an "openness" concept;[45] that is, the possibility of making appreciations and criticisms from a "disinterested" or detached point of view.

4. Lanier, Efland, and Newman translate Dewey's aesthetics into a contextualist criticism. Their approach is "attitudinal," condoning aesthetic posture or aesthetic attitude as a method of criticism. In this respect their position is subjective. Class distinctions, differences in generations, culture, etc., give different reasons for attending to different aesthetic objects and different aesthetic qualities. Given the correct "aesthetic posture," all things may be experienced aesthetically. In this respect these programs lean towards Sociological Relativism.

5. Newman's emphasis is on "intuition" while Efland, following Lanier's lead, posits aesthetic qualities as being sociologically relative. In Newman's case, aesthetic qualities are intuited in a non-prejudicial way.

6. Ecker, Villemain and Eisner, occupy transitional positions. They attempt to bridge the gap between formalistic and contextualist criticism. This is done by making a distinction between a studio or artist's point of view and a spectator's point of view.

7. Ecker and Villemain translate Dewey's aesthetics as a problem solving approach. This studio point of view leans towards a formalist orientation, wherein aesthetic qualities are manipulated by the artist to achieve unity. A pervasive quality guides the artist towards an end.

8) Contextualism is introduced through the acknowledgement that previous experiences had by the artist, are used to order and solve perceptual tasks.

9) From the spectator's viewpoint, Eisner assumes formalism when examining non-objective works. An objective validity is claimed. However, when viewing representational works, "contextualism" (as defined by the New Criticism) is accepted. Physiognomic perception is employed for non-objective works while iconographic study is employed for representational works, a reflection of Eisner's acceptance of the communication theory of Langer.

10) Kern, Marantz, Arnstine translate John Dewey's aesthetics directly as "art is experience." Art as an emotional experience and art as aesthetic experience are objectively valid, and logical reasons may be given for judgments made.

11) Kern and Arnstine further maintain that connoisseur and expert judges can give logical reasons for their choice of aesthetic qualities. Their criticism is generally highly formalist, though Arnstine occupies a more contextualist position than the others.

12) Dimondstein presents a translation of Langer's theory. Her criticism is highly formalistic, assuming that art may be defined through the objective qualities inherent in a particular art form.

13) Following these same lines, Broudy and Smith represent the last position. They adhere to an aesthetic philosophy whose general technique is the analysis of reasons. Smith and Broudy

both agree that there are connoiseurs and experts who are able to point out aesthetic qualities and give inductive or deductive reasons for their choices. Both Smith and Broudy adhere to historical references but these are considered only after initial experiences with the art work. Intentions of the artist are not important. Sibley and Beardsley are their exemplars.

B. Content Analysis #2

Content analysis of fifty-seven articles yielded the following quantitative results:

1. Approximately half the articles analyzed were found to base their positions on the aesthetics of John Dewey (twenty-five out of fifty-seven).

2. Langer's communication theory (seven out of fifty seven: 12 percent) and Weitz's "open perspective" (six out of fifty-seven: 10 percent) were mentioned next.

3. Read's social perspective received 8 percent of mentions.

4) Beardsley and Sibley's aesthetics and Pepper's theories received 7 percent of the support.

5. Croce, Ortega y Gasset, Munro, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, Heidegger, etc., present other positions which received marginal support, each receiving approximately 1 percent each.

3.6 Conclusions to Questions

1. What aesthetic theory provided the foundation for particular aesthetic programs in the affective, middle and cognitive positions?

(a) The aesthetic side of Sartre's and Heidegger's philosophical existentialism is used for positions near the "affective side" of the continuum.

(b) John Dewey's aesthetics are prevalent for all positions through the middle as well as to the left and right of the middle ground position. Langer is also mentioned by Eisner and Dimondstein. The aesthetics of Beardsley and Sibley are supported by Smith. Virgil Aldrich's aesthetic theory utilized by Thompson marks a transition between "affective" and "middle ground theories."

(c) The cognitive positions are supported by the metacriticism of Beardsley and Sibley.

2. What is the nature of the theory of criticism revealed in these qualities?

(a) A formalistic approach (structuralism) is used for affective positions but then a contextualist position is condoned by groupings which tend towards the middle. It is at these middle positions that there is a mixture of formalism (during arting process) and contextualism (when the work is appreciated).

(b) Criticism becomes more formalist as aesthetic positions become more cognitively orientated. Extreme ends of the cognitive domain and existential domain are formalistic.

3. What is the nature of the validity claimed by art educators as they appear on the Affective/Cognitive continuum?

(a) Affective positions have a phenomenological methodology based upon radical individualism.

(b) Middle ground positions are more sociologically oriented. Artistic knowledge is dependent on class, culture and generation. As positions become more cognitive in their orientation, validity becomes relative.

4. Which is the most prominent position?

John Dewey's position is considered to be the most dominant position cited in Studies in Art Education. Approximately half the articles use his aesthetics for their validation.

3.7 Further Criteria: Vertical Axis

From the content of this chapter, it is now possible to develop a number of broad criteria which will be presented as the vertical axis in Chart 2. Acknowledgement of each criterion by an aesthetic educator is marked by an "X" on the chart, and with the addition of the horizontal axis described in Chart 1, Chart 2 may be said to present a fairly accurate picture of the interrelationships which exist amongst the programs described in the previous chapters.

Readings of the major articles in Studies in Art Education provided five recurring criteria: (1) the notion of a Gestalt, (2) the notion of symbolic transformation, (3) a sociological dimension, (4) a transcendental dimension (pour-soi), (5) historical transformation.

CHART 2

A Characterization of Axiological Positions in Aesthetic Education

	Kaelin	Stumbo	Thompson	Bradley	Lanier	Efland	Newman	Ecker	Villemain	Eisner	Arnstine	Kern	Marantz	Dimondstein	Broudy	Smith
Historical Transformation																X
Gestalt	X	X	X	X			X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Transcendental Dimension	X	X														
Sociological Dimension	X			X	X	X		X	X	X	X				X	
Symbolic Transformation	X	X		X			X	X		X	X					

Symbolic transformation is an acknowledgement that the artwork is a representation of some aspect of the artist's environment or a symbol of a feeling. It is an "open concept" which acknowledges that art forms change.

The sociological dimension is the acknowledgement of the possibility that forms are influenced by the cultural institutions of a society.

The transcendental or existential notion acknowledges the possibility that the artistic endeavour goes beyond the confines of the limiting situation. Through the reflective process, human consciousness shapes its environment.

Gestalt is the notion that a configuration is perceived by an intellect while attending to a work.

Finally, the historical dimension is the recognition that symbolic forms, as rooted in a particular culture have their own solutions to the aesthetic dimension. This dimension recognizes that economic and political factors underlie aesthetic decisions.

3.8 The Problem Defined

Completion of a chart which includes as its horizontal axis the positions of various art educators along an Affective/Cognitive continuum, in combination with a vertical axis outlining the criteria used to indicate the sources from which these art educators draw their material, reveals what was hinted at in the sections headed Initial Recognition of the Problem. An important dimension, it seems, has been ignored by art educators to date. That dimension is concerned with historical and sociological factors, and specifically with systematic analysis of socio-historial phenomena. Its presence seems to have been ignored or glossed even by those aestheticians whose influence upon the current crop of art educators has been profound.

The intent of Chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7 is to examine the work of four important figures in the world of aesthetics whose works underlie contemporary aesthetic education and, in Chapter 8, to critique these four positions, with a view to showing the direction which their thinking has taken, and the extent to which they have dealt with or failed to deal with the socio-historical dimensions.

The material included in Chapters 4, 5, 6, and 7 transcends that which has an immediate bearing upon the problem. Only by discussing the totality of a particular philosophy can one establish a proper perspective for critiquing that position.

Footnotes - Chapter Three

[1] A number of articles in Studies in Art Education have reviewed aesthetic theories and theories of art criticism. See, Nancy MacGregor, "Concepts of Criticism: Implications for Art Education," Studies in Art Education 11(2) (Winter 1970):27-33. MacGregor presents three contending concepts of criticism, those of Frank Sibley, C. Stevenson and Morris Weitz. MacGregor does not commit herself to which position is most acceptable, but proceeds to outline criticism under each theory. Frank Sibley presents an instrumentalist view of criticism, highly linguistic and formalistic in intent. Stevenson presents a more relative view, in which positions are examined from more than one context. There is the realization that each individual has a certain amount of "cultural baggage." Weitz also advocates a linguistic base wherein the stress is on description, explanation, evaluation and poetics. See also Duke Madenfort's "The Aesthetic as Immediately Sensuous: An Historical Prospective," Studies in Art Education 16(1), 1974-1975, pp. 5-17. Madenfort examines the ideas of Kant, Kierkegaard, Bergson, Dewey and Langer, claiming that these five aestheticians are representative of the history of theory which treats aesthetics as knowledge of the immediately sensuous.

[2] Clark has done a similar analysis of art textbooks. See, S. A. H. Clark, "Modern Theoretical Foundations of Appreciation and Creation in Art Education Textbooks 1960-1970," Studies in Art Education 16(3), 1975, pp. 12-21.

[3] Ole Holsti, Content Analysis for the Social Sciences and Humanities (Don Mills: Addison-Wesley Pub. Co. Inc., 1969), pp. 94-119.

[4] M. Weitz, "The Role of Theory in Aesthetics," in Aesthetic Inquiry: Essay on Art Criticism and Philosophy of Art, ed. Beardsley and Schuller (Belmont, California: Dickenson Pub. Co. Inc., 1967), pp. 3-11.

[5] A. Berleant, The Aesthetic Field (Springfield, Illinois: Charles C. Thomas Publisher, 1970), pp. 19-39. See his Chapter II, "Surrogate Theories of Art" which contains Berleant's analysis of aesthetic theories.

[6] G. Dickie, Aesthetics, An Introduction (New York: Bobbs-Merrill Co. Inc., 1971), pp. 78ff.

[7] M. Rader, A Modern Book of Esthetics, 3rd ed. (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1968).

[8] F. Tillman and Steven Cahn, Philosophy of Art and Aesthetics (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1969), pp. 513ff.

[9] Clive Bell, Art (New York: Capricorn Books, 1958).

[10] Roger Fry, Vision and Design (New York: New American Library, 1974; originally published 1920).

[11] DeWitt Parker, The Principles of Aesthetics, 2nd ed. (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1920). Parker's aesthetics are formalistic. He states that art can be divided into three parts: imaginative, linguistic and design. Good art shows alot of imagination. (Parker notes the comments of Freud who stated that human desires lead to imagination which must be satisfied by dreams.) Imagination and satisfaction were equal in Parker's views. All art contained imaginative satisfaction. Parker forms a syntax of painting, which describes the way the form and design is composed and organized: (1) principle of organic unity (organicism of Weitz), (2) theme of variation (one element is dominat), (3) balance, (4) evolution and hierarchy (not all elements are of equal weight). Four more things may be seen in a work of art: Musical Value, Natural Value, Spiritual Value and Formal Value. Dewitt argues that #1 and #4 are form; #2 and #3 are content. Parker insists that without #4 a good work is not possible, and that what is not important is #3. This places Parker in a formalist framework.

[12] M. Beardsley, Aesthetics (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1958).

[13] Frank Sibley, "Aesthetic and Non-Aesthetic." The Philosophical Review 74, 1965, pp. 135-159 and "Aesthetic Concepts," in Philosophy Looks at the Arts, ed. Margolis (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1962), pp. 63-88.

[14] Virgil Aldrich, Philosophy of Art (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1963).

[15] B. Croce, Aesthetics, trans. Douglas Ainslie, 2nd ed. (New York: MacMillan, 1922).

[16] R. G. Collingwood, The Principles of Art (New York: Oxford University Press, 1958).

[17] John Dewey, Art as Experience (New York: Minton, Balch, 1934).

[18] S. Langer, Philosophy in a New Key (New York: New American Library, 1948).

[19] E. Cassirer, The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, 9th ed., Vol. 3 (Forge Billage, Mass.: Murray Printing Co., 1973).

[20] E. Panofsky, Meaning in the Visual Arts (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co. Inc., 1955).

[21] Encyclopedia of Philosophy Vol. 1, 2nd ed. "Aesthetics" pp. 121-153.

[22] G. Dickie, Aesthetics (Pegasus: Bobbs-Merril Co. Inc., 1971), pp. 160-165.

[23] Walter Sutton, "Contextualist Theory and Criticism as a Social Act," JAAC 19 (Spring 1961):317-335 and "Contextualist Dilemma - or Fallacy?" JAAC 17, 1958, pp. 219-229. In these articles, Sutton argues that the "contextualism" of the New Critics, particularly I. A. Richards, has denied referential meaning to poetic and literary language. Contextualism in literature is characterized as (1) art having its own imagined world, (2) meanings and values contained in a work by its own language system, (3) the contextualist critic tending to deny that a work may make statements about the world or pre-existent reality, (4) the work being an organic form or symbol, (5) the past experiences of an observer not being deemed important, (6) work of art not analyzable, only understood or configurated as a "total structure." In short, there is a dichotomy between "historical" and "aesthetic" criticism. The rebuttal to Sutton's remarks may be found in Murray Krieger, "Contextualism Was Ambitious," JAAC 21 (Fall 1962);81-85, and Eliseo Vivas, "Contextualism Reconsidered," JAAC 18, 1959.

[24] Jack Burnham, The Structure of Art (New York: George Braziller Inc., 1971), pp. 43-57. Burnham uses primarily the structuralist theories of Claude Levi-Strauss and Roland Barthes to develop a structuralist art theory. Essentially, Burnham views art as a mythic structure which is reconstituted through a binary system of Natural and Cultural elements or signifiers and signifieds. Burnham accepts that art mirrors values and goals of a society. However, the art's (myth) underlying logic remains unchanged (p. 3). Art history is treated as a series of myth events or "significant break throughs" towards vague goals (p. 5). These underlying changes of these series are not developed. Burnham has an "open

system" concept at the surface level (cf. Chomsky), treating variations of modern art's "isms" in synchronic fashion. Diachronic elements, that is, art history, are treated as a series of synchronic events. "Art 'evolves' without really changing" (p. 27). Following Claude Levi-Straus's assumption that "unconscious mental processes remain fixed for all cultures, 'primitive' and literate alike" (p. 8), effective art analysis must presuppose that the "historical consistency of art is due to a highly sophisticated but hidden logical structure observed without exception by all successful artists ..." (p. 3). Artistic "deep structures" are the same. In this respect his diachronic system is closed. Deep structure is not treated axiologically, it is a given. See also, Richard F. Kuhns, Jr., "Art Structure," JAAC 19 (Fall 1961):89-97.

[25] Stefan Morawski, Inquiries Into the Fundamentals of Aesthetics (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1974), pp. 9-18.

[26] G. Dickie, Aesthetics (Pegasus: Bobbs-Merril Co. Inc., 1971), pp. 154-169), and D. Walsh, "Critical Reasons," Philosophical Review 69(3) (July 1969):386-393, and Arnold Isenberg, Aesthetics and the Theory of Criticism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1973), and J. O. Urmson, "What Makes a Situation Aesthetic?," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 31, 1957.

[27] C. Stevenson, "On the Reasons That Can Be Given for the Interpretation of a Poem," in Philosophy Looks at the Arts, ed. Margolis (New York: Scribner's Sons, 1962), pp. 119-138.

[28] Mikel Dufrenne, The Phenomenology of Aesthetic Experience, trans. E. Casey (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973).

[29] Frank Sibley, "Aesthetic Concepts," in Philosophy Looks at the Arts, ed. Margolis (New York: Scribner's Sons, 1962), pp. 63-88.

[30] V. Aldrich, Philosophy of Art (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1963).

[31] T.M. Greene, The Arts and the Art of Criticism (Princeton, 1940).

[32] Jerome Stolnitz, "On Objective Realism in Aesthetics," Journal of Philosophy 57, 1960.

[33] C. E. M. Joad, Matter, Life, and Value (London, 1929).

[34] W. James, The Principles of Psychology II (N.Y., 1950) p. 103.

[35] C. Stevenson, op. cit., p. 135.

[36] J. Dewey, Art as Experience (N.Y.: Minton, Balch, 1934).

[37] M. Polanyi, Personal Knowledge (N.Y.: Harper & Row, 1964).

[38] Rudolf Arnheim, Art and Visual Perception (Berkely: University of California Press, 1971).

[39] L. L. Whyte, "A Scientific View of the 'Creative Energy' of Man," in Aesthetics Today, ed. M. Philipson, (New York: The World Pub. Co., 1961), pp. 349-374.

[40] S. Morawski, op. cit., p. 15.

[41] John Dewey, Art as Experience, p. 324.

[42] E. Husserl, The Idea of Phenomenology, trans. W. P. Alston and G. Naknikian (The Hague, 1964). Husserl gives a series of lectures given in 1907 in which transcendental-phenomenological reduction is introduced.

[43] A. Schutz, "Common Sense and Scientific Interpretation of Human Actions", in Alfred Schutz Collected Papers I: The Problem of Social Reality, ed. M. Natanson (The Hague: Marintus Nijhoff, 1973).

[44] E. Kaelin, "Aesthetic Education: A Role for Aesthetics Proper," Journal of Aesthetic Education, 1, 1966, pp. 51-66.

> "This is not to claim that an actual aesthetic experience begins with an awareness of the surface and then proceeds to closure in an idea, nor that there is only one interpretation of the given work; but only that the system of postulates devised to interpret the meaning of aesthetic categories affords a method of critical procedure, according to which any image or idea which is not traceable to the organization of some sensuous surface is patently irrelevant." (p. 57)

[45] The concept of "openness" is discussed by Kaelin in Guidelines a CEMREL project edited by Barkan, Chapman, Kern.

> "On the part of the viewer openness to perceive counters freshly and without prejudice acts as an invitation into the aesthetic experience." (p. 49.)

Bradley mentions the same concept in, "Intrinsic Feedback and Its Effect Upon Aesthetic Growth," Studies in Art Education 10(2) (Winter 1969):41-49.

> "The checklist seems to require that one observe his own work from a detached point of view, and it presupposes that the artist will have the subjective capacity to retain his mental 'openness' while objectifying his position." (p. 42.)

Alfred Schutz uses the concept of "openness" to propose that a social scientist detach himself from his biographical situation within the everyday world and adopt a "scientific attitude" of disinterestedness. See, A. Schutz, "Common Sense and Scientific Interpretation of Human Action," in Alfred Schutz Collected Papers I: The Problem of Social Reality, ed. Natanson (The Hague: Martinus Nijoff, 1973), p. 62.

CHAPTER FOUR

Aesthetic Theory of Monroe Beardsley

4.1 Statement of Intent

Since the inception of his book, Aesthetics: Problems in the Philosophy of Criticism[1] in 1958, Beardsley, through his numerous articles and several books,[2] has maintained the metacritical theory of Instrumentalism. His concern has always been directed towards normative criticism[3] and its application towards the arts. This chapter's aim is to delineate these concerns as they are embodied in his writings.

4.2 The Aesthetic Object

To avoid the pitfalls of both the affective and intentionalist fallacies[4] Beardsley treats the aesthetic object as an entity.[5] With this stipulation, each presentation or performance of a script, score, or text is treated as a separate and self-sufficient aesthetic work.[6]

The aesthetic object is treated as a perceptual object. Its aesthetic qualities are distinguished from non-aesthetic or physical features such as color, material or the written word.[7] Aesthetic qualities are said to be *in* the aesthetic object and therefore, phenomenally objective. Affective adjectives may be used to describe them but this is not the same as describing the perceiver's reactions to them.[8] Critics who concentrate only on what is seen in the aesthetic object, Beardsley claims, are being objective.[9]

To avoid the confusion between what is veridical and what is illusionary in criticism, Beardsley adopts a number of postulates[10] which aid in describing the aesthetic object objectively. "If two presentations of the same aesthetic object have incompatible characteristics, at least one of them is illusionary."[11] Qualities must be distinguished as being internal to the work.[12] Knowledge of the creative process or knowledge of physical materials is not relevant information to the perceiver.[13]

Internal qualities, Beardsley maintains, are both local and regional, belonging to the larger, complex whole.[14] Qualities are said to be both summative and emergent. By emergent Beardsley means that such a regional quality may be discriminated. By summative qualities, Beardsley means that two or more elements are fused into a larger regional quality without losing their individuality. This regional quality may be treated as a whole or it may form part of a larger complex where its intensity is dependent on the way it relates and combines to adjacent regional qualities.[15]

For visual design, Beardsley lists qualities describing non-aesthetic elements like line, color and shape as having anthropomorphic characteristics (physiognomic qualities).[16] For example he treats a line as having movement. If it changes its direction frequently it is like an uneasy or unsettled mind, wavering between alternatives.

4.3 General Canons in Beardsley's Aesthetics

Beardsley accepts three broad canons or "general tendencies."[17] The Canon of Unity; the Canon of Complexity and the Canon of Intensity have dominated Beardsley's intellectual career and form the necessary kernel of his aesthetics.

The Canon of Unity, Beardsley maintains, is germane to all the arts. Completeness and coherence are its component qualities.[18] Completeness re-emphasizes a work's autonomy, while coherence is promoted by a dominant pattern or through compositional elements such as harmony, rhythm, balance and similarity.

The Complexity defines the number of parts within an aesthetic object. Although not a measurable ratio, the degree of complexity or simplicity affects the unity of an art work. This canon is consistent with a Theory of Fusion which Beardsley supports.[19] Coherence of fusion is dependent on the degree to which a design (form or structure) coheres with its subject.[20] In the case of non-representative works, complexity and unity of the non-aesthetic elements become important.

The Canon of Intensity refers to the magnitude of the aesthetic quality of the whole or to a particular regional quality. It plays its chief role in evaluation and will be referred to when Beardsley's Instrumental Theory is explained.

4.4 Beardsley's Formalism

Beardsley accepts a theory of "Divergence"[21] which claims to be formalist in nature,[22] modified by the elements of "fusion" and "intensity" which makes allowances for content.[23] A visual design is read correctly because it is accompanied with definite representations which experience tells us are congruent.[24] This principle can be applied to non-representational art, too, since art suggest representation without representing them. Symbols can also be interpreted formally because they are established by convention; by vital basis; or by natural association.[25] A study of iconology[26] would aid in establishing a congruent meaning.[27]

4.5 Classification of the Arts

Beardsley argues for a closed-system classification of the arts.[28] The Wittgensteinian notion of "family resemblances" and the "open-ended" definition of art is rejected. After the analysis of new art forms, Beardsley maintains that there are necessary conditions, although admittedly minimal, which define the various arts.[29] Music, for example, must have "movement" which is coherent and complete while painting relies on the juxtaposition of elements which is the contemporary name for unity. Although the arts cannot be compared by their similarities in structure and style, nor can a given period in history reveal their underlying connections, Beardsley does admit that physiognomic qualities do cut across the arts.[30]

4.6 Artistic Truth

In the strict sense of "knowledge" as inference,[31] Beardsley rejects art as the product of knowledge. It is mere acquaintance. In a limited sense, truth, as depicted in an aesthetic object, may be true or false depending on whether the characteristics of the subject have or have not been presented.[32] Art itself does not make a claim to truth. It simply offers a subject. However, the qualities presented by an aesthetic object may become the data for future knowledge.[33]

4.7 Beardsley on Creativity

Although Beardsley rejects the notion that understanding the process of creation can aid in judgments, he has given it its due attention.[34] Essentially Beardsley does not agree that there is a "normal creative pattern" which provides an element of control for the direction of an end product. This is the central thesis held by the Propulsion and Finalist Theorists.[35]

Each stage, as part of a means-end chain in the creative process, "suggests" a quality that is self-correcting. The artist is constantly redirecting his aims. There is no single guiding factor. Each process generates its own direction and movement.[36] The inception of an art work may be any sort of thing (i.e., idea, thesis, line); however, Beardsley maintains, the thing chosen does not necessarily dominate the entire work.

Hence, although there are no universal stages in a creation Beardsley does maintain that two broad phases do alternate throughout. These involve the interplay between the preconscious (inspiration) and the conscious (selection).[37] In this schema, the artist knows when the process is finished but does not know whether the work is finished.

4.8 Meaning of Aesthetic Objects

Maintaining an objective view of the aesthetic object, Beardsley states that all meaning of the work of art may be found by an analytical examination of local and regional qualities.[38]

This thesis, paradigmatically developed in the criticism of literature, is supported by Beardsley's adoption of Austin's development of "illocutionary and perlocutionary acts."[39] Connotations and suggestions found in local and regional areas are not psychological and personal in which case they might fit the requirements of a Subjective Theory. They are part of the meaning of these local and regional elements.

Interpretation, Beardsley maintains, is an illocutionary act. Hence, there are many rules and conditions which are tacitly recognized by the speech community.[40] Connotations and suggestions are illocutionary act-potentials, which can be discovered by applying "the principle of congruence". Interpretation must "fit" the found facts.[41]

4.9 The Logic of Evaluation and Interpretation

Beardsley divides all critical evaluations into three main groupings: cognitive, moral and aesthetic.[42] Of these, the aesthetic is sub-grouped into objective, affective and genetic reasons. Both genetic and affective reasons have already been rejected, leaving only objective reasons as acceptable. Objective reasons appear as either descriptive statements or interpretive statements and are either true or false.[43]

Objective reasons are rational deliberations and conclusions which can be supported in their claim to truth.[44] Given two interpretations of a work, one is true, the other is false, otherwise, Beardsley claims, the work is ambiguous and no interpretation may be established. Although he does not deny that a correct interpretation has been given,[45] Beardsley makes an important distinction between an interpretation and a superimposition.[46] The interpretation of a work as a particular symbol, myth, conflict or struggle is called superimposition since it is a way of using the aesthetic object to illustrate a pre-existent system of thought.

Objective reasons are further sub-grouped as judgments of unity, complexity and intensity,[47] to which his General Canons apply. Reasons given about a work's unity, complexity or intensity is a judgment of "aesthetic goodness."[48] The critic gives an estimate, in a non-qualitative sense, of "the greatest amount of artistic goodness that the [aesthetic object] allows of actualizing in any one encounter."[49]

The estimate of the capacity of the aesthetic "goodness" is a rough judgment which is subject to correction by future experiences but yet it is based on reasons.[50]

4.10 The Instrumentalist Theory

Beardsley attempts to treat "a good aesthetic object" along the same lines as a "good wrench." Introducing the concept of a function-class[51] as a capacity of an object to do or serve in some way that other objects cannot, he assigns the aesthetic object the capacity of eliciting an "aesthetic experience."[52] An aesthetic experience is characterized by "unity, complexity and intensity." Hence, Beardsley expands his Canons to cover the subjective response.

The magnitude of an aesthetic experience, that is its intensity, provides the possibility of comparing two experiences.[53] The greater the capacity to elicit aesthetic experience, the better the work of art is. This is its measure of "aesthetic goodness." Furthermore, it is also the functional definition of good and because this definition defines "aesthetic value" in terms of its consequences, Beardsley's aesthetic is called an Instrumentalist Theory.[54]

Decisions on whether one aesthetic object is better than another can be rationally justified. However, Beardsley admits to an area of "Rational Undecidability" where it cannot be decided which object has a greater aesthetic capacity. Choice is not guided by reason in these cases.[55]

4.11 Aesthetic Experience

Since his reintroduction of aesthetic experience in his magnum opus, Beardsley has had to defend its underlying assumption.[56] The assumption of this theory of "goodness" or aesthetic worth is that an aesthetic experience is worth having.[57] The greater the work's unity, complexity and intensity, the greater the "good." These Canons refer to characteristics of aesthetic objects that enable them to evoke aesthetic experiences. The occurrence of such experiences is under their control.[58]

Beardsley claims a cathartic role for aesthetic experience.[59] Moral and didactic judgments are considered side effects of aesthetic experience whereas reliving tensions, resolving conflicts, refining perception and discrimination, developing imagination, aiding in mental health, fostering sympathy and understanding and offering ideas for human life, are regarded as its ends.[60]

Such claims have generated severe criticism[61] and Beardsley has consistently defended these challenges by modifying the sorts of action aesthetic experience could elicit. Beardsley has lowered his expectations. Aesthetic experience is now characterized as aesthetic pleasure or aesthetic satisfaction and aesthetic enjoyment.[62]

Most recently Beardsley has considered its effect as "gratification." He has accepted the view that the adoption of an "aesthetic attitude" (which he had previously rejected)[63] could increase the possibility of aesthetic experience.[64]

Footnotes - Chapter Four

[1] M. Beardsley, Aesthetics: Problems in the Philosophy of Criticism (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World Inc., 1958). Hereafter designated as A.

[2] Notably, The Possibility of Criticism (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1970). Hereafter designated as PC.

[3] Beardsley, A, p. 9. Normative statements in Beardsley's aesthetics refer to critical evaluation, description and interpretation.

[4] Beardsley is often associated with his expose of the affective and intentionalist fallacies. For what is considered a landmark article, see, W. K. Wimsatt, Jr., and Monroe C. Beardsley, "The Intentional Fallacy", Sewanne Review 54, 1946, pp. 468-488. A recent treatment of this problem may be found in PC, "The Authority of the Text," pp. 16-37 as well as in A, pp. 26-29.

[5] Beardsley, PC, pp. 10-36.

[6] Beardsley, A, p. 57. Each presentation reveals a characteristic of a performance. A distinction is needed between criticism of a particular work by a particular artist at a particular time and criticism which is directed to all that is common to all productions of an aesthetic work.

[7] Beardsley, A, pp. 29-33.

[8] Beardsley, A, p. 49. One can be cheerful towards a work. Cheerful is a quality but it is subject to the person. If this quality was "read" into the work, then the affective fallacy is committed and one would be acting like an impressionistic critic.

[9] Beardsley, A, p. 42.

[10] Beardsley, A, p. 46.

[11] Beardsley, A, p. 48. This is Beardsley's all-encompassing postulate and has been questioned by Bruce Morton, "Beardsley's

Conception of the Aesthetic Object," JAAC 32, 1974, pp. 385-396. Morton argues that in musical compositions Beardsley's final postulate does not hold. Two different aesthetic objects may be perceived by examining a score.

[12] See Beardsley's, "The Concept of Economy in Art," JAAC 14(3) (March 1956):370-375. Beardsley presents the thesis that the critical term "economy" as applied to the arts is external to the work. It is either subsumed under the criterion of unity or it commits the affective fallacy.

[13] See, Bruce Morton, "Beardsley's Conception of the Aesthetic Object," JAAC 32, 1974, p. 390. A counter argument is offered in the realm of music. Morton states that a certain knowledge of music is essential for its criticism

> "He cannot say that to the average listener the music has a quality which would be perceived as F-majorness, since, to the average listener, there is no such phenomenal quality. That is, the 'quality' which would be perceived as F-majorness' is not the same quality as F-majorness, hence the above translation is not successful."

[14] Beardsley, A, p. 83.

[15] How this applies specifically to painting may be found in Beardsley, "The Categories of Painting Criticism," in Aesthetics and Criticism in Art Education, Appendix III, ed. R. Smith (Chicago: Rand McNally & Co., 1966), pp. 489-490.

[16] Beardsley, A, p. 94 and p. 328.

[17] A clear presentation of his General Canons may be found in "Reasons in Aesthetic Judgment," in Introductory Readings in Aesthetics, ed. John Hospers (New York: The Free Press, 1969), pp. 245-253 and in A, pp. 472ff.

[18] Beardsley, A, pp. 190-193, and "The Classification of Critical Reasons," Journal of Aesthetic Education 2(3) (July 1968) :55-64.

[19] Beardsley, A, pp. 342-343.

[20] Beardsley, A, p. 299, and "The Aesthetic Problem of Justification," Journal of Aesthetic Education 1(2) (Autumn 1966) :29-40.

[21] Beardsley, A, pp. 296-297.

[22] Beardsley, A, p. 338.

[23] Beardsley, A, p. 299. Simply put, the allowance of content is connected directly to the form or design of the work. Content and form must be judged coherent. Content also aids in determining the "goodness" of the aesthetic object.

[24] Beardsley, A, p. 284.

[25] Beardsley, A, p. 290. By vital basis, Beardsley means that a symbol or object has taken on ritualistic sanctity while natural association comprises the idea that a natural symbol suggests a facet of man's behavior (i.e., sun suggests life).

[26] Beardsley, A, p. 292.

[27] Beardsley, A, p. 142.

[28] See Beardsley, "On Art and the Definition of Arts: A Symposium: The Definition of the Arts," JAAC 20 (Winter 1961) :175-187 and "Semiotic Aesthetics and Aesthetic Education," Journal of Aesthetic Education 9(3) (July 1975):5-26.

[29] Ibid., p. 180.

[30] Beardsley, A, pp. 201-202.

[31] Beardsley, A, p. 383. Until the data are combined and connected by reasoning they do not constitute knowledge. Furthermore intuition as immediate feeling of truth does not exist.

[32] Beardsley, A, p. 375.

[33] Beardsley, A, p. 430. Beardsley entertains the idea that the literature may suggest a hypothesis for cognitive empirical testing but it cannot be verified.

[34] Beardsley, "On the Creation of Art," JAAC 23 (Spring 1965):291-304.

[35] The Propulsive Theory, as maintained by Collingwood, claims that the controlling agent is something which exists prior to the creative process and presides over it throughout. The Finalist Theory, as maintained by Ecker, claims that the controlling agent is the final goal which is dominated by a pervasive quality. The Propulsive Theory is rejected on the grounds that an artist cannot compare the emotion prior to the artwork and its end. Ecker's problem solving theory is rejected because there is no problem. A pervasive quality does not become established from the beginning but is suggested through successive stages.

[36] Ibid., p. 297.

> "For the crucial controlling power at every point is the particular stage or condition of the unfinished work itself, the possibilities it presents, and the developments it permits. There are three things to discuss here, and I will say something about each—the incept, the development, and the completion of the work."

[37] Ibid., p. 302.

[38] Beardsley, A, pp. 132-144.

[39] Beardsley, PC, pp. 34-61. Perlocutionary act of informing is directly done through language. Illocutionary act consists of this and all the connotations and suggestions the act entails.

[40] Beardsley, PC, p. 50.

[41] Beardsley, PC, p. 144.

[42] Beardsley, A, pp. 456-457.

[43] Beardsley, A, p. 402.

[44] Beardsley, PC, p. 39.

[45] Beardsley, PC, p. 44.

[46] Beardsley, PC pp. 43-44.

[47] Beardsley, A, p. 405.

[48] Beardsley, A, p. 471.

[49] Beardsley, PC, pp. 74-75.

[50] Beardsley, PC, pp. 76-77.

> "Let us call a reason why something is the case an explanation, and a reason for believing that something, a justification."

[51] Beardsley, A, p. 525.

[52] Beardsley, A, p. 527.

[53] Beardsley, A, p. 530.

[54] Beardsley, A, p. 531 and p. 541. There is no such thing as intrinsic value in this theory. Nothing can be discovered to be good in itself. Everything is a means to something else in a chain of means-ends relationships.

[55] Beardsley, A, p. 536. The existence of this area of Rational Undecidability occurs because critics lay stress to different Canons. Furthermore, Beardsley is not admitting to Relativism. Between two aesthetic objects both may produce equal aesthetic capacity, yet one is preferred or desired above the other, even in the absence of a judgment that one is better or more desirable than the other.

[56] Reintroduced from John Dewey et al.

[57] Beardsley, A, p. 533.

[58] Beardsley, A, pp. 534-535.

[59] Beardsley, A, p. 559.

[60] Beardsley, A, pp. 574-575.

[61] See, George Dickie, "Beardsley's Phantom Aesthetic Experience," Journal of Philosophy 62, 1965, pp. 129-136. Dickie argues that there is no such thing as unity of aesthetic experience.

Coherence and completeness are attributed to the aesthetic object. Such effects as tension, balance and impulse in aesthetic experience do not exist. These effects are nothing more than feelings of expectation and satisfaction. Dickie concludes that the notion of aesthetic experience is an idealistic holdover from Hegel as interpreted through John Dewey and should simply mean "unity" of a work. Beardsley presents a counter-critique in "Aesthetic Experience Regained," JAAC 28 (Fall 1969):3-11 Beardsley's claim is that aesthetic experience is ultimately tied into the features of the aesthetic experience. He quotes Maslow's experiments as showing that "peak performances" do exist.

[62] Beardsley, "The Discrimination of Aesthetic Enjoyment," British Journal of Aesthetics 3(4) (October 1963):291-300. Wherein Beardsley characterizes aesthetic enjoyment as:

> "...the kind of enjoyment we obtain from the apprehension of a qualitively diverse segment of the phenomenal field, in so far as the discriminate parts are unified into something of a whole that has a character (that is, regional qualities) of its own." (p. 296.)

[63] Beardsley, A, pp. 62-63.

[64] Beardsley, "The Aesthetic Point of View," Metaphilosophy 1(1) (January 1970):39-58.

> "Gratification is aesthetic when it is obtained primarily from attention to the formal unity and/or the regional qualities of a complex whole, and when its magnitude is a function of the degree of formal unity and/or the intensity of regional quality." (p. 40.)

Also see in the same issue, H. W. Janson, "Comments on Beardsley's "The Aesthetic Point of View'," pp. 63-65. Janson argues that Beardsley, by accepting the aesthetic attitude, makes everything a work of art. Furthermore, it is human values which become the issue, not aesthetic values. Beardsley's reply may be found in the same issue, "Reply to Professor Janson," pp. 66-67.

CHAPTER FIVE

Aesthetics of Suzanne Langer

5.1 Statement of Intent

Throughout her intellectual career Suzanne Langer has attempted to introduce a theory of "mind" which is distinctly human, claiming that both empiricism[1] and the biogenic model of man[2] are reductive concepts of man. She is also responsible for a semiotic theory of aesthetics which claims to be distinctly human. It is the explication of that theory which is our aim here.[3] Material drawn from the British Journal of Aesthetics and the American journal, Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism,[4] will aid in this exposition.

5.2 Langer's Semiotic Theory

The primary need for symbolization,[5] Langer maintains, is unequivocally human. "Mind," which acts as a transformer, can express objects in absentia; as well as change the character of experiences for immediate use. Art, ritual, laughter, weeping, superstition, scientific genius are examples of symbolic transformations.[6] A very small amount of human behavior is based on a "utilitarian model of symbolism"; a great deal of it seems non-functional.[7]

Langer's terminology requires some initial explanation. She makes a distinction between signals and symbols. Signals denote action,[8] whereas symbols, in contrast, are vehicles for concepts and thought.[9] "Meaning" of signals involves a one-to-one correspondence between the object and its sign. This relationship (signification) is interpreted by perceiving the object.[10] "Meaning" of symbols is infinitely more complex. The symbol is perceived as a presentation of a concept. Its form is grasped as an abstraction. Its particulars are filled in by the imagination.[11]

5.3 Art as Non-Discursive Symbolism

Language represents the most faithful and indispensible picture of human experience through the use of discursive symbols.[12] The logical positivists, like Wittgenstein et al.,[13] who have investigated the limits of language, maintained that expressiveness which could not be "projected" in discursive form, was not accessible to the human mind. It was not knowledge. It remained unknowable and incommunicable.[14]

It is on the note that Langer parts company with the positivists. In Philosophy in a New Key, she begins to develop her theory that a genuine semantic, which covers the subjective experience, emotions and feelings, is possible.[15] Art, myth, ritual and religion present non-discurisve symbolic systems with the Gestalt providing a foundation for the theory's rational conditions.[16] Visual forms are presented simultaneously and immediately.[17] These sensuous forms present one form of apprehending the world; discursive language another.[18]

Perception as it relates to symbols in her schema is an abstraction.[19] She claims that the key to her new philosophy of art is based on "significant form" and not on the pleasure of sensuous form.[20]

5.4 Art as Logical Symbolism

In Feeling and Form Langer expands the claim that art has emotional content symbolically, as language has conceptual content. It is a logical expression of feelings.[21] Structures logically resemble patterns of human experience. The pattern presented in an art form is the logical form of sentience. The significance of this felt pattern Langer calls "vital import" rather than meaning[22] and it is this "vital import or significant form" which is felt as a quality, rather than logically discriminated.[23]

"Semblance" is Langer's term used to denote the contemplation of sensory qualities of objects by disregarding their functional purposes and attending to their form.[24] "Psychical distance" becomes a necessary condition for aesthetic contemplation.[25] The aesthetic object is treated as "otherness," detached from its surroundings.[26]

By this method Langer is able to treat both representational and non-representational aspects of a work of art as abstracted symbols representing emotion. Iconographic elements which function as discursive symbols are treated as elements of the larger symbol.

They are considered as lying on different semantic levels from the work which contains them.[27]

It is the aesthetic or sensuous surface which pre-occupies Langer, insofar as what is expressed is not actual feelings but ideas of feelings which are in the work. Sensuous quality is in the service of "vital import." By viewing this surface, the Gestalt reality of the work becomes visible.[28] In this sense Langer can claim that non-representational works make the surface "more visible" because surface offers a logic of vision; it has emotional import and by reflecting principles of artistic vision it expresses basic vital rhythms. The task of the artist is to create and produce the illusion that the form he articulates coincides with the acts of living by using whatever means available.[29]

5.5 The Notion of Illusion in Langer's Aesthetics

The great bulk of Langer's work is the attempt to delineate and classify the arts; each, she maintains, has its own form to convey "human feelings." The idea of "living form" is common to all the arts.[30]

In her analysis of art forms Langer describes each medium as an expression of virtual or illusionary elements.[31] These are manipulated to create the expressive object or symbol.[32] The "expressive form" is an objective presentation of feelings which are analogous to the actual undergone emotions, tensions and experiences.[33]

Each art form makes use of primary apparition.[34] Music is treated as virtual time;[35] dance as virtual power;[36] poetry as a virtual event;[37] dramas as virtual history;[38] painting as virtual space;[39] sculpture as virtual kinetic volume;[40] and finally, architecture as virtual ethnic domain.[41]

Space, Time, Powers and Events are all interrelated in reality. They present the deep structure of all the arts which comprise the rhythms and principles of dynamic form.[42] Although Langer accepts this unity she does maintain a "purist" view of the arts. There are no hybrids in her scheme.[43] Crafts are not considered art because no illusion is presented.[44] Secondary illusions in the arts may however, be considered: that is, the notion that music has a space element in it or painting has a time element.[45]

5.6 The Notion of Feeling and Form in Langer's Aesthetics

Primary illusions present patterns of tensions and resolutions of actual time, space, powers and events in a logically objectified form. It must be true in design to the structure of the experience.[46] Form, in the sense of "significant form" or "expressive form" is congruent with the subjective inner reality as manifested by complex rhythms and tensions.[47] This significant form must be clear, reflecting unambiguously the different emotional values contained in an artwork. Langer maintains that the artist "projects" feelings in the structure of the work,[48] but he need not have experienced in actual life the emotion he expresses.

Furthermore, in the course of manipulating his materials he may come up with something unexpected.[49]

The presentation of virtual space, time, powers and events frees the appreciator from using normal vision,[50] and allows him to contemplate only the work. Creating sensory illusion is the artist's normal way of making us see abnormally. We abstract only the virtual element, contained in symbols which Langer calls "living form" because it is the semblance of life.[51]

5.7 The Role of Intuition in Langer's Aesthetics

Intuition is at the grass roots of the rationality which arises from the elaboration of feeling.[52] It is the fundamental activity which produces logical or semantical understanding. It is through intuition that "living forms" are "felt." "Vital Import" or artistic expressiveness cannot be pinned down. One apprehends expressiveness or one does not.[53] It cannot be demonstrated. The metaphorical interpretation of a work is a spontaneous intuition.[54]

Moreover, the work of art, as the expression of human consciousness in a single metaphorical image, does not point beyond itself. It has to be seen *in toto* first, that is, the "understanding" of the work of art begins as an intuition of the whole.[55] Contemplation then gradually reveals the complexities of the piece and its import.[56]

5.8 Criticism in Langer's Aesthetics

Langer agrees with Collingwood in his analysis of judicial assessments,[57] in that she feels that good art gives a true expression while bad art is distorted because it lacks candor.[58]

To this Langer adds the notion of poor art which arises from a failure by the artist to express what he knows through or due to too brief an intuition or to his failure to be familiar with his materials.[59]

Langer maintains that the art symbol is public. The measure of its "objectivity" is determined by an "ideal beholder."[60] The ideal observer consists of "people" who have developed their powers of perception by long conversance with the order of art in which their judgments are to be made. Intuition guides their verdicts.[61]

Langer handles problems of criticism in the arts in a rhetorical manner. The analysis of how works of art are made and how the sense of import is given in an artwork are not criteria of excellence. Materials are neither good nor bad, strong nor weak. The artist's success or failure is intuitively known by the critic.[62]

Under this scheme the response or capacity to grasp the expressiveness of a work is an intuitive act which cannot be taught.[63] To increase its occurrence, Langer suggests that the mind is cleared of intellectual prejudices and false concepts which would inhibit people's natural responsiveness.[64]

The ideal observer is defined by Langer as having the natural capacity of responsiveness. "That is primarily a natural gift, related to creative talent, yet not the same thing; like talent, where it exists in any measure it may be heightened by experience or reduced by adverse agencies."[65]

5.9 Communication in Langer's Aesthetics

Since the art symbol is not discursive the "message" of an artwork is misleading. A "message" is discursive communication while an emotive symbol is a direct communication through intuition.[66] Since the art symbol's import is not separable from its form, Langer maintains that the artist is not saying anything about nature or the feeling, he is showing it.[67]

"Aesthetic emotion," which is the feeling one gets from the work, does not belong to the work but belongs to the viewer. It is psychological reaction to the artistic activity.[68] It is really a feeling of exhilaration directly inspired by the perception of good art, and not, according to Langer, to be translated as "communication."

"Communication" of knowledge, in Langer's sense, contains the possibility that symbols presented to the imagination could be used to imagine feelings and formulate conceptions of visual, factual and audible reality. The forms given to the imagination allow self-knowledge and insight into all phases of life.[69] The appreciation of a new art form, for Langer, is an indication that one's own emotive possibilities have been expanded. The possibility that the "felt life" of any culture presented in an objective form may be communicated, falls under the same concept.[70]

5.10 The Role of Style, Education and Culture in Aesthetic Theory

Every generation has its style of feeling which, Langer maintains, is largely unconscious. It is not necessarily determined by social causes,[71] but shaped by artists, usually popular artists of film, television and music.[72]

Artistic training is therefore, an education of feeling. Art is rooted in experience; but experience, in turn, is built up in memory and performed in imagination according to the intuitions of powerful artists often long dead.[73] Genius, she says, is the power to conceive a reality of sentience, vitality and emotion currently invisible or undeveloped. This is the mark of a true artist.[74]

Langer maintains such emotional shaping comes about through four variables: (1) the ideas that artists wish to express; (2) discovered devices for the artist; (3) the opportunity offered by the physical and cultural environment, and finally, (4) the public response.[75]

Of these four, Langer considers the first to be the most important. The discovery of major art devices plays the second largest role. These two factors determine "aesthetic feelings" in a culture.

Every technical advance is first felt to be the discovery of a better means of imitation and only later is it recognized as a new form; a stylistic convention[76] which then becomes a great tradition.

5.11 Summary of Langer's Aesthetics

Langer has developed a semiotic theory of aesthetics. Considering art from the "studio point of view" Langer maintains that an "expressive form" is a logical objectification of a feeling of "inner life." Artworks are symbols. They articulate rhythms, tensions and patterns of actual life by "symbolically transforming" these into symbols, by using virtual elements of space, time, powers and events.

"Significant form" or "vital import" of these symbols may be intuited by a perceiver who may be an "ideal observer" provided that he has had familiarity with a particular form. Langer states that such a capacity cannot be learned; in all probability it is inherited.

Finally, the style and artistic tastes of a culture are shaped by its artists and the "devices" they discover. Communication with other cultures is possible by intuiting the forms of feelings presented in their artworks.

Footnotes - Chapter Five

[1] S. Langer, Philosophy in a New Key 16th printing (New York: Mentor Book, The New American Library, 1951), pp. 15-30. What is particularly enlightening in this critique is the assertion that empiricism, being a science of sensations, has turned towards observations of readings taken from measuring instruments. Direct sensation no longer plays an important role.

[2] S. Langer, Philosophy in a New Key, pp. 33-54 and Feeling and Form (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Limited, 1953), p. 312. Literally "organic process" is a biological concept; "life," "growth," "development," "decline," "death" - all these are strictly biological terms. They are applicable only to organisms. In art they are lifted out of their literal context, and forthwith, in place of organic processes, we have dynamic forms, instead of metabolism; rhythmic progression instead of maturation; fulfilment, instead of procreation, ..." Langer develops this concept to its maturity in Mind: An Essay on Human Feeling Vol. II "The Specialization of Man," (Baltimore and London: John Hopkins University Press, 1972), pp. 215-264.

[3] This development will be traced through Langer's writings, designated as follows: PNK, Philosophy in a New Key 16th printing (New York: Mentor Book, The New American Library, 1951); FF, Feeling and Form (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Limited, 1953); PA, Problems of Art (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1957); M, Mind: An Essay in Human Feeling Vol. I (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1967); M-II, Mind: An Essay in Human Feeling Vol. II (Baltimore & London: John Hopkins Press, 1972); PCA, "The Principles of Creation in Art," The Hudson Review 2, 1950, pp. 515-534; PIGOA, "The Primary Illusions and the Great Orders of Art," The Hudson Review 3, 1950, pp. 219-233; PS, Philosophical Sketches (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1962); AA, "Abstraction in Art," JAAC 22 (Summer 1964):378-392.

[4] Herein designated as BJA and JAAC, respectively.

[5] Langer, PNK, pp. 45-50 and M-II, "Symbols and the Evolution of Mind," pp. 265-316.

6. Langer, PNK, p. 42, and PA, pp. 98-104. The latter reference develops the notion of "symbolic transformation" is considered an abstraction of an event or an appearance to produce

an equivalent sense impression rather than a direct imitation. It is a metaphor, a model of an idea, event or character. Art is a sensuous symbolic transformation.

[7] Langer, M, pp. 35-55. The utilitarian model is appropriate on the animal level where signals govern their behavior.

[8] Langer, PNK, pp. 56-60 and FF, p. 26. Langer changes the term signs to signals to incorporate the notion of action associated with a sign.

[9] Langer, PNK, p. 61.

[10] Langer, PNK, p. 70.

[11] Langer, PNK, pp. 70-75.

[12] Langer, PNK, pp. 77-79.

[13] Langer, PNK, p. 78.

[14] Langer, PNK, p. 86.

[15] She then presents this semantic development in PCA, pp. 515-534.

[16] Langer does not expand on the notion of Gestalt. Pertinent references may be found in PNK, p. 89-91 and AA, p. 384, where there is an attempt to introduce the notion of physiognomic perception.

[17] Langer, PNK, pp. 89-95, also see Curtis L. Carter, "Langer and Hofstadter on Painting and Language: A Critique," JAAC 2 (Summer 1974):331-342. Curtis convincingly argues that painting is a discursive language. Studies by Buswell suggested that paintings are not perceived "simultaneously" but are "read" much like language. Paintings have syntax (form) and semantic (reference) like language.

[18] Langer, M, p. 102 and p. 90. Langer argues that syntax cannot be applied to paintings.

[19] Langer, AA, p. 378 and PNK, p. 127. Langer applies this idea to abstract painting where she argues that abstraction in science is a generalization whereas in art they are "presentational abstractions" of events.

[20] Langer, PNK, p. 175.

[21] Langer, PNK, pp. 193-213. This claim is made for music but not generalized to all the arts.

> "The upshot is ... - that there are certain aspects of so-called 'inner life' - physical or mental - which have formal properties similar to those of music - patterns of motion and rest, of tension and release, of agreement and disagreement, preparation, fulfilment, exaltation, sudden change, ..." (p. 193.)

[22] Langer, PNK, p. 223.

[23] Langer, FF, pp. 19-22, and see, Forest Hansen, "Langer's Expressive Form: An Interpretation," JAAC 27 (Winter 1968):165-170. Hansen attempts to clearify Langer's notion of significant form by examining illusions of "hidden figures" as paradigm cases of the appearance of significant form.

[24] Langer, FF, p. 50.

[25] The notion of "psychical distance" is mentioned a number of times. FF, pp. 318-319. See also, its use in the development of drama in Richard Courtney, "On Langer's Dramatic Illusion," JAAC 29 (Fall 1970):14.

[26] Langer, FF, p. 45.

[27] Langer, PA, pp. 135-139 and FF, p. 55. Should interest be placed on objects imitated in the work, the work takes on a literal significance and evokes feelings, which obscure the emotional content of the form.

[28] Langer, FF, pp. 59-68, and "Abstraction in Science and Abstraction in Art," in Structure, Method and Meaning: Essays in Honor of Henry M. Sheffer (New York: The Liberal Arts Press, Inc.), pp. 163-180. Here the notion of Gestalt in the arts is explicated.

[29] Langer, FF, pp. 61-68 and see, Samuel Bufford, "Suzanne Langer's Two Philosophies of Art," JAAC 31 (Fall 1972):9-20. Bufford claims that Langer proposes two theories. Aside from the expressive theory (symbolic) theory, Bufford maintains that a "presentational" theory is given.

> "Langer's second theory of art holds that works of art abstract aspects of the world around us or our own experience to enable us to perceive these aspects more clearly. The point of creating a work of art is to abstract sounds, shapes, or movements to draw our attention to them." (p. 10.)

[30] This notion was first introduced in "The Primary Orders of Art," pp. 219-234.

[31] Langer, FF, p. 188. All forces that cannot be scientifically established and measured are considered illusionary. These forces are a part of direct experience which Langer calls virtual or non-actual semblances.

[32] Langer, PA. p. 127. Langer changes the term symbolic form to "expressive form" to avoid the implications symbol has with discursive discourse.

[33] Langer, PA, in "Abstraction in Science and Abstraction in Art," p. 164.

[34] Langer, PA, p. 81. Langer changes primary illusion to primary apparition to avoid the implications of the world illusion as meaning unreal.

[35] Langer, FF, pp. 104-168, and also see Timothy Binkley, "Logical and Ontological Modes," JAAC 28, 1969, pp. 455-464. Binkely presents the argument that music cannot be examined as a logical form because its form cannot be isolated. He concludes that only a small portion of music is isomorphic with human feeling and that it is its ontological status as an object of appreciation in the Kantian sense of disinterestness that should be examined.

[36] Langer, FF. pp. 201-206. See, R. Courney, "On Langer's Dramatic Illusion," JAAC 29 (Fall 1970):11-20. Courney argues that Langer's theory of drama is absolutist and universalistic.

[37] Langer, FF, p. 234ff.

[38] Langer, FF, p. 306ff.

[39] Langer, FF, pp. 71-88.

[40] Langer, FF, p. 89ff.

[41] Langer, FF, p. 100ff.

[42] Langer, PA, p. 11 and p. 79.

[43] Langer, PA, pp. 82-83. In "The Principles of Creation in Art," The Hudson Review 2, 1950, pp. 515-534 was the first indication of this view.

[44] Langer, PA, pp. 110-111.

[45] Langer, AA, pp. 385-390.

[46] Langer, PA, p. 30.

> "But logical 'form' is not visible, it is conceptual. It is abstract; yet we do not abstract it form the work of art that embodies it. Somehow in perceiving the work, we see it not as having an expressive form, but being one."

[47] See, Timothy Binkley, "Langer's Logic and Ontological Modes," JAAC 28, 1970, for a counter argument.

[48] Langer, M, pp. 60-65.

[49] The concept of feeling is well developed in Vol. I of Mind: An Essay on Human Feeling, also see Louis Arnauld Reid, "New Notes on Langer," BJA 8(4) (October 1968):353-358, and "Suzanne Langer and Beyond," BJA 5(4) (October 1965):357-367. In the first article Reid argues that feelings are always "feelings-of" something; hence, projection by the artist is a form which he has experienced. In the second article Reid argues that art symbols are not iconographic of feelings but something else.

[50] Normal vision is not contemplative. By it Langer refers to mere recognition of objects that surround us day by day.

[51] Langer, PA, pp. 32-33.

[52] Langer, FF, p. 378 and PA, "Artistic Perception and 'Natural Light'," pp. 59-74. Langer equates intuition with Locke's "natural light." Abstraction and intuition are non-discursive forms

which lie at the base of all human mentality; both in language and art.

[53] Langer, PA, p. 60 and p. 135.

[54] See, C. Carter, "Langer and Hofstadter on Painting and Language," JAAC 32 (Summer 1974):342.

[55] Langer, PA, pp. 67-68. Discursive thought on the other hand is a passage from one intuition, or act of understanding, to another. If, at any point, intuition fails, we use equivalent symbols to present the desired meaning until insight occurs.

[56] Langer, M, p. 66.

> "...the (art) symbol is a work, and its elements are analyzable. I say 'elements' rather than 'factors'. because the components of the art symbol—of the virtual entity, to which import belongs—are created elements, whereas the factors are materials used, and are replaceable by others for most purposes. Elements, too, sometimes have alternatives; but their measure is expressive power, which pure materials possess only at second remove."

[57] Langer, FF. p. 380.

[58] Langer, FF, pp. 380-386.

[59] Langer, FF, p. 387 and PA, p. 126.

[60] Langer, FF, p. 391.

[61] Langer, FF, p. 406. See also Teddy Bruins, "The Uses of Works of Art," in Aesthetic Inquiry, ed. by Beardsley and Schneller (Belmont, California: Dickenson Pub. Inc., 1966). Bruins pushes the idea that each group has different expectations of artworks' standards.

[62] Langer, FF, p. 409.

[63] Langer, FF, p. 396.

[64] Langer, FF, p. 396.

[65] Langer, FF, p. 396.

[66] Langer, FF, p. 393.

[67] Langer, PNK, p. 223.

> "There is no law of artistic adequacy because significance is always for a mind as well as *of* a form. But if a Gestalt cannot be grasped then it seems meaningless. A definite grasp requires a certain familiarity."

[68] Langer, FF, p. 395.

[69] Langer, PA, p. 71 and FF, p. 397.

[70] Langer, FF, p. 410 and PA, p. 69 and p. 113.

> "When our culture reaches out suddenly beyond its old bounds and makes contacts with other cultures we become interested in new possibilities of feeling. It takes awhile, but there comes a point where the beauty of the exotic art becomes apparent to us then we have grasped the humanity of another culture, not only theoretically but imaginatively." (p. 410.)

[71] Langer, PA, p. 113 and FF, p. 401.

[72] Langer, PA, p. 72.

[73] Langer, FF, p. 405.

[74] Langer, FF, pp. 408-409.

[75] Langer, PA, p. 112. See also Langer's article, "The Cultural Importance of the Arts," *Journal of Aesthetic Education* 1(2), 1966, pp. 5-12.

[76] Langer, PA, p. 113.

> "Sometimes quite fortuitous things enter in to give it a historic turn - not things that alter

> the pattern of feelings, like cultural decay, new religions, commercial expansion, crusades, ...but such things as the inversion of oil pigments, the finding of carra marble, the construction of the pipe organ."

CHAPTER SIX

Aesthetic Theory of John Dewey

6.1 Statement of Intent

The intention of this chapter is to delineate the aesthetic theory of John Dewey as embodied in Art as Experience,[1] published in 1934. By that time clichés about pragmatism, instrumentalism, and naturalism[2] had become so entrenched, that many of John Dewey's followers and critics were surprised at his emphasis on aesthetic enjoyment as an end[3] to the detriment of social and practical problems. The following sections will examine his views on aesthetic theory.[4]

6.2 John Dewey's Aesthetic Theory

Dewey set the stage for his aesthetic theory by first analogizing art to a "live creature" whose appreciation and enjoyment should be experienced aesthetically as a part of man's daily life.[5] Like Malraux's "museum without walls"[6] Dewey's aim was to bring art back into the realm of experience[7] and away from its role as a nationalistic and imperialistic symbol placed on a pedestal in museums and galleries.[8]

Dewey's aesthetics formed a reaction to cognitive and idealistic theories of art.[9] For Dewey, the aesthetic problem was to recover aesthetic experience in everyday living and to examine how artworks idealized qualities which could be found in common experience.[10]

Dewey attempted to answer this problem by adopting elements of a neo-Hegelian position.[11] Through accommodation, man adapted himself to his environment as he interacted with it. The resulting dialectic produced a homeostatic state which was gained following a period of transition.[12] The following passages will try to explicate this aesthetic dialectic.

6.3 The Concept of "Experience" in John Dewey's Aesthetics

The terms "doing and undergoing"[13] represent the balance that the "live creature," in this case man, achieved when he overcame resistances, tensions and difficulties in the environment.[14] During this process emotions ran high. It is these emotions which became metamorphozed into objects of meaning.[15] Objects and actions of meaning, so created, are aesthetic. Art objects epitomize this process, which Dewey called an experience.[16] An experience is the direct result of qualities "felt" through the senses of the "live creature."[17] Art is the proof that man could consciously select, regulate, control and synthesize qualities as well as meet his needs in the environment. In this sense an experience is different from ordinary experience.[18] An experience is a tensely felt emotion which is significant and clear. It has a unity which is pervaded by a single quality.[19] An experience is not a pathological occurrence but seems to stand out against the backdrop of commonplace experience.[20]

Art, under this schema, attains a new and broader meaning. As an enhancement of experience, it is not divorced from science and technology. "'Art' in the most artistic meaning, is now the same for any phase of enterprise to increase human control and freedom..."[21]

The unity which binds _an_ experience is not emotional, practical, or intellectual. However, through reflection, after the experience, one can intellectually speculate about its emotional character. Dewey maintained that experience was contemplative, but not in the passive Kantian sense.[22] The experience was completed, as a "felt" harmony.[23] This harmony had a pattern and structure which, as a relationship, gave meaning and significance to the "live creature."

In Dewey's terms, the beginning of every experience was an impulse, a driving of the organism to meet the needs of its survival. Emotion and energy were generated by resistances and tensions which were met in achieving these needs. Impulsion towards a need began in an experience which had no pre-determined end; with reflection, the conscious was able to give it guidance and meaning.[24]

Impulsion played a very important role in creation. Impulsion did not merely expel emotion, it enabled the "working over" and the "working out" of emotion through an expression.

The artist capitalized on this process. He saw relationships between what had been done and what there was to do next. Qualities and relationships were worked out. The work was finished when the artist had an intuitive knowledge that the experience had come to a close.[25] This was an act of intelligence.[26]

The experience of the artist in performance and the experience of the viewer or listener to the performance were identical acts. The artist "worked" as a perceiver to see how the work was progressing while the perceiver had to reconstruct the work. In both instance, emotion was aroused by yielding the self to the work.[27]

6.4 John Dewey's Notion of the Expressive Act

"Impulse" and "turmoil" played significant roles in the expressive act. Each impulse of an experience was re-synthesized in a dialectical process. Obstacles were overcome in an experience and became the means for new experiences.[28]

There was no expression without some "turmoil." An impulse could not lead to expression unless there was an "indispensible excitement." It was in "turmoil" that the inner impulse (Dewey called it inspiration on the sub-conscious level) came in contact with the environment to call for an idea or fact which might be expressed.[29] This expression embodied attitudes and meanings which were derived from prior experiences.[30]

"Emotion" was a necessary but not a sufficient condition for expression. This "emotion" needed to be shaped in materials to give it expressive form. Form, for Dewey was not so much the form of a thing as it was an act of an experience. It was the structure and organization of the performance of an expression.[31] Art was expressive of the values of a particular medium as well as of the artist's feelings embodied in the object.[32] Two transformations took place in this act of creation. As material was manipulated and ordered so were ideas and feelings ordered.[33]

6.5 John Dewey's Notion of the Expressive Object

Philosophical theories which deal only with the expressive product were in Dewey's opinion incorrect because they ignored the individual's contribution to the perception of the product which was always new. "Meaning" of the expressive object became an ambiguous term in Dewey's aesthetics. "Meaning" was not treated symbolically[34] in his schema, but directly. The "meaning" of objects were experienced as direct immediate qualities, not as cognitions of symbols.

The expressive object was a presentation of selected interest. It was an unconscious and organic bias towards certain attitudes and values of the complex universe in which the artist lives. In this sense, Dewey felt that an art object was an emancipatory expression. The adjective "ugly" applied only to those objects which had been presented according to a convention. This theme is recurrent throughout Art as Experience.[35]

Expression of an emotion in the arting process was under the command of certain motor skills which were able to "work off" an emotion by directing the response along prepared channels.[36] This process, Dewey maintained, occurred both in the artist and in the observer.[37]

The relationship between sensuous qualities and the image suggested, presented two alternatives. Either this relationship operated because some transcendent essence (i.e., beauty) descended upon experience from the outside, or the aesthetic effect was due to direct sensuous qualities. Aesthetic values were said to belong to sense qualities _in_ themselves. Their expressiveness may be explained without _any reference beyond_ the immediately sensuous.[38]

Dewey accepted the second alternative with a modification: the element of contextualism was introduced.[39] Line and color expressed the _way_ in which objects acted on man in certain situations. These properties of objects were "earthbound" and became ingrained through multiple experiences with the same object.[40]

To balance aesthetic theory which attributes properties "solely in themselves" (subjective theories) or "solely in objects" (objective theories) Dewey expanded on the idea of multiple cummulative experience. The world experienced, became part of self. Meaning and value became retained as an integral part of self. Habits became formed through intercourse with the world. Experience became internalized, eliminating the subject-object distinction.

6.6 The Notion of Form in Dewey's Aesthetics

Form, in the artistic sense, meant that an object was seen as a perceptual whole. Its qualities as seen were modified by parts of the whole.[41]

Dewey identified continuity, cumulation, conservation, tension and anticipation as the formal conditions of form. The history of form, Dewey maintained, made significant advances when problems were solved which had grown out of a need for new modes of experience.[42] This introduced new techniques which were relative to form and determined to a large degree by the available technology.

Rhythm, "as an ordered variation of change,"[43] played a major role in the nature of form. The rhythm of the art work reflected the basic pattern of the relations between the live creature and the environment.[44] Dewey used the term, "naturalism," to denote art which attempted to capture the rhythm experienced from a number of viewpoints, as contrasted to "realism" which expressed only one viewpoint.[45]

The notion of rhythm was once again discussed when Dewey made his distinction between the art product and the artwork. Since it was the latter which was experienced and active, (the first merely the physical object), rhythm was related to the subjective act of perception.[46] To enhance rhythm, distortion and asymmetrical balance were introduced to increase interest.

6.7 The Notion of Fusion in John Dewey's Aesthetics

Dewey maintained that fusion and quality were simultaneously occurring concepts which had been given synonymous meaning.[47] A "quality" which was in all "parts" of a work of art was immediately experienced. This quality could not be described or even specifically pointed to. Quality may only be intuited.[48]

Different elements and specific qualities of a work of art blended and "fused" in a way which was "felt" intuitively.[49] Specific "parts" were discriminated, not intuited. However, without the envelope of intuition, parts became disorganized or mechanically related.[50]

"Quality" was the spirit of the work of art and it was the work's reality that was felt. Dewey considered a work's uniqueness and individuality as its "quality" or idiom. This uniqueness had a boundary or "horizon" which was established by the "quality" of the work as a whole quality which in turn belonged to a larger whole, and ultimately the "universe" in which man lived.[51]

Quality was concrete and existential, varying with individuals, impregnated with the artist's and the perceiver's uniqueness. Conditions which would allow for the reappearance of the exact same quality were next to impossible. It was of particular importance that this be the case because it was the artist's business to concern himself with particular qualities in their context.[52]

The notion of "quality" had with it a space-time property. Space-time was considered qualitatively, not quantitatively, as a movement in experience which was altered in the qualities of objects. Space-time might be intensified or compressed depending on which qualities were considered significant.[53] Dewey concluded that space-time was a common property of the matter of the arts, without which experience was not possible.[54]

6.8 John Dewey's Notion of Classification

Language, for Dewey, was an inadequate way of describing the particularity of surface counters.[55] It could, however, give direction as how to come upon "qualities" of experience.

Definitions of qaulities, Dewey argued, were also meaningless because a strict class of objects was an illusion, although in pragmatic terms, one *thought* in terms of classes.[56]

What was possible were definitions of *tendencies*. Rigid classifications distracted from the unique quality and integral character of experience in an artwork. Classifications were further misleading because there was a neglect for *transitions* and connecting links which provided obstacles for historical development.[57] The arts had been classified according to the senses (arts of the eye, the ear), but Dewey, developed an organic metaphor which attempted to eliminate these distinctions. Art was sensed not only through the ear and eye, as Kant had maintained, but by total organismic activity.[58]

Deweyan "organicism" eliminated the classification of the temporal arts (music) and the spatial arts (painting, architecture). He maintained that sensations reached the perceiver simultaneously from the object, where they became integrated into a single perception.[59]

Traditionally, the arts had also been classified according to their particular medium. This too was dismissed.[60] Dewey argued that this classification gave a false picture of the milieu from which they came, and any categories which were coined (i.e., comic, grotesque, tragic, picturesque) were to be considered as tendencies and used as adjectives to qualify "qualities."[61]

These tendencies marked a movement towards a limit to which a given "quality" could be "felt". "Qualities" then, existed in varying degrees and forms between such "limits." These boundaries were marked by the thresholds of disorganization.[62]

Finally, Dewey concluded that classification made one observe rules rather than subject matter. Classification in this sense, set limits to perception. Neologisms could not be pigeon-holed, so they were rejected.[63]

6.9 Psychological Theory in Dewey's Aesthetics

The "human contribution"[64] in Dewey's notion of experience was a theme which consistently emerged in his work. His main purpose for this was to eliminate the subject-object distinction (mind-body or self-world).[65]

Dewey used the term "projection" as a term which indicated the organism's (self) contribution to the interpretation of the world (objects). Projection was a transfer of values accomplished through the organism's participation in the environment. However, this organism had been "made what it is" and caused to "act as it did" through organic modifications due to prior experiences."[66] Projection was then this factor which caused the organism to interact with the environment to produce an experience. For example, a painting was a total effect brought about by the interaction of external causes (physical causes like light, color, tone, etc.) and organic causes; these latter being what the mind contributed to perception.[67]

Dewey's notion of "mind" carries with it the human contribution of interest, selection, organization, retention and bias.[68] "Mind" is formed by the modification of the Self that occurs in the process of prior interactions with the environment. Further actions are sought out through previously established routes. This process comes to a logical conclusion in the realization that there are different kinds of "minds" which are so named because of different interests. Hence, scientists, executives, artists, etc., present different kinds of "minds." The artistic "mind" is characterized as having a peculiar sensitivity to some aspect of man's nature for expression.[69]

In summary, Dewey was saying that prior learned experiences, which to a large extent were already established traditions of ordering and conveying material (i.e., art material, scientific symbols) became fused with "inherent impulses." This fusion, Dewey termed "mind."

6.10 Dewey on Imagination

Dewey maintained that the theory of imagination had been misconceived. "Imagination" could not be treated as a self-contained faculty, possessing mysterious potencies. Imagination was a way of seeing and feeling things as they compose an integral whole.[70] It was the blending of interests at the point where mind came in contact with the world. Like the notion of intuition, imagination made previous known concepts appear new in experience. When this happened, something new was established in a synthesis of material which had previously been strange and mysterious.[71]

Intuition, in Deweyan psychology, was a process which saw simultaneously, the old and new synthesized and clarified. It appeared spontaneous, but in fact this was a misconception. Before intuition could occur there had to be a long and slow incubation. Imagination suffered from the same misconception.[72]

His theory of imagination still retained the dialectical notion of conflict. Conflict of the imagination was the struggle between inner and outer vision. Inner vision, at first, rendered things more clearly than outer vision. But then came a reaction. Inner vision seemed to give place to an increasingly concrete scene.

The artist submitted to this objective vision. The inner vision was not completely rejected but remained an organ of how the vision was controlled. The concrete vision took on structure as the inner vision was absorbed within it. The interaction of the two modes of vision was "imagination." As "imagination" took form, the work was born.[73]

6.11 Criticism in Deweyan Aesthetics

On the whole, John Dewey criticized judicial criticism as unable to cope with emergent trends which expressed new relationships about man's relation to his environment.[74]

Dewey, however, did not abandon the idea of judicial judgment entirely. His was a modification of it.[75] Criticism was judgment, but it involved a hypothetical element. Criticism concerned itself with "qualities" of an object. Furthermore, these qualities belonged to an individual object and were not to be compared by means of external pre-established rules.[76]

It was a search for the properties of an object which would justify a direct reaction. Loosely put, criticism was a survey for objective properties. The critic had an option whether to place a "value" at the end of the process or leave it as a summary of this objective examination.

Regardless of this final evaluation, the description given was a social document which could be checked by others to see whether they could themselves "see" these objective properties as described.

Criteria for judgment, in Dewey's scheme, consisted of the relationships which were established between forms in relation to matter. Other relationships examined were the meaning of the medium and the nature of the expressive object.

The role of the art critic was to evoke a clearer consciousness of the constituent parts and to discover how consistently these parts were related to form a whole. He had to be neither too sentimental nor completely cold.

To meet this qualification, the critic had to be acquainted with the tradition of a particular art form. This acquaintance had to be more than mere knowledge; he had to be personally involved with the tradition.[77] The more traditions he became acquainted with, the better were his powers of discrimination.

These powers would be further assisted by a knowledge of the development of a particular artist, as manifested in a succession of his works. Aside from the discriminating phase of judgment, Dewey maintained that a unifying synthetic stage was also required. The critic had to find some unifying strand or pattern which ran through all the details. When he found this theme he was to present it to his audience as clearly as possible so that his clues would be a guide for them to follow.[78]

Two fallacies which a critic could hold were explicated by Dewey. These were reduction and confusion of categories. Reduction over-simplified the work by isolating one element and treating the rest of the work in terms of this element.[79]

Confusion of categories treated artworks for their historical, philosophical, sociological contexts but paid no attention to the aesthetic qualities in the work.[80] Critics confused aesthetic values for philosophic values (i.e., morality).[81]

6.12 Dewey's Notion of Art in Society

Underlying the entire emphasis of his book, Art as Experience, and especially in the last chapter, Dewey developed the thesis that there was, at present, a separation of art and society.[82] A secondary thesis claimed cross-cultural communication through art.[83]

The first theme rests upon the notion that the institutions and social values of a civilization influence the accepted art form.[84] Aesthetic experience is a record of the life of a civilization, a means of promoting its development and is also an ultimate judgment upon the quality of civilization.[85]

The second prevailing theme is summarized in the assertion that art has communicative powers.[86] Dewey argued against previous theories which stated that artworks could not be experienced because they were produced in different milieux.[87]

Experience was treated as an interaction between artist and product. Hence, there were no two experiences which were ever alike so there should be no reason why different works from different periods could not be enjoyed aesthetically.[88]

This same assumption was carried over to other cultures. The differences among cultures (attitudes, purposes, needs) could be bridged through art. Because art expressed deep-seated attitudes which reflected the culture, the artistic characteristics of a civilization could be discovered sympathetically, so getting at the heart of the deepest elements in the experience of another civilization.[89] This broadened and deepened a perceiver's own experience, and had a tendency to dispel prejudice, since attitudes basic in other forms of experience were felt.[90]

Dewey's summation in Art as Experience was a plea to close the gap between life and the aesthetic which had been separated through the development of industry and commerce. If art was to be grounded in experience, there had to be a change in social relations.[91] Only this would change the nature of experience. The way things stood then, psychological conditions for the private control of labor of other men and private gain supressed and limited aesthetic quality. Life and art were separated.

6.13 Summary of Dewey's Aesthetics

In short, Dewey's position maintained that art was not "for art" but for common everyday experience. The aesthetic was to play an integral part in enhancing the life in an individual and in the community. Art enabled the individual to unite the actual and the possible by giving it concrete form. Dewey made no distinction between fine and useful arts. Both should be embedded in experience.

The communication of art formed another theme. Dewey maintained that through immediate sensuous knowledge of an experience, attitudes and deep seated feelings of a culture could be communicated.

Finally, Dewey had an organismic view of man. Man was a "live creature" who interacted with his environment, actively selecting, synthesizing and overcoming obstacles to meet his needs. Aesthetic attitudes grew from the results of these "experiences."

Footnotes - Chapter Six

[1] John Dewey, Art as Experience 17th Impression (New York: Capricorn Books, G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1958). Henceforth, this book will be designated as AE in these footnotes.

[2] Sidney Hook, John Dewey: An Intellectual Portrait (New York: John Day Co., Van Rees Press, 1967), p. 192.

[3] Richard Bernstein, John Dewey (New York: Square Press, Inc., 1966), p. 147.

[4] A great deal of information is supported from articles taken from the Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism.

[5] John Dewey, AE, p. 4.

[6] A. Malraux, Voices of Silence trans. Stuart Gilbert (Paladin: Granada Pub. Ltd., 1974). See Chapter One.

[7] César Graña, "John Dewey's Social Art and Sociology of Art," JAAC 20, 1962, p. 406.

> "It was Dewey's intention to convince us that the daily language of our aesthetic emotions held a truth far deeper than that of any lofty conventions. That aesthetic meaning was, not a property of things but a parcel of experience, and that no real borderline existed between the quality of art and the content of life."

[8] John Dewey, AE, pp. 8-14.

[9] There had been a running debate between John Dewey and Benedetto Croce to resolve their differences; however, little success was reached. If one examines Croce's "Dewey's Aesthetics and Theory of Knowledge," JAAC, 11 (September 1952):1-6, and "On the Aesthetics of Dewey," JAAC 6, 1948, pp. 203-305, one sees Croce's attempt to define the common ground between idealism and pragmaticism. Croce claims that Dewey's aesthetics under the "organicist" metaphor are contrary to the pragmatist theory of conflict and resolution, and they lean more towards idealism.

Dewey in reply in, "A Comment on the Foregoing Criticism," JAAC 6 (March 1948):206-208, rebuts this accusation.

> "The actual fact is that I have consistently treated the pragmatic theory as a theory of knowing and as confined within the limits of the field of specifically cognitive subject-matter. And in addition I have specifically rejected the idea that aesthetic subject-matter is a form of knowledge, and have held that a prime defect of philosophies of art has been treating subject matter as if it were (whether the creators and enjoyers of it or not) a kind of knowledge of Reality, presumably of higher and truer order than anything of which science" is capable." (p. 206.)

Chapter XII, in Art as Experience, is his complete critique of idealist positions, as well as his theories of illusionism, play, mysticism and imitation.

[10] John Dewey, AE, pp. 11-19. See also, Sidney Zink, "The Concept of Continuity in Dewey's Theory of Esthetics," Philosophical Review 52, 1943, pp. 392-400.

[11] "Dewey's Hegelian influence has been well documented. Donald B. Kuspit's, "Dewey's Critique of Art for Art's Sake," JAAC 27 (Fall 1968):93-98 is an attempt to critique the Hegelian influence in Dewey's aesthetics. He concludes that Dewey's Hegelianism took on degenerate forms in his later thought. He denies that the dialect is rooted in reason but is merely a play of forces which he calls "experience." Furthermore, Kuspit concludes that the conception of "art as experience" is a degenerate version of the romantic conception of art as Hegel described it. (See Jack Kaminsky, Hegel on Art (New York: State University of New York, 1962), pp. 104-131, for a clear exposé on Hegel's notion of Romantic Art.) Dewey had turned commonplace experiences into aesthetic experiences by describing them as moments of heightened experience. In this sense Dewey reverts to Romanticism. For further reading on the neo-Hegelian element in Dewey see E. Griffin, A Critical Re-Assessment of John Dewey (Ph. D. dissertation, University of Alberta, 1974).

[12] John Dewey, AE, p. 339. Nowhere is this more evident than when, in his final chapter, he writes,

> "Moreover, resistance and conflict have been factors in generating art, and they are, as we have seen, a necessary part of artistic form."

[13] See, D. C. Mathur, "Consummatory Experience in Dewey's Aesthetics," *The Journal of Philosophy* 63 (April 28, 1966):225-231, for an explanation of "situation" in "doing-and-undergoing."

[14] C. Graña, "John Dewey's Social Art and the Sociology of Art," *JAAC* 20 (Summer 1962):406.

> "As he so tirelessly repeated, man was a *live* creature, an organism linked to the surroundings by relations of dominance over it, defense against it, or acquiescence with it. Even ideological issues were discussed by him in the language of organic adjustment."

[15] This concept of "emotion" being expressed during accommodation has been linked with the Expressionist Movement in America. Stewart Buettner, "John Dewey and the Visual Arts in America," *JAAC* 33 (Summer 1975):383-391, writes,

> "Emotional sensibility served as the vehicle which provided continuity and unity to aesthetic experience, but was never sufficient in itself to function as its significant content. Emotion was a necessary condition of art, but never what was expressed." (p. 387.)

[16] D. W. Gotshalk, "On Dewey's Aesthetics," *JAAC* 23, 1965, pp. 131-138. Gotshalk argues that Dewey has *two* views of *an* experience: (1) the aesthetic is integrated or unified, and (2) aesthetic is the qualitative immediate as intuitively grasped.

> "In sum, the aesthetic exists not merely where there is unity in an experience, and where this is incorporated in immediate qualities but where there is a certain kind of act—an intuition, a seizure of the individual quality or pervading tonality, of the immediate object and all that it incorporates. When one attains to this kind of encompassing feel of the total entity, an unanalytic and in this sense unintellectual grasp of this totality in its immediacy, one might be said to have an aesthetic experience." (p. 132.)

[17] D. W. Gotshalk, "On Dewey's Aesthetics," *JAAC* 23, 1965, pp. 131-138. Gotshalk argues that signs and symbols in a work must be intellectualized. They cannot be intuited.

[18] Bertram Morris, "Dewey's Aesthetics, The Tragic Encounter with Nature," JAAC 30 (Winter 1971):190.

> "Experience refers to the actual connections in human encounters, whereas an experience is that limited, intense perception which has a beginning, a middle, and an end, and which he identifies with art."

[19] E. G. Gauss, "Some Reflections on John Dewey's Aesthetics," JAAC 19, 1960, p. 128. Gauss argues that an unsuccessful operation would not be called an experience even though the experience of the surgeon meets the criteria of an experience. See also, Sidney Hook, op. cit., p. 198. Hook deems this solution inadequate because of two reasons:

> "First, qualitative unity or form is found not only where experiences are pre-eminently aesthetic but in any experience that has a distinctive character. Second, by form is sometimes meant a pattern that is abstracted form the means and material in which it is embodied, and capable like a Platonic universal of an indefinite number of incarnations."

[20] Van Meter Ames, "John Dewey as Aesthetician," JAAC 12 (December 1953):147. These experiences seem intense because they are experienced at their fullest. Van Meter Ames explicates this notion by naming games, meals, and artwork as possible instances of aesthetic experience. This leads John Dewey to claim that humdrum activities are the enemy of aesthetic experience.

[21] John Dewey, AE, p. 146 and also on p. 38, where he argues that an experience may be intellectual. Conclusions that are reached in mathematics bring about an integrated experience which Dewey considers aesthetic.

[22] C. Graña, "John Dewey's Social Art and the Sociology of Art," JAAC 20 (Summer 1962):406.

> "All of Dewey's writings are, in a sense, episodes out of great struggle against the traditional image of human thought as something surveying the world from a detached eminence of its own, the 'spectator' theory of the mind which Dewey attributed

> to the historic connection between intellectual pursuits and aristocratic leisure."

See also, John Dewey, Art and Experience, pp. 252-257.

[23] C. E. Gauss, "Some Reflections on John Dewey's Aesthetics," JAAC 19, 1960, pp. 127-132.

> "Closure quality is a function of our perceptive activity. In other words, the qualities by which a thing is called an experience are lifted high above the threshold of perception by our consciously turning our attention to bringing them up in experience to the detriment of intellectual or practical dimensions. This would mean, though I do not think Dewey ever exactly admits it, that an experience is dominantly intellectual, or practical, or aesthetic according to one's conscious intent, as a result of one's attitudes directing his conscious experience." (p. 130.)

[24] John Dewey, AE, pp. 42-57.

[25] In the act of creation, if the artist does not perfect a new vision in his process of doing, according to Dewey, he acts mechanically, simply repeating old forms and old models that have become fixed in his mind.

[26] I. Edman, "A Philosophy of Experience as a Philosophy of Art," Essays in Honor of John Dewey (On Occasion of his 70th, October 20, 1959) (New York: Henry Holt Co., 1969), pp. 122-132. Edman attempts to defend the art process and art appreciation as acts of intelligence.

[27] John Dewey, AE, p. 54.

> "For to perceive, a beholder may create his own experience. And his creation must include relations comparable to those which the original producer underwent. They are not the same in any literal sense. But with the perceiver, as with the artist, there must be an ordering of the elements of the whole that is in form, although not in details, the same as the process of organization the creator of the

> work consciously experienced. Without an act of recreation the object is not perceived as a work of art."

[28] He does not mean that giving way to an impulse, a habitual one for instance, constitutes expression. Values of prior experiences need to be evaluated if an expression is to take place.

[29] John Dewey, AE, p. 65.

[30] C. Graña, "John Dewey's Social Art and the Sociology of Art," JAAC 20 (Summer 1962):408.

> "The same is true of his remark that an artist does not approach a subject with an empty mind but through subtle affinities between the subject and his own experience as a 'live creature' which cause line and color to assume one pattern rather than another."

[31] Kuspit has criticized Dewey's use of the term form. He maintains that Dewey had omitted describing the form of the art object, but concentrated only on the form of an experience. The end of art was in experience, not in the work of art. See, Dewey's Critique of Art for Art's Sake," JAAC, 1968, p. 97. Also see, S. Pepper, "Some Questions on Dewey's Aesthetics," in The Philosophy of John Dewey, Vol. 1, ed. Paul A. Schlipped (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1939), pp. 371-389. Pepper argues that Dewey's Pragmaticism is similar to an organic theory of aesthetics.

[32] Van Meter Ames, "John Dewey as Aesthetician," JAAC 12 (December 1953):157.

[33] John Dewey, AE, p. 82. Art is not nature, but nature which is transformed by the relationships established which evoke new emotional responses.

[34] John Dewey, AE, pp. 95-100. Dewey rejects the notion that represented works (i.e., like poetry, literature) have meaning which is borrowed directly from nature. Any presentation of representative work is immediately experienced differently by different people because different relations of line, color, symbols become significant for different perceivers. This is something different from symbolic "meaning" where one thing stands for another. Meaning in such cases is generalized. Art meanings

on the other hand are particular. See, Bertram Morris, in "Dewey's Aesthetics: The Tragic Encounter with Nature," JAAC 30 (Winter 1971). He further elaborates:

> "Perceptions do copy things, not literally but through a sort of one-to-one correspondence that provides a new dimension to the world. If the account he gives is in principle correct, it is also an authentic philosophical revelation —man and nature are so a part of each other that what we experience is nature." (p. 191.)

[35] Most evident in the first chapter, "The Live Creature" and the last, "Art and Civilization."

[36] See J. Kaminsky, "Dewey's Concept of An Experience," Journal of Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 17, 1957, p. 320. Kaminsky clearly presents the distinction between emotional reaction and expressed emotion.

> "In essence, Dewey regards emotion as the quality that permeates an experience. But the emotion must be expressed and not simply discharged. A jump of fright may be no more than an automatic reflex to a situation; it may be no more than a sudden discharge of activity. But a jump of fright becomes the 'emotional fear' that can characterize an experience when it entails actions to be undertaken, plans to be devised, and consequences to be foreseen. In such an instance fear has been expressed rather than discharged."

[37] John Dewey, AE p. 98.

> "This motor preparation is a large part of esthetic education in any particular line. To know what to look for and how to see it is an affair of readiness on the part of the motor equipment."

[38] John Dewey, AE pp. 99-102 and pp. 184-185.

[39] This notion is clarified by Bertram Morris, "Dewey's Aesthetic: The Tragic Encounter with Nature," JAAC 30, 1971, p. 193.

> "Dewey's virtue in coping with the form of continuity that is purely aesthetic resides

> in his dogged insistence that art is first and fundamentally a process, and only secondarily a product. The part-whole kind of analysis of traditional, idealistic aesthetics is junked, except for a few scraps he overlooked. The part-whole analysis is too much like the jigsaw puzzle, in which the parts are ready-make, just waiting to be put into place. Dewey's insistance upon the aesthetic process is not idealistic but naturalistic: it is an urgency born of experience and ..."

[40] John Dewey, AE, p. 101.

> "Different lines and different relations of lines become subconsciously charged with all the values that result from what they have done in our experience in our every contact with the world around us."

See also, M. W. Boyer, "An Expansion of Dewey's Groundwork for a General Theory of Value," JAAC 15 (September 1956):100-105. Boyer claims that Dewey omitted to delineate "natural beauty." His was an attempt to correct this.

[41] John Dewey, AE, p. 136.

> "Form may then be defined as the operation of forces that carry the experience of an event, object, scene, and situation to its own integral fulfilment."

Also see, Sidney Hook, John Dewey: An Intellectual Portrait, p. 204.

> "The possession of aesthetic form is objectively determinable just as soon as specific meaning has been given to the general conditions which an object must meet in order to become an object of art."

[42] John Dewey, AE, pp. 141-145. Dewey does not mean technical achievements, but techniques which arise because of new experiences. Three-dimensional space, as a development of the Renaissance, grew out of naturalism, while aerial perspective arose to glorify mystic experiences. These techniques, once they had gone through a dialectic process became academic, eclectic and static. They no longer had any relationship to the experience which first produced them.

[43] John Dewey, AE, p. 154.

[44] B. Morris, "Dewey's Aesthetics: The Tragic Encounter with Nature," JAAC 30 (Winter 1971):190.

> "Closer to what Dewey actually means is that art sets up rhythms in man, which are also found in nature. And this is so, but they are not copies, for perception is an activity, not a copy of nature."

[45] John Dewey, AE, pp. 150-161. Naturalism is Dewey's term to express an escape from convention. Secular arts are able to make "official" arts more naturalistic by expanding acceptable expressible values. "Nature" in naturalism refers to both man and his relations to nature.

[46] This ideal is well defined in Bertram Morris', "Dewey's Aesthetics: The Tragic Encounter with Nature," JAAC 30 (Winter 1971):191.

> "But even if there is a sense in which art corresponds to nature as its model that somehow gets incorporated in it (and we really cannot rule this out), there is another kind of copy or mimicry that definitely we cannot dismiss. This is a mimicry that is in the piece of sculpture or the painting or the dance that we cannot perceive without responding to it rhythmically."

See also, R. Bernstein, John Dewey, p. 156, and D.W. Gotshalk, "On Dewey's Aesthetics," JAAC 23, 1965, Section II, pp. 133-134. Gotshalk argues that Dewey maintained this distinction to (1) avoid placing art on a pedestal, (2) extend the notion of experience to the perceiver rather than attributing experience solely to the artist who produced it.

[47] S. C. Pepper, "The Concept of Fusion in Dewey's Aesthetic Theory," JAAC 12 (December 1953):169-176. Pepper lists six characteristics of fusion as developed in Dewey's analysis of perception. These he lists and prepares to criticize.

> "Some of these characters of fusion appear to be inconsistent with others. Let us name the characters simply. (1) Fusion is quality, (2) fusion (quality) has references of meaning, (3) what is fused is itself qualitative

> (and so fused?), (4) fusion is a single felt immediacy, (5) fusion (quality is a process, may change, may be in error, (6) fusion controls an event, situation, process, and defines its boundaries.
> ...No. 1 appears self-contradictory, No. 4 appears contrary to No. 2 and No. 5, No. 3 seems to involve an infinite regression." (p. 171.)

He writes,

> "...(1) First, it is clear that there is no actual difference between 'fusion' and the single quality that results from it. The process of fusion is not one thing occurring at one time and the resulting single quality another thing at a later time. The process of fusion _is_, in the very process itself, the quality fused:..." (p. 170.)

[48] John Dewey, _AE_, p. 192.

[49] S. Pepper, "The Concept of Fusion in Dewey's Aesthetic Theory," _JAAC_ 12 (December 1953):170-173. Pepper makes mention that the concept of fusion is an old one. Both James and Bergson stressed it and even Baumgarten's connotation of aesthetic experience as _confused_ cognition is synonymous with fusion.

[50] Ibid., p. 170.

> "Dewey adds that fused quality cannot 'be described nor..._specifically_ pointed out', which is in some sense ridiculous since clearly he is quite successfully indicating it and doing well at giving some sort of description of it. Many philosophers when they approach one of their ultimate categorical elements delight in casting the halo of ineffability about it. The unspeakability of the element, however, must be of a specially defined sort, since by some other sense of utterability they are presenting it for belief by means of speech. All Dewey evidently means by indescribability is this passage is the character of ultimate immediacy. And he suggests that 'intuition' be stipulated to symbolize this sort of apprehension of immediacy."

[50] Van Meter Ames, "John Dewey as Aesthetician," JAAC 12 (December 1952):164.

> "Dewey would let art mean a fine fusion of means and ends increasing human freedom, a successful making over of experience into what it wants to be. He would make plain that aesthetic effect calls for something in addition to the adaptation of the parts of an object for use. The resulting form is aesthetic only when it 'fits into a larger experience'."

[52] Pepper in "The Concept of Fusion in Dewey's Aesthetic Theory," attempts to turn Dewey around. Dewey argued that fusion occurs in *an* experience and furthermore, *an* experience resultant from "turmoil" or "conflict" with the environment. Pepper develops the opposite thesis. Fusion seems to be the natural state *unless* the organism undergoes a problematic situation, *then* analysis is necessary to restore rhythm and balance.

> "Fusion seems to be the natural, easy, primitive mode of perception, and analysis the difficult mode requiring effort or training. That suggests that analyzed perception develops only under practical stress for the solution of conflicts in problematic situations.
>
> ....
>
> Fusion then seems to be the state of consciousness to be found *unless* a problematic situation arises forcing discrimination and analysis to avoid pain and frustration." (p. 173.)

[53] Ibid., p. 174. Pepper wished to correct this one point. Space-time were changing relations when experiencing "qualities."

> "The one correction of any great significance that seems to be needed in Dewey's general treatment of quality and fusion has to do with his emphasis on the singleness of quality. Actually the intuited quality will change with every change in the elements fused."

[54] John Dewey, *AE*, pp. 200-212.

[55] John Dewey, *AE*, p. 215.

[56] C. Graña, "John Dewey's Social Art and the Sociology of Art," *JAAC* 20, 1962, p. 405.

> "For Dewey the greatest obstacle to aesthetic understanding was the accepted classification of art as objects made by professionals, possessed by institutions, or bought and sold under the rules of the cultural market."

[57] Van Meter Ames, "John Dewey as Aesthetician," *JAAC* 12 (December 1953):159. Van Meter Ames expands this concept which indicates that the element of artistic genius becomes eliminated. If more transitions are shown, quantum jumps are seen more as steps than leaps.

[58] John Dewey, *AE*, p. 220ff.

[59] John Dewey, *AE*, p. 220. The fundamental mistake, Dewey maintains, is to confuse physical products with aesthetic ones. The latter embodied in a cumulative series of interactions, is realized as a single perception.

[60] See, I. Edman, op. cit., p. 60.

[61] John Dewey, *AE*, p. 229. Each medium had particular suitabilities for specific situations.

[62] John Dewey, *AE*, pp. 220-230.

[63] C. Graña, "John Dewey's Social Art and the Sociology of Art," 20, 1962, p. 409.

> It is nevertheless Dewey's intention to judge artistic success as part of a symbolic accommodation to the surroundings, including of course, the social surroundings."

[64] See Jack Kaminsky, "Dewey's Concept of an Experience," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 17, 1957, p. 3-17. Kaminsky sums up Deweyan analysis of human nature as:

> "To understand Dewey's analysis of human experience, we must endeavor to understand what Dewey believes man is. As a strict naturalist Dewey denies that man is in

> some sense a unique being who is divorced from nature. Man, like any natural creature, is a being reacting and interacting with an environment. His life and destiny are bound up with the interchange he makes with his physical and social environments. His responses to stimuli may not be as instinctive as those of the lower animals, but the same pattern of need and required fulfillment is found in both. Man, as a more complex animal, may have more complex needs. But his needs, like those of the lower animals, arise from 'a temporary absence of adequate adjustment with surroundings'. And like a creature of nature man seeks constantly to regain the equilibrium that he may have lost.
>
> ...This similarity between man and animal does not imply that man is reduced to the level of the brutes. Rather it implies that man's own kind of experience must be understood in the light of its continuity with and development out of animal forebears. It is to be expected that man, as a complicated animal, will experience much more than the other animals. His world will be filled with greater possibilities for action, greater experiementation, and more ways of obtaining the equilibrium he seeks. His feelings will become more subtle and his sensitivities will increase. In resolving his conflicts and fulfilling his needs he will be able to call upon many more instruments than the lower animals. With his gift of consciousness he will be able to examine the very interchange between himself and his environment. Unlike the lower animals he will not react mechanically to the rhythms discoverable in nature, but instead he will be able to abstract from their concrete instances the processes of give and take that occur between himself and his environment. Thus in his consciousness will develop the *Idea* of law, the *Idea* of harmony, and finally the theoretical sciences. By using these abstract principles man begins to achieve a control over nature that no other animals before him have ever attained. With such control his adjustments, his resolutions of conflicts, become more satisfactory. The hit-or-miss response of animal instinct is replaced by the warranted and thought-out response of intelligence."

[65] John Dewey, AE, p. 249.

> "For the uniquely distinguishing feature of esthetic experience is exactly the fact that no such distinction of self and object exists in it, since it is esthetic in the degree in which organism and environment cooperate to institute an experience in which the two are fully integrated that each disappears."

[66] Ibid., p. 249.

[67] Sidney Hook, John Dewey: An Intellectual Portrait, p. 204.

> "What is perceived is not in the object; nor in the subject; but in the interacting relation of the two."

[68] Gotshalk, "On Dewey's Aesthetics," JAAC 23, 1965, p. 137. Gotshalk argues that Dewey is missing the human element.

[69] John Dewey, AE, p. 265.

[70] See Irwin Edman, "Dewey and Art," in John Dewey: A Symposium, ed. S. Hook (New York: Dial Press, 1950), p. 50 and p. 61.

[71] John Dewey, AE, pp. 265-270.

[72] John Dewey, AE, p. 268.

[73] Dewey's theory of imagination is consistent with his theory of expression. Stewart Buettner in "John Dewey and the Visual Arts in America," JAAC 32, 1975, pp. 383-391, develops the theme that Abstract Expressionism was uniquely based on the Deweyan hypothesis and which culminated with John Cage and the "Happening."

> "Almost all important American artists then painting in a more abstract manner renounced European ideas of spirituality and purity in painting in the belief that art could produce 'a profound change in our environment and in our lives'. It was this stimulus which inclined American artists working in New York during the early 1930s, even the most avant-

> garde of them, to believe that art could not be separated from life." (p. 385.)

[74] John Dewey, AE, p. 300.

[75] Ibid., p. 157.

> "Dewey does not take to mean that we cannot make valuations. For him it means that we must use judgment, and are free to. Not something external to our experience but the very factors constituting it are the criteria by which to judge the expression of it. We can and must use our own judgment, but not without the insights of others when they enable our observation to be more aware and articulate. In Dewey's book genuine criticism is possible for each of us only as judgment, as our venture toward the qualities of an object by way of our impressions and knowledge; with our own daring to perceive what is there for us. The best protection of judgment is not professional training, but opennes to life itself."

[76] John Dewey, AE, pp. 306-310.

[77] John Dewey, AE, p. 311. Dewey maintained that critics should have acquaintance with masterpieces and works which were transitions to various "traditions." Furthermore, a knowledge of a variety of conditions and materials used in art would aid in his criticism.

[78] John Dewey, AE, pp. 315ff.

[79] Sociological criticism is a case in point. Cultural aspects may throw light on the work but it is no substitute in understanding the object for its own qualities and relations. See George Boas, "Communication in John Dewey's Aesthetics," JAAC 12 (December 1953) :177-183.

[80] John Dewey, AE, p. 317.

> "But historic judgment is not esthetic judgment. There are categories - that is, controlling conceptions of inquiry - appropriate to history and only confusion results when they are used

> to control inquiry into art which also has its own ideas."

[81] John Dewey, *AE*, p. 319-320.

[82] The examination of Dewey's instrumentalism as embodied in earlier thoughts in *Experience and Nature* which refers to theory and practice may be found in E. A. Shearer's, "Dewey's Esthetic Theory I," *Journal of Philosophy* 32(23) (November 1935):617-627, and "Dewey's Esthetic Theory II," *Journal of Philosophy* 32(24) (November 1935):650-664.

[83] Van Meter Ames, "John Dewey as Aesthetician," *JAAC* 12, 1953, p. 167. Van Meter Ames clarifies this point under the pragmatic rubric.

> "At least there is a way of thinking about art on the part of Dewey and other pragmatists. It is tied up with a social theory of the self, according to which the growth of the individual depends upon social contacts. It follows that value is relative to the development reached by the individual-and-his-society. Then what is good or great in art may change or even be replaced by later work. The merit of any artwork is always exposed to re-assessment in relation to the social context in which it appears."

[84] C. Graña, "John Dewey's Social Art and the Sociology of Art," 20, 1962, p. 406.

> "Later Dewey adds that art is, in the largest sense, a social phenomenon, and that men should understand it as a manifestation of their *collective* spirit. Whole societies, and not individuals alone, could be the agents of experience in his sense."

[85] B. Morris, "Dewey's Aesthetics: The Tragic Encounter with Nature," *JAAC* 30, 1971, p. 195-196. Morris attempts to define "society," in light of Dewey's claim that art is its record of "quality" and achievement.

> "Between these two notions of society apparently lies the kind of society Dewey talks about—a society too good to be entirely degrading and too bad to be quite satisfactory. Between total

> alienation and total well-being, men are restless and inquiring and needing change."

Morris concludes that is it within these limitations that art may be said to be reflective of social character.

[86] John Dewey, AE, p. 270. See Section 6.11 of this thesis. Dewey's statement of this assertion goes as follows:

> "Expression strikes below the barriers that separate human beings from one another. Since art is the most universal form of language, since it is constituted by the common qualities of the public world, it is the most universal and freest form of communication."

[87] This concept has brought on criticism from at least one writer. Graña, "John Dewey's Social Art and the Sociology of Art," JAAC 20 (Summer 1962), argues that the assumption is made, that the meaning of the lives of most people comes from the images of a few; others, whom artists paint and write about, are voiceless. Hence, a true picture is not received. More information is required.

> "The Parthenon tells us something about the Athenians, not aside from its being a work of art but because of it. Which is to say that we understand the Athenians better when we know that they wanted their civic temples to be monuments." (p. 408.)

[88] B. Morris, "Dewey's Aesthetics: The Tragic Encounter with Nature," JAAC 30, 1971, p. 191.

> "The gift of the gods is repsented in the form of experience—aesthetic experience—by which men come to a more perfect union with themselves and their environment. In the process, it is be observed, men achieve a real sense of the social, which itself is a manifestation of art. This, I take it, is Dewey's way of envisioning the continuity between art and society."

[89] Ibid., p. 191.

> "The question then is how to understand art in the context of society, and not that of how to understand society in the context of art. The former allows us to see art as a

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> natural phenomenon; the latter makes art precious in the form of the fine arts, and then seeks a context for understanding the fine arts when that context has already been obliterated by the method employed. Consequently the method negates the naturalistic point of view in favor of aestheticism, whether of the Crocean or psychedelic variety."

[90] John Dewey, AE, p. 335.

> "Unless we arrive at the attitudes expressed in the art of another civilization, its products are either of concern to the 'esthete' alone, or else they do not impress us esthetically."

[91] Leon Jacobson, "Art and Experience and American Visual Art Today," JAAC 19 (Winter 1960):117-126. Jacobson criticizes Dewey for not practicing what he preached. The theme is developed that Dewey maintained that works of art should be representational, whereas the American art scene from 1946-1952 was well into abstraction.

CHAPTER SEVEN

Aesthetic Theory of Eugene Kaelin

7.1 Statement of Intent

The purpose of this chapter is to critique the aesthetics of Kaelin, particularly insofar as his aesthetic position has been moulded by the aesthetics of Sartre, Merleau-Ponty and Heidegger. Kaelin has claimed[1] that each of these writers has influenced his development of an aesthetic. This chapter will attempt to analyze those philosophical characteristics which are associated with each of the three philosophers mentioned above, and will assess the extent to which other factors may have contributed to Kaelin's philosophical position.

A three part analysis will be presented. Section 7.2 will examine the aesthetics of Sartre, particularly in regard to his Theory of the Imagination, since Kaelin has claimed[2] that this theory occupies a central position in the analysis of the artwork.

Section 7.3 will examine the aesthetics of Merleau-Ponty, chiefly insofar as his theory of perception deals with the non-representational features in the work of art. While Kaelin accepts Merleau-Ponty's analysis of the perceptual process, he has stated[3] that he does not feel satisfied with Merleau-Ponty's explanation of the ontological status of the artwork. This section will attempt to reflect those features of Merleau-Ponty's theoretical position which Kaelin finds most useful.

Section 7.4 will examine Kaelin's aesthetic theory. Kaelin has claimed that he has gone beyond the positions of Sartre and Merleau-Ponty by adopting elements of Heidegger and Roman Ingarden.[4]

This claim will be examined by reviewing his critique of Sartre and Merleau-Ponty; his own eclectic position and his methodology. Appendices C through F will provide explications of phenomenology and the work of Heidegger, of Ingarden and Dufrenne.[5] The chapter will end with a summary of Kaelin's aesthetics.

7.2 Aesthetics of Jean-Paul Sartre

A. His Phenomenological Theory of Aesthetic Imagination

In order to understand Sartre's aesthetics it is necessary to understand his general theory of the imagination. In accounting for its development, Sartre has claimed[6] that he has answered the question of how images function in the act of knowing and how they differ from perceptions.

Adopting Husserlian transcendental reduction,[7] Sartre, in L'Imaginaire (1940) presented a distinction between the act of perceiving a real object and the act of perceiving the representation of a real object.

In the act of imagining, images themselves are not perceived but can be known through a process of reflection. Reflection enables one to intuit the essence of the imagining consciousness through the phenomenological method.[8] Sartre applied this method to summarize the essence of an image as being constituted by four conditions.[9]

The first condition sees the image as a conscious and intentional event. Thus, an image is not conceived merely as content.

The second characteristic is the attitude of the imagining consciousness. In an act of imagination the consciousness intends an unreal object which is constituted by the consciousness. This image is unique because it has no relation to objects in the environing world.

The third characteristic which typifies the essence of an image is the quality of non-existence. Images are said to assume the non-existent form of objects.[10] A negation of the image (which is to say, the concretization of the image) constitutes the essence of the imaginative consciousness. It follows that negation will occur in reflection.[11] In reflection, which investigates the structure of the image, the consciousness loses the image, because the intention of the consciousness has changed from the immediate image to the image as a product of investigation.

The final characteristic of an imaginative act is spontaneity. A free and spontaneous decision to introduce images in the imaginative act is what Sartre terms a judgment, because imaginative assertions are being made.

These characteristics are the underpinnings for the difference between perceiving a real or an imagined object. In perceiving a real object, the consciousness intends a real object. This perception of the object is however, not a direct copy, but is related to other objects of its kind.

In an act of veridical perception only one "profile" (Abschattugen) is perceived—a "profile" unified by an understood concept. To perceive an object, one understands the concept of that object and of objects in the same class. In the act of imagining however, the concept is revealed in each particular instance, or imagining act.

B. Aesthetic Theory in Sartre's Phenomenology

Applying his theory of imagination to the creation of art, Sartre presents an idealistic aesthetic.[12] He claims[13] that the work of art is "unreal." Artists construct a material analogue in the real world which is representative of the "unreal work."

The artifact is therefore an image. The image's referent is the aesthetic object. The term "aesthetic object" is synonymous with "work of art," "essence," "ideal," or "non-actual" event. Sartre warns[14] that the aesthetic object cannot be identified by any one interpretation because it is a non-actual or ideal object. What is enjoyed and appreciated is one interpretation of the aesthetic object as embodied in the physical object. What is contemplated or reflected is the aesthetic essence.

Sartre maintains a phenomenological veiwpoint in his description of the communicating process.[15] When an artist creates an object his consciousness intends an "absent" object via the created artifact. To complete the act of communication necessitates a second consciousness, that of the appreciator, who, by assuming the aesthetic attitude[16] intends the same unreal or absent object. The artifact serves to unite both consciousnesses in the act of communication.

The role of emotions in the act of communication are considered as facts of consciousness by Sartre.[17] They are intentional ways by which a subject is related to objects in the world. Emotions, are therefore, properties of objects.

For the act of communication to occur someone must respond actively to the artifact or performance in such a way that the ideal aesthetic object is apparent. In this way, by assuming the aesthetic attitude, the perceiver helps to create the artist's work. The appearance of the aesthetic object depends upon the attitude taken by an audience of appreciators. "Aesthetic distance," between the real (lived in) world and ideal (aesthetic) world is required in order to understand the "aesthetic object."

C. Sartre's Existentialist Criticism

Sartre's position towards the role of the critic in the arts is an extention of his social theory and his view of the role of literature in society.[18] The general purpose of the critic is to widen the actual audience to include as many as possible in the virtual audience.[19] His task is to understand the artist's work and help others to do the same. To judge the value of a contemporary work, Sartre claims the critic must guess and take a chance.[20] To do otherwise, the critic would require the ability to disengage himself from his historical situation, which would be an impossibility.

To produce the understanding necessary to be a critic, knowledge of politics and society is required. Only historical data relevant to the explanation of the work should enter the structure of criticism; the rest is historical pedantry. Aesthetic analysis begins where historical research leaves off. Judgment of aesthetic value follows from the understanding of the concrete form of the structured aesthetic object.

The critic has fulfilled his function when he has analyzed the texture and structure of the work under consideration in such a way as to disclose the manner in which it reveals the inner structure of the world, society, or consciousness. Criticism, then, attempts to show the value of art as it discloses being in some aspect of its totality.

For Sartre, the value of the imagined object is the revelation of the world as it is. The "world as it is" means the reality of the realization that the work is good in itself. It has no end but to produce feelings of harmony during comtemplation even though the perception of the structure of the artwork may have moral and theoretical implications. Evaluations leave the person with occasions of "aesthetic" pleasure. When the imagination and understanding are harmonized, the work is then judged as beautiful and pleasurable.

The claim to knowledge[21] is explicit in the above schema. Images are motivated by perceptions of the world and reflected in the artifact as an abstraction of it. Knowledge of image is therefore made by direct acquaintance. It is either had or not by the person who enjoys the image. This "immediate knowledge" is further supported by the fact that the image is unique. Knowledge of it cannot be had in any other way.

D. Sartre's Aesthetic Existentialism

The criteria of "choice" and "freedom" are central to existentialism and to Sartre's existentialist aesthetics.[22] The artist should have a free choice in imagining and presenting a situation other than the one in which he is presently involved. Man is responsible for the world he lives in (pour-soi). Motivated by the external situation surrounding him, man must choose to change it, or go along and accept the consequences of his situation as it is. The existentialist movement sees the artist as free to express a personal choice as to how to present the "world" in his artworks.[23]

In relation to the above, Sartre introduces a further criterion of commitment in the arts to show the functional aspect of arts and their role in society.[24] Commitment shows directionality for art, both socially and politically. First, commitment is a social action. The artist is to reveal the world and man's place in it. The achievement of the pour-soi (complete selfhood) should be reflected in the work. Secondly, commitment is political because of art's social consequences. The artist may indicate new directions and new meanings and values which would enrich culture and be shared by all.[25]

E. Summary of Sartre's Aesthetics

Sartre's theory of the imagination lays the foundation of an idealistic aesthetic which views the aesthetic object as an "unreal" or "absent" projection of a created analogue or physical artifact. Sartre calls this analogue, an image.

The creative process is given similar treatment. The imagining mind of the artist intends a non-real object. One facet of this absent object materializes during the creative process. The artist is given no special privileged position in this process. He too, like his audience, must wait until the process of creation is finished to see the development of the aesthetic image.

Communication between artist and audience is via the art object. It is here that the emotions play a role in the communicative process. The artist is said to present emotion objectively in various artifacts, but it is the audience which experiences and entertains these emotions.

The existentialist notion of freedom and choice is reflected in the communication process. Audience and artist can actively complete the communication by assuming the "aesthetic attitude" so that the aesthetic object becomes visible. The critic's role is to enhance this communicative process.

Knowledge in this schema is considered on two levels. The first is the recognition that "immediate sensuous knowledge" is had through the intuition of a unique object. The recognition that an artist is culture-bound historically and socio-economically provides a further type of knowledge. The textural aspects of the work are reflected in the first sort of knowledge; while ideological structure is reflected in the second.

Finally, choice and commitment are key considerations in Sartre's existentialist aesthetics. An artist is to have freedom in the manipulation of his materials and in the ideology he chooses. Commitment to the existentialist movement serves to achieve social consciousness whereby the ideology of the arts is the same ideology of all. In this classless society, art and man are not disjoined.

7.3 Aesthetics of Merleau-Ponty

In order to understand Merleau-Ponty's aesthetics it is first necessary to understand his views on psychology and the phenomenology of perception. The following presents a discussion of both these major areas and how they affect Merleau-Ponty's aesthetic stance.

A. Merleau-Ponty's Psychology

The major thrust of Merleau-Ponty's psychology was[26] that each species determines its own kind of stimulii. By their selectivity and intentionality, organisms have as much causal effect upon the environment as the environment has on them. The total set of circumstances in each situation conditions each response to it. The effect of the situation gave "meaning" to a stimulus.[27]

In a realistic situation,[28] Merleau-Ponty adopted the gestalt notion of "form"[29] to explain the organism's adaptability to the environment. "Form" had no central cause. It was an expressive term which described properties of certain groupings creating necessary conditions for specific responses.[30]

In an attempt to explain human behavior, Merleau-Ponty based his analysis on the various responses of lower animals. This he called his "philosophical anthropology."[31]

Merleau-Ponty identifies three levels of behavioral responses which, in hierarchical order, he named "syncretic forms," "mutable forms," and "symbolic forms."[32] These he introduced as the "dialectics of order" and each one of these forms presented a dialectic development of behavior. A successive progression from lower to higher order behavior culminates in these for which man is uniquely fitted.[33] "Symbolic form" was self-conscious behavior which could be reached by man through reflection, and was demonstrated in his ability to reflect upon lower order questions. It was this level which enabled man to extend his biological capacity, through his ability to create institutions and do work.[34]

B. Phenomenology as Theory of Perception

Merleau-Ponty adopted the Husserlian view of phenomenology but with a re-evaluation of eidetic reduction.[35] The pre-objective domain was his term for Husserl's method of bracketing to avoid any reference to the real world. The pre-objective domain was manifest in the moment when the consciousness grasped an image or an object within an indeterminate situation.[36] During this phase there is no reflection, only an immediate grasp of sensations. The human being, who is always in an environing situation, thus constructs his object from the pre-objective indefinite perception of a quality. This original or primary perception may not be definite but becomes clearer in reflection.[37]

Perception, in this schema, is a re-organization of the indeterminate relations between the perceiver and the environment. When the perception becomes clear, the subject's consciousness achieves a new way of being present to the world and learning takes place.[38]

From the above, it follows that the primary act of pre-objective perception is already a primitive act of creation. Retinal images which enter perception are not themselves perceived but serve as motivations for the appearance of the object perceived within the phenomenological field. This is the primary intention needed to perceive the object. Thus Merleau-Ponty posits the existence of two consciousnesses, in the manner of Husserlian phenomenology.[39]

In reflection, the individual can only examine the patterns and events in prior lived-in states. Perception, therefore, has its roots in pre-rational experiences and to account for this fact, Merleau-Ponty's theory of perception starts with the analysis of the body.[40]

It is at the body level that primary perception occurs.[41] The primary reference point of the body is the here. All spatial-temporal objects gain their meaning from the body's position. The body is treated as a locus of kinesthetic sensations which are given globally and immediately.[42]

In Merleau-Ponty's theory for perception there is always an understood third term, that of the body's position. Every object of perception is grasped as a figure on a double ground; the ground of the perceived figure and that of the body's space. Feelings, including those immediately experienced from the artwork, are felt on the body, it being the focal point of interaction with its environment.[43]

Merleau-Ponty introduced the notion of the "intentional arc" or the "phenomenological field" to explain how a normal consciousness is related to the objects in the environment.[44] This "intentional arc" was the tension between the organism and the environment. It was here that all facts of consciousness took place. Although man was bound by the phenomenological field, every human being was capable through the exercise of consciousness of surpassing it by changing it to suit his own particular needs. Transcendence could occur.[45]

C. Merleau-Ponty's Criticism

The role of philosophy as criticism plays a central role in Merleau-Ponty's aesthetics. Through philosophical reflection, the tacit symbolism of the lived situation could be made visible; that is, brought to conscious awareness.[46] Indeed, the "aesthetic object," as the synthesis of primary perception, demanded such reflection.

Merleau-Ponty considered "the aesthetic object," especially in the plastic arts, as the product of humanly significant acts whose meaning was pre-rational, demanding continual and indefinite criticism.[47] Cezanne's work was, for him, the embodiment of this way of thinking.[48]

The "aesthetic object" as a primary expression was a reaction against the socially codified "secondary expressions" which defined culture. Merleau-Ponty defined these "secondary expressions" as those which were a reinterpretation or copy of past and existing ideas.[49]

Being human meant perceiving a world and creating a culture in which behavioral patterns and reactions soon began to be ingrained in the human personality, to the point where an individual did not think about the "significance" and "meaning" of his behavior. The logic of cultural meanings was "lived," not reflected. This was why critical philosophy as applied to the arts, was necessary, to examine ingrained secondary expressions which were out-dated but purported to describe pre-rational experiences.[50]

The above rationale provided the backdrop for explaining artistic creation. The complete and articulated artistic idea did not precede the finished work. The artist stopped working only when he, himself, discovered what he had said. Thus discovery and aesthetic judgment were one and the same process.[51] Style was the result of the artist perceiving objects and placing his individual mark on them without being consciously aware of it.

Merleau-Ponty further reasoned that the meaning of a work was not translatable into a set of discursive or logical symbols. His theory of perception indicated that "meanings" of artworks were judged by individuals in a direct first-hand experience of primary perception.[52] "Understanding" a form was therefore, a body reaction.

The significance of the work had to appear on the work's surface. It was a world in itself and had to be understood in itself. Emotion was also controlled by the work's structure. This being the case, the critic's role was to clarify and describe the work's structure by attempting to recreate the form in order to understand its significance.[53]

The work was not to be assessed but described. The critic had to assume an aesthetic attitude towards the work so that he would allow himself to experience the work. This attitude, Merleau-Ponty argued, could be formalistic, intellectualistic or existentialistic.[54]

Existential criticism was Merleau-Ponty's attempt at "philosophical reflection" in aesthetics. Through continual reworkings, the significance of the work would be revealed, although not in an ultimate sense since a single truth was not available. The methodology for doing such criticism was never fully developed; only paradigm cases were given.[55]

D. Summary of Merleau-Ponty's Aesthetics

Merleau-Ponty has suggested the existence of a non-thetic (i.e., non-discriminating) consciousness, a pre-objective, original perception which possesses an immanent meaning in lived experience. This meaning is not fully determinable but becomes clear only in the face of further evidence and through reflection. These two consciousnesses (primary and reflective) were related by the meaning one suggests to the other.

This phenomenology is carried over to aesthetics. Merleau-Ponty distinguishes two types of expressions: primary and secondary. Primary expressions were embodied in works of art which presented unique insights into cultural values while secondary expression presented ingrained and institutionalized views. Only through the process of critical reflection could one consciously change his judgments about works of art because primary perception was already a pre-judgment via the body reaction. An existentialist criticism was needed for such reflection: however, its methodology was never developed.

7.4 Kaelin's Existentialist-Phenomenological Aesthetics

Kaelin has claimed to have developed an eclectic position which is more efficacious than the aesthetic theories of Sartre and Merleau-Ponty.[56] He has further claimed that the theories of Heidegger and Roman Ingarden offer an improvement over those of the French phenomenologists.[57] Kaelin has freely borrowed from all four positions in arriving at his existential-phenomenological base. The following sections examine this claim. Appendices D and E provide explanations of phenomenology and the aesthetics of Heidegger and Ingarden. These will be referred to in the following analysis.

A. Kaelin's Critique of Sartre and Merleau-Ponty

Sartre had described an aesthetic object as an intentional object, distinguished by its absence or non-existence and intended by means of the physical analogue constructed by the artist.

Sartre had further defined man as free, insofar as he was capable of imagining the existence of an object which was not present to his senses. Transcendence was possible through an act of the imagination. Structures which were lacking in the real environment could be fulfilled through imagination.

To this, Kaelin made the criticism that if Sartre's phenomenological description of the imagining consciousness is applied to the experience of works of art, it is found to be limited to representational works.[58] If the work deviated towards a non-objective mode, one couldn't describe an intentional correlate of the physical analogue in any way other than what was perceived in the actual work. Yet non-objective works represented a unique and individual significance.

For non-objective works, Kaelin prefers Merleau-Ponty's explanation. Perception was conceptualized as a corporeal reaction: the value of what was seen on the surface of the work was felt within the structures of the human corporeal schema as it attended to an object in an organized field. The object and its field were related as figure and ground, held in a single and tense vibrating position. Merleau-Ponty linked intuition of a form with the significance of its organization. Materials were all sensuous; the form was the felt tension of materials as they fused into closure and significance.

In this case Kaelin claimed that Merleau-Ponty had not taken into account representational elements. Merleau-Ponty's aesthetics dealt with elements which were not seen, only referred to. In pre-objective perception, the structure of the elements is grasped, without their referential content being apparent.[59]

In summation, Kaelin concluded that where Sartre's doctrine was "thick," Merleau-Ponty's doctrine was "thin." An emphasis on the imagal values of representational works at the expense of perceptual values of their surface, as Sartre had suggested, ignored the important fact of aesthetic creation; that the meaning of representational works was controlled by the manner of their presentation on the work's surface. Both meaning and representation needed to be "internalized" as part of the total expression.[60] Kaelin came to believe that Roman Ingarden's phenomenological aesthetics had solved this inconsistency.

Merleau-Ponty, on the other hand, was aware of his "thin" doctrine. His theory had reduced all visual objects to a felt tension within an intentional arc. He had given no support for any kind of iconological or symbolic reference, however, in L'oeuil et l'esprit he made the attempt to introduce the experience of painting as a direct revelation of "Being."[61] This attempt, Kaelin claimed, was a failure. It was Heidegger, said Kaelin, who provided the correct analysis.[62]

B. Kaelin's Eclectic Position

Kaelin has attempted to rectify the above limitations by centering his aesthetics around three notions concerning the imagination, perception and context of significance.[63] The first notion was an adaptation of Sartre; the second notion was a contribution of Merleau-Ponty; and the last, Kaelin has attributed to Roman Ingarden[64] who had applied the method of Husserl to describe the nature of an aesthetic object. Heideggerian concepts are adopted whenever theory has grown "thin."

1. Role of Imagination. Kaelin accepted Sartre's principle of freedom. In painting, a set of qualitative relationships is manipulated. The artist has the freedom to accept or change these relationships as they become instituted in the act

of creation. This can only be done through the imagination, by which the artist projects qualitative relationships not as yet part of the established situation.[65]

To clarify this point further, Kaelin introduces the Heideggerian notion of "world".[66] Each new stroke is grasped as a new art of intending the "painter's world." The causal influence is from the future, not the past. The work begins with a past perception, is interpreted in the light of the future, through the imagination and culminates in a new meaning in the present.[67]

Such a view of creation placed no premium on either imagination or perception; both were involved, regardless of whether the work was representational or non-objective.[68] The future orientation of Heideggerian aesthetics introduced the notion that art may show new directions of transcendence.

This projection of value was qualified by Kaelin. In order for communication to take place the artist had to use common materials and embody in them meaningful present experience.[69] Artistic freedom was not absolute. To be of maximum effect on society, the work had to be of significant context, otherwise there was no communication.

2. Context of Significance. Kaelin's second notion purported to answer what was appreciated when one attended to the artistic creation. The idea that the aesthetic object was a metaphysical object intended by the physical analogue had been fully developed by Sartre and Mikel Dufrenne.[70] Both accounts were dismissed.

Judgments of value were warranted only by appealing to the features of various works as they appeared in context. Context was defined as the relationship between object and subject. This relationship may be called "imagination," "perception," "minding" and "feeling" and it depends upon the character of the object intended.[71] This thesis was an adaptation of Roman Ingarden's position.[72] Ingarden termed the total expressiveness of a work of art as a "polyphonic harmony" which was composed of a number of strata.

Following his lead, Kaelin states that in some works of art expressiveness was exhausted by its "surface " (i.e., dance, non-objective painting, music). Aesthetic surfaces were components of sensory elements of "counters." The perception of them was attributed to Merleau-Ponty. The _felt_ tension of counters was considered a judgment. _Clarity_ and _intensity_ were the criteria for this pre-judgment.[73]

The appearance of depth counters altered the context. Lines, volumes and spaces suggested familar forms to the imagination. The appearance of an object evoked further ideas. The relationship of these representations introduced further play of the imagination and understanding. The interrelationships of all these counters (i.e., depth to depth; surface to depth; overall depth to overall surface) constituted the total expressiveness of the work.[74] This was essentially Roman Ingarden's account applied to painting.

3. Perception. For communication to take place, all depth and surface structure had to be presented to the appreciator's vision if the signification was to be perceived. The role of the imagination in this perception was to supply the cognition of the represented objects and to hypothesize on the meaning between depth counters. The resultant understanding had to rest on the surface which controlled the image itself. This account paralleled the Heideggerian account of the struggle between "earth" and "the world."[75]

Aesthetic communication was completed, then, when the significance of the work was "understood" by a number of viewers. This significance was controlled by the nature of the counters. Freedom was evident in what the artist chose to express and how the viewers interpreted it; however, it was limited to the work's structure.[76]

The possibility of communication was increased because the structures of the perceptual field (style and manner) placed limits on both participants,[77] while the communication process was given a distinctive Heideggerian flavor. Kaelin accepted the maxim of existence prior to essence. Art illuminated this process. An act of creation was a clarification of choice. Furthermore, art was an institution which reflected the being of man. It was a testimony of freedom of the human personality in which the creator and his audience discovered what he and they were.[78]

C. Kaelin's Methodology of Criticism

1. The Three Postulates. From the previous three concepts, Kaelin formulated three postulates around which he constructed a methodology for art appreciation. These postulates provided methods of reflection for interpreting the significance of the non-reflective experiences.

Postulate one stated: aesthetic expressions are context bound. There is no "meaning" for any gestures taken out of context. The work of art provides the limits as to what can be criticized. Attention only on a particular work of art avoids classification with other works resembling it.[79]

His second postulate read as follows:

> The context of an aesthetic expression and hence of its significance, is constructed uniquely and exhaustively by the network of relations set up by 'the counters' of a given medium.[80]

The second postulate re-emphasized that the total signification of the work included both surface and depth counters like symbols, markers, elements, in short, all that the artist thinks of within a given medium. "Texture" was the common term for surface organization and "structure," for depth qualities.

Kaelin's third and final postulate stated:

> The aesthetic expressiveness of a work of art is the experience of the relatedness of the surface counters and their representations out of which the total context is constructed.[81]

By this postulate Kaelin acknowledged the fact that the values of surface and depth varied. To experience the work, both texture and structure required analysis. This experience was either had or missed, and could not be rendered into words.[82]

For structure (depth), Kaelin suggested an interpretive hypothesis, for which history, philosophy, psychology, etc., provided the material. This hypothesis needed to be tried against the experienced events of the given work (texture). Criticism did not begin until depth had been understood.

2. Method. Kaelin adapted a Husserlian methodology of criticism. The critic allowed the work to be experienced and then a description was given of the way the work of art had controlled his experience.

This "bracketing the world" meant a suspension in belief in the reality of the real, physical world. The appeal to facts of laws of science in describing the real world had to be held in check.

"Bracketing the world" enabled the critic to reflect on acts of consciousness and their corresponding objects. This was "phenomenal reduction." The distinction between the knowledge of the natural (real) world and that of the lived world was made visible. The object could be examined simply as a physical object (noema) or it could be examined in phenomenological terms for its sensuous qualities; that is, it was viewed aesthetically (noesis). The appearance of the object and attitude of that object were simultaneous events by the intended perceiver. This event could be examined in the description undertaken.[83]

Kaelin applied this methodology to painting. Descriptions were made of emerging "strata" or strands of experience, following Roman Ingarden's lead.

Consciousness was guided by the visual structures of the painter's "world." This "world" for non-representational works was exhausted at the surface stratum. However, for representational works it consisted of representational objects and their relations (ideas).[84]

Total expressiveness was seen as a description of a series of emergent strands of experience. Examination of the description to reveal the meaning or hypothesis of the work of art constituted a "world" which was paralled to the Heideggerian notion of "Being" of the work.[85]

D. Summary of Kaelin's Aesthetics

Kaelin had dismissed Sartre's ontology and rejected Merleau-Ponty's epistemology in explaining representational art works. Merleau-Ponty's attempted ontology in Eye and Mind was also dismissed as inadequate.

Kaelin accepted Heideggerian metaphysics as a more adequate explanation of creativity, truth and the nature of man's transcendence. These he incorporated into his aesthetics, giving his theory an existentialist flavour.

How an aesthetic expression was able to communicate was an adaptation of Roman Ingarden's theories. Kaelin had accepted Roman Ingarden's notion of "strata" or strands of experience.

The total expressiveness of the work of both depth and surface counters, could be elucidated by the phenomenological method, by practicing the phenomenological epoché. Through the imagination, a hypothesis as to the "nature" of the work was formulated. This hypothesis introduced the existentialist notion of freedom and truth.

Footnotes - Chapter Seven

[1] E. Kaelin, *An Existential Aesthetic* (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1962).

[2] E. Kaelin, *Art and Existence* (Lewisburg: Bucknell University Press, 1970).

[3] See, E. Kaelin, "The Visibility of Things Seen," in *Invitation to Phenomenology*, ed. J. M. Edie (Chicago, 1965), pp. 30-59.

[4] E. Kaelin, "Notes Toward an Understanding of Heidegger's Aesthetics," in *Phenomenology and Existentialism*, ed. E. Lee and M. Mandelbaum (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1967), pp. 59-92.

[5] E. Kaelin, "The Visibility of Things Seen," in *Invitation to Phenomenology*, ed. Edie (Chicago, 1965), pp. 30-34.

[6] This claim is traced by Kaelin from Sartre's earliest work, *L'Imagination*, through *L'Etre et le Neant* and ending with *L'Imaginaire* (1940).

[7] The Husserlian thesis of transcendental reduction sees the act of knowledge as consisting of two irreducible phenomena. The first is the object which is the intention of the perception, while the second is the consciousness which intends. In this schema, the image *is* a structure of consciousness itself. To describe the image, it *is* necessary to take into account the structure of consciousness in the act of imagining.

[8] The phenomenological method consists of analysis of this essence. It is a three-fold procedure which begins with the contemplation of an image; then the reflection on the essence of that image and finally, the description of the essence of the image (necessary properties).

[9] This development is given in E. Kaelin, *An Existentialist Aesthetic*, pp. 19-52, and also Jean-Paul Sartre, *Essays in*

Existentialism, ed. Wade Baslam (Secaucus, New Jersey: The Citadel Press, 1974), pp. 257-300.

[10] E. Kaelin, An Existentialist Aesthetic, pp. 38-40. The imaginative consciousness may posit the existence of an object in four ways: as non-existent, absent, existing elsewhere or making no claim to existence at all.

[11] Sartre's ontology in "Being and Nothingness" begins to develop here. The imagined object is given as absent. The image envelopes a certain nothingness, since it seems a truism to say that the imagination refers to something which is not there.

[12] The basic difference between Sartre and Croce's idealism is that Croce posited the art object as the original intuitive vision of the artist, while Sartre posited the art object as expressed during the artistic activity.

[13] In Jean-Paul Sartre, Psychology of the Imagination (New York: The Citadel Press, 1961), pp. 231-273.

[14] See E. Kaelin, An Existentialist Aesthetic, pp. 53-89.

[15] Ibid., p. 65ff.

[16] Ibid., p. 72. Aesthetic attitude in the act of imagination is the act of consciousness which attempts to enter into the unique world that the aesthetic object is intending to. By assuming the aesthetic attitude the perceiver helps create the artistic work.

[17] Jean-Paul Sartre, "The Emotions: Outline of a Theory," in Essays in Existentialism, pp. 187-252. Emotion is seen as a structure of consciousness which has a meaning for the subject's psychic life. This structure is spontaneous and lived.

[18] See the Introduction to Jean-Paul Sartre, Essays in Aesthetics, selected and translated by Wade Baskin (Freeport, New York: Books for Libraries Press, 1962), p. vii-ix and E. Kaelin, An Existentialist Aesthetic, pp. 91-155.

[19] E. Kaelin, An Existentialist Aesthetic, p. 139. The virtual audience is the ideal public the artist is trying to reach. The actual public, on the other hand, is his current following.

[20] Ibid., p. 120.

[21] Ibid., p. 138.

[22] Sartre treats literature as the paradigm case for his existentialist aesthetic. In this treatment, these criteria cover all the arts. See, E. Kaelin, An Existentialist Aesthetic, pp. 91-116 and pp. 136-155.

[23] Sartre's "creative communication" theory is an attempt to do justice to the individual concept of choice. It is up to the audience whether they want to share in the communication of "freedom" by completing the "aesthetic process." The existentialist ethic never treats another person as a thing. He is always to be treated as an end; never a means. This occurs only when free personalities communicate. An I-Thou relation is established.

[24] Jean-Paul Sartre, Existentialism and Humanism, trans. Philip Mairet (London: Eyre Methuen Ltd., 1975, original 1946), pp. 27-57.

[25] E. Kaelin, "Committed Literature, Second Phase," An Existentialist Aesthetic. Sartre adopted the Marxist notion of "classless society" to avoid art being labelled as propaganda. Extending this to literature, Sartre's littérature totale was a concept to declass literature. If there were no separate ideologies, as presented in literature and those presented by the audience, then there would be no propaganda.

[26] E. Kaelin, An Existentialist Aesthetic, pp. 159-212, and Remy Kwant, From Phenomenology to Metaphysics: An Inquiry Into the Last Period of Merleau-Ponty's Philosophical Life (Pittsburgh, Pa. Duquesne University Press, 1966). pp. 93-114. In these sections Merleau-Ponty crituques the psychological theories of empiricism and rationalism. In this respect he followed Sartre's critique, not on ontological grounds but on epistemological grounds. Pavlovian models, reflex models and conditioned reflex models were critiqued.

[27] Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, trans. Colin Smith, (New York: Routledge & Kegan Paul, The Humanities Press), pp. 98-148.

[28] E. Kaelin, An Existentialist Aesthetic, pp. 172-180. The realistic situation means the everyday experience and is contrasted to the labratory situation which Merleau-Ponty thought was a pathological situation.

[29] M. Merleau-Ponty, The Primacy of Perception, trans James M. Edie (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1964), pp. 3-12.

[30] Each stimulus affecting the organism has its own meaning which is interpreted by the organism. "Meaning" and structure are correlative terms because each stimulus changes the figuration or structure and hence the meaning.

[31] E. Kaelin, An Existentialist Aesthetic, pp. 184-212.

[32] E. Kaelin, Art and Existence (Lewisburg: Bucknell University Press, 1970), pp. 316-330.

[33] Ibid., p. 323.

> "Syncretic response which is the first order form or level, physical or external forces produced an equilibrium in behaviour. This balance or re-alignment was small. In the second order, organic structures react upon the influencing environment in such a way that both the organic structure and the environment experience growth."

[34] E. Kaelin, An Existentialist Aesthetic, pp. 192-212.

[35] R. Kwant, From Phenomenology to Metaphysics, pp. 156-174. Essentially Merleau-Ponty rejected the notion which stated that pure essences comprized something more than the field of experience. See also Appendix C under Eidetic Reduction.

[36] M. Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p. 169. An indeterminate situation meant that the phenomenon, when viewed in context, had not been grasped in reflection.

[37] E. Kaelin, An Existentialist Aesthetic, pp. 212-257.

[38] M. Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, pp. 203-242.

[39] Ibid., p. 219.

[40] Ibid., pp. 67-174.

[41] E. Kaelin, An Existentialist Aesthetic, p. 232.

[42] M. Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, pp. 93ff.

[43] Ibid., p. 13 and p. 101.

[44] M. Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p. 136.

[45] E. Kaelin, An Existential Aesthetic, p. 247ff. The analysis of habit gives a good indication of how the consciousness is related to the world via the body. The explication of the intentional arc is visible in learning a skill. In the beginning the subject begins by intending the object theoretically. Each movement is learned in a prescribed order. The intentional arc has not become part of the body. When it does, the objects implicits in the action are never conscious.

[46] R. Kwant, From Phenomenology to Metaphysics, p. 211

> "The painting is a contraction of the visible world and expresses its essence."

[47] E. Kaelin, An Existentialist Aesthetic, p. 301.

[48] Merleau-Ponty, Signs, trans. by Richard C. McCleary (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1964), pp. 52-59, and Merleau-Ponty, Sense and Non-Sense, translated by Hubert L. Dreyfus and Patricia Allen Dreyfus, (Northwestern University Press, 1964), pp. 8-25. In Signs, Merleau-Ponty criticizes Malraux's Voices of Silence claiming that his analysis of non-objective painting as being entirely subjective is in error. Non-Objective painting was like modern thought. It showed the understanding of man's primary perception. In Sense and Non-Sense, Merleau-Ponty examines Cezanne's doubt as to his contribution to art.

[49] E. Kaelin, An Existential Aesthetic, p. 312.

[50] Ibid., pp. 310-314. This theme recurs in Malraux, Museum Without Walls and John Dewey's Art as Experience.

[51] Ibid., p. 317.

[52] Ibid., pp. 322-331.

[53] R. Kwant, From Phenomenology to Metaphysics, p. 212-214.

[54] E. Kaelin, An Existentialist Aesthetic, p. 314.

[55] E. Kaelin, An Existentialist Aesthetic, p. 331

[56] E. Kaelin, Art and Existence, p. 74. Herein designated as AE.

> "I propose, in what follows, to get out of this impasse by constructing a phenomenological view of creation in art embodying the theories of both Sartre and Merleau-Ponty."

[57] The claim for Heidegger is made in "Notes Toward an Understanding of Heidegger's Aesthetics," in Phenomenology and Existentialism, ed. E. N. Lee and M. Mandelbaum (Baltimore: John Hopkins, 1967), see Part I, 'On Being, Essence and Truth', pp. 59-64 and "The Existential Ground in Aesthetic Education," Studies in Art Education 8(1), 1966. The claim for Roman Ingarden is made in "The Visibility of Things Seen: A Phenomenological View of Painting," in An Invitation to Phenomenology, ed. James M. Edie (Chicago: Quadrangel Books, 1965), pp. 30-34.

[58] E. Kaelin, AE, p. 71

[59] E. Kaelin, "The Visibility of Things Seen: A Phenomenological View of Painting," p. 39.

[60] E. Kaelin, AE. p. 71.

[61] The English translation of "The Eye and the Mind" may be found in The Primacy of Perception trans. Edie (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1964), pp. 159-192. Carleton Dalley is accredited for its translation.

[62] E. Kaelin, "Notes Toward an Understanding of Heidegger's Aesthetics," and in AE, pp. 325-334.

[63] E. Kaelin, AE p. 74.

[64] See Appendix E.

[65] E. Kaelin, AE, p. 75.

[66] See Appendix C and D for concept of "world."

[67] See Appendix D (Heidegger's Notion of History).

[68] E. Kaelin, AE, p. 78.

[69] E. Kaelin, AE, p. 78.

[70] Mikel Dufrenne presents a viable account of the aesthetic object; so much so that in all his articles Kaelin has dismissed his solution to the problem of creation, aesthetic experience and criticism. Appendix F presents the basis of his theory.

[71] E. Kaelin, AE, p. 82-83.

[72] See Appendix E.

[73] E. Kaelin, "The Visibility of Things Seen: A Phenomenological View of Painting," p. 35.

[74] E. Kaelin, AE, p. 85.

[75] See Appendix D for this account.

[76] E. Kaelin, AE, p. 86.

[77] E. Kaelin, AE. p. 87.

[78] E. Kaelin, AE, pp. 88-93.

[79] E. Kaelin, AE, pp. 100-101.

[80] E, Kaelin, AE, p. 101.

[81] E. Kaelin, AE, p. 103.

[82] E. Kaelin, AE. p. 109.

[83] See Appendix C.

[84] E. Kaelin, AE, pp. 153-177.

[85] E. Kaelin, AE, p. 93.

CHAPTER EIGHT

Critique of the Four Aesthetic Theories

8.1 Introduction

Chapters Four through Seven have presented four aesthetic positions which together form a spectrum of the foundational underpinnings of current aesthetic programs in aesthetic education. It is the aim of this chapter to present an argument as to why all four positions present an inadequate foundation for a comprehensive aesthetic.

It will be shown that all four positions fail to take into account the following factors.

1. The possibility that so-termed non-aesthetic influences can directly affect the course of art and that these require attention for a complete aesthetic. Religious, moral, didactic, political and technological inventions need to be included. In short, a sociological element is missing in all four theories.

2. The possibility that the criticism of art, when imparted on a group level, or class level, or even from the standpoint of an artist's oeuvre, produces quite different patterns and configurations and evaluations from those produced when only one single work is examined. In short, macro-criticism is a required element. All four positions have stressed micro-criticism at the single, autonomous individualistic level.

3. Diachronic or deep structural transformations are not taken into account. All four positions have stressed synchronic changes of art. The possibility that new relations of production in the historical sense have transformed the aesthetic function of art have not been adequately discussed.

4. Because of the inadequacies resulting from criticisms One through Three, avant-garde movements, especially recent movements of minimal, kinesthetic, op and conceptual art, cannot be adequately explained. Causes for change in deep structure remain unexplored.

5. The focus on psychological aesthetic theory by all four theorists has under-stressed the socio-historical side of aesthetics. Consequently, new movements in art which emphasize "process" rather than an art "object," find little epistemological justification in the four theories. It is suggested that the introduction of "ideology " as developed by Mannheim and discussed in Section 8.5 aids in solving this inconsistency by providing the basis for an institutionalized definition of art.

The possibility exists that the pre-objective world (Merleau-Ponty's a priori) and the reflective world (the a posteriori) have an ideological bent, flavoured by the cultural setting. The introduction of Mannheim's concept of "world-view" goes far in assessing the possibility of a group of artists attempting to establish their own aesthetic and also their own political position.

6. All four theories have placed stress on "aesthetic experience." It is argued here that a socio-historical explanation

of the arts eliminates the affective overemphasis given to aesthetic experience by all four theorists in Chapters Four through Seven, as well as an over-intellectualization of its effects by their reliance on intuition and Gestalt theory. This is possible since an examination of the genetic transformations of an art movement provides a scientific basis for understanding the causes and ideological conditions for the establishment of new affective categories; while the sociological perspective provides the understanding of the values held by an ethnic group, or a rising class. The individualistic element, that is, the artist's work and the artist's biography, provides the paradigmatic case study for a class view.

To deal with these six inadequacies, a two chapter critique will be presented. This chapter will go on to elaborate upon the deficiencies of the positions presented in Chapter Four through Seven. It will argue that at best, Beardsley presents a subdued version of a positivist aesthetic position, and that he does not deal with the subjective side of aesthetic theory. Langer, at best, presents an over-intellectualized view of the aesthetic object. Her theory rests on an intuitive approach which in the final analysis is a biological theory rather than a human or cultural theory.

Dewey, at best, presents a case for sociological relativism. His pragmatic theory, based on "experience" and action, underemphasizes the historical foundation of art. Although he attempts to bridge theory and practice, his aesthetic thought sees art as continually re-inventing itself, an indeterminate "live creature" which develops through the necessity of solving problems encountered in day to day existence.

It will be argued that Dewey underemphasizes the fact that certain artistic factors change at different rates. Although specific consequences of how an artwork may turn out cannot be determined, general outcomes may be predicted by examining the historical influences affecting the "art world."

Furthermore, Dewey's emphasis on the psychological-biological factors of aesthetic experience needs to be recast into a sociological-historical mode. The institution of the "art world" legitimizes and bestows the status of "artwork" for us. Aesthetic experience is not necessarily a biological reaction to the work, but a behavior conditioned through the "art world."

Finally, Kaelin has presented an existentialist-phenomenological aesthetic. It will be argued that this view is essentially a structuralist aesthetic, which, while paying attention to the phenomenological and synchronic elements of art, presents an ahistorical position. In many aspects, Kaelin's translation of French existentialists breaks down into an organic theory, as first developed by the New Critics (a movement discussed later in this chapter). Roland Barthes and Jack Burnham present a much more developed structuralism than does Kaelin.

The next chapter will present possible directions for solutions of the above inadequacies, by examining more recent neo-Marxist aesthetics which have attempted to bridge the macro and micro aspects of aesthetics. The theories of Morawski, Goldman, Duvignaud, Lukács and others will be presented, as they relate to solving the above inconsistencies.

8.2 Critique of Beardsley's Aesthetic Theory

Beardsley's aesthetic theory, in many respects, is reminiscent of neo-classical and early empiricist aesthetic arguments. His triadic canons of Intensity, Unity and Complexity parallel early developments of Cartesian rationalism as presented by Corneille (1660), with his emphasis on the dramatic unities of action, place and time,[1] and the development of universal "rules" which became firmly established by the French and English Royal Academies.[2]

Beardsley's approach amounts to a logical-positivist approach to aesthetics via linguistic analysis. This is most evident in his arguments that logical reasons may be given for evaluating and justifying seen aesthetic features.[3]

Logical-positivism, as the modern exemplar of Empiricism or Sensationalism, presented by A. J. Ayer and Ludwig Wittgenstein, has been criticized for its concern over words (semantics) as more important for reasoning than the realities they represent.[4] The adherence to an empiricist epistemology rejects any a priori knowledge. Aesthetic features and non-aesthetic features are given ontic (or concrete) status rather than an ontological (or abstract) one.

The narrow focus of Beardsley's metacriticism rejects moral, religious, political, economic reasons for evaluation; reasons which, Barrows Dunham[5] has argued, are more often than not crucial. Isolating the work as an autonomous organic whole, Beardsley has been able to claim verifiability by examining only logical reasons. It may be argued, though, that his rejection of these other value judgments is in contradiction to his own logical-positivist methodology which examines all existing critical judgments.

Given the analogy of a fisherman catching four different species of fish in his net, Beardsley, (the fisherman), throws three of them out, claiming that there is but one species in the sea. As simplistic as this sounds, questions as to how these other three species interact in the system are dismissed. Not a very sound empiricist procedure!

It is questionable, therefore, how comprehensive Beardsley's conclusions are from examination of only one aspect of criticism. The three canons deduced from his examination have been generalized to the extent that they become worthless in their application to criticism.

Beardsley maintains that the critic, in the act of interpretation, description and evaluation is proceeding in a clear, value-free and objective manner.[6] He makes a separation between empirical "facts" and subjective facts, claiming that the latter commit the affective fallacy. A priori knowledge is considered a contradiction. Subjective facts are relegated to an area of "Rational Undecidability."[7]

This stance on aesthetic knowledge has been abandoned by the mainstream of modern European philosophy.[8] In general, the idea that an objective world exists apart from one's experience of it is discredited since the growth of Husserlian phenomenology and Verstehende sociology.[9] Merleau-Ponty's critique of reflex arc and conditioned reflex theories, which fall under the empirical-analytical tradition, is a further attempt to impart a subjective element to perception.[10] The basic assumption of the above critique is that the subjective element, that is Descartes' Cogito, cannot be eliminated from the aesthetic equation. Aesthetic qualities are interpreted as anthropomorphic and physionomic characteristics which are inter-subjectively experienced (Schutz, 1967) or as a priori metaphors (Dufrenne, 1967).

In summary, Beardsley's formalism treats the artwork as an entity separate from the society which produced it. The redeeming feature of his theory is that it has scientific verifiability and it is empirically based. Sibley,[11] Kivy,[12] and Sircello,[13] who are recent exponents of the logical-positivist philosophy, fall under the same sorts of criticisms.

8.3 Critique of Langer's Aesthetic Theory

Suzanne Langer's aesthetic theory presents an improvement over that of Beardsley's for her study departs from empiricism and Wittgensteinian positivism.[14] She has given more attention to the subjective side of art by introducing the notion of intuition and

Gestalt. However, her claim that art is a logical expression of feelings is subject to the same kinds of criticism as Beardsley's.

By far the most serious problem with Langer's approach is her over-intellectualization of aesthetic theory. Feelings, which constitute the import of a work, are not felt, but only conceptualized. If Gestalt "means" a "feeling," if its value is the conceptualization of feeling, all art becomes representative in this sense despite Langer's insistence that it is the motif which embodies the feeling. Such emphasis is in error. Merleau-Ponty, for example, has shown that feelings are perceived, not conceived in any sense at all. "Understanding" a form is also a bodily reaction.

This problem affects the entire scope of her theory. Although Langer has argued that her theory is truly a "human aesthetic," her assumption that the mind is a type of transformer which unconsciously intuits the form of feelings is, ironically, presenting aesthetic theory at the biological level. Communication, as she defines it, is much like a biological explanation of how animals react to symbols.

The "arts" among animals are instinctive, genetically programmed and therefore inherited. Their responses have been conditioned into the genes and appear in action as instinct. This is much the same as Langer's insistence that emotive symbols are a direct communication through intuition. Intuition is tantamount to instinct. For example, sparrows "read" and "sing" different musical notes during mating time.[15] When a honeybee wants to tell her hive-mates where she has found food, she does a wiggle dance which is a miniaturized version of re-enactment of her trip.[16] The architectural works of the bower birds in Australia and New Guinea take the form of a bower with two parallel walls of arched twigs. In front is a display ground, decorated with a variety of blue object, feathers. flowers, fragments of glass, rags, etc.[17] These are but a few examples of how art is the employment of effects to produce affects.

Langer's aesthetics presents no reflection theory, and it is this omission which causes her to resort to intuition and rely on the concept of an "ideal" observer[18] as the measure of the capacity to grasp the expressiveness of a work. This capacity is innate and cannot be taught.[19] The "ideal" observer becomes a throwback to Hume's essay "Of the Standard of Taste" (1765)[20] wherein he develops the concept of a "Qualified Observer" to distinguish a critic from a naive observer. More recently, Ducasse[21] has argued that judgments may be disqualified or over-ruled on various grounds of insensitivity, inattention, prejudice and inexperience. The assumption of the ideal observer rests on the general principle that human nature is uniform. However, because different works of art appeal to different temperaments, there is a residual range of unresolvable disagreements.

In summary, Langer, in adopting a number of empiricist elements, has ensured that what was to be a truly humanist aesthetic is ultimately based on a biological model.

8.4 Critique of John Dewey's Aesthetics

John Dewey's aesthetic theory, in many aspects, suffers from the same criticisms as do Langer's aesthetics. Dewey also relied on intuition in communication. However, he called this a "fusion of felt qualities." It will be argued below that Dewey's pragmatism is ahistorical. Furthermore, Dewey's explanation of aesthetic experience is based on a biological model which is reductive in its approach. Hence, Dewey's sociological theory is tantamount to psychologism.

To begin with, Dewey's pragmatism underscores the role of experience. That which is directly experienced is the most authentically known. This is a striking relapse on the theoretical level from a genuinely scientific approach, which would say examine previous successful and unsuccessful experimentations.

Dewey's instrumentalism asserted that scientific ideas, propositions and theories did not reflect or reproduce any objective realities. They were simply symbolic of the realities which enabled the experimenter to regulate changes; merely useful devices.[22] It was not science which revealed the inner nature of things but,

> The intrinsic nature of events is revealed in experience as the immediately felt qualities of things. The intimate co-ordination and even fusion of these qualities with the regularities that form the objects of knowledge, in the proper sense of the word 'knowledge' characterizes intelligently directed experience, as distinct from mere casual and uncritical experience.[23]

Such instrumentation states that science is relative. When Dewey mixes up the objective with the subjective and fails to draw a clear distinction between what belongs to the physical world and what is added by man, he relegates aesthetic qualities and non-aesthetic qualities to the same level.

> Empirically, things are poignant, tragic, beautiful, humorous, settled, disturbed, comfortable, annoying, barren, harsh, consoling, splendid, fearful... These traits stand in themselves on precisely the same level as colors, sounds, qualities of contact, taste and smell.[24]

And still further,

> Things are beautiful and ugly, lovely and hateful, dull and illuminated, attractive and repulsive. Stir and thrill in us is as much theirs as is length, breadth, and thickness.[25]

This places aesthetic judgments and emotional responses, which it will be argued, are social and historical phenomena, on a par with physical sensations; qualities generated by the properties of the things themselves. Dewey has fallen into the trap of subjectivism. Dewey places all qualities present in immediate personal experience on the same level. Pragmatism places so much emphasis on experience that the attitude towards the past as a factor of historical causation is dismissed. The emphasis on action and experimentation leads to an unbalanced individualism.[26]

Dewey's instrumentalism approaches art as if it had no past to determine its occurrence at a particular time and in a particular way. His theory, as Finkelstein claims,[27] has provided the foundations for the "Art for Art Sake Movements" and Buettner[28] mentions that this overemphasis on individualism provided the foundations for American Abstract Expressionist Movement.[29]

The devotion to a trial and error method raises the notion of experimentation to number one rank. Knowledge then, hinges on the way things appear to the observer, who then chooses an action to fit the circumstances. This method discourages systematic search for the underlying causes that produce the outward appearance of art.

Pragmatism prevents an understanding of art at a more profound level. To do so it would be necessary to seek out art's connections with other things (i.e., institutions) as well as the changes it undergoes through time. Things are not always what they seem to be at first sight and with limited experience. They are products of long processes, outcomes of the past with all sorts of relations to the present. A scientific aesthetic should be able to provide a deeper understanding of art and its contradictions. For Dewey, however, science remains merely a useful instrument. Dewey's pragmatism for example, could not explain "process" art as presented by Levine, Haacke, Kaprow, Oppenheim and others.[30] Only a historical assessment of art can provide this.

The other major problem with Deweyan thought is his explanation of "aesthetic experience" which is fraught with Darwinian biological explanations.[31] Dewey adopted Darwin's evolutionary process as an accumulation of small changes in which gradual growth within established forms prevails. Qualitative changes and mutations were minimized.[32] Dewey took over the notion of adaptation and applied it to the function of the mind.

> The biological point of view commits us to the conviction that mind...is at least an organ of service for the control of environment in reaction to the ends of the life process.[33]

Darwin had pointed out how changes in surrounding conditions led to a selection of characteristics among animals and plants which enabled them to become better adapted to the new environment.[34] Dewey extended this to cover humanity and its mental activities. Incessant changes in their situation compel human beings to readjust their actions and modify their ideas; this process of readjustment is the hallmark of experience, the source of progress and the main spring of mental functioning. Nowhere is this more evident than in his description of aesthetic experience as an adjustment to surrounding tensions and turmoils.[35]

8.5 Critique of Kaelin's Aesthetics

Kaelin's aesthetics present three facets which need to be critically reviewed. The first is Existentialism, notably that of the atheists, Sartre and Heidegger; the second is phenomenology and the last is Kaelin's own structuralism. In what follows, it will be argued that existentialism as a philosophic current is non-scientific and ahistorical; phenomenology at the psychological level, as existentialist's methodology, is a form of subjectivism which cannot accommodate the concept of "ideology." A sociological phenomenology (Verstehende) is required at this level to explain the ideological bent of consciousness. Lastly, Kaelin's position, it will be argued, is in essence, a structuralism dangerously leaning towards formalism. His is but a pale reflection of Roman Ingarden's structuralism. Structuralism will be criticized for its avoidance of diachronic transformation. It will be suggested that Burnham's structuralism is a much more adequate theory at this level.

The Existentialist psychological tone is an overwhelming sense of tragedy which arises form the inherent and insurmountable senselessness of man's position in the world. The primary proposition of Existentialism is that existence, which is defined as the immediate living experience of the individual, takes priority over essence: that is, that one must begin from the subjective.[36] This is the atheistic assumption which claims human nature is made. Catholic existentialists hold the direct opposite. Heidegger and Sartre maintain that it is imperative for a person to exert his Will, choose among possible courses of action, have free choice of moral values and the personal creation of spiritual ideals.

Mounier[37] summarized the recurring themes of Existentialism as contingency of the human being, the importance of reason alone, the use of the dialectic, man as a being who is always becoming, the instability of being human, inauthentic existence, man's empirical existence as always threatened, man's essential individuality, and finally, man as constantly plagued by the "nothingness" of existence. This includes the nothingness from which he came; it is the nothingness which he experiences in the present and it is the realization of nothingness in the future (Sartre's thesis of Being and Nothingness).

Such radical individualism sees science as irrational because the universe is treated as irrational and absurd.[38] The absurd is wholly subjective, arising from the individual's apprehension that the most crucial questions must remain unanswered because the world remains inherently incomprehensible. The Existentialists do not recognize any social laws. Ambiguity presides over existence. Any given situation has no intrinsic structure, trends or signs. There is no way to tell whether one alternative is superior to another.

The Existentialist picks that solution he prefers, since the outcome is a matter of chance or caprice.[39] He refuses to concede that the outcome of a situation depends upon the relative weight of all factors at work within it; he wants to make the settlement depend entirely upon the will of the individual. This tenet runs into conflict with the observation which sees the results of man's activities often at odds with his intentions, desires and expectations.

Underlying forces which determine the outcome are given to accident.[40] Existentialists hold that the objective and subjective components of being do not exist apart from each other and in fact, the subject makes the world what it is. Heidegger, for example, claims that there is no world without man.[41] This idealism is in direct opposition to the claims of materialism, which claims "world" exists independently of man's experience with it.

The entire thrust of Existentialism revolves around the absolute primacy of the conscious subject over everything objective, whether it be physical or social. The truth and values of existence are to be found exclusively within the experiences of the individual in his self-discovery and the self-creation of what he authentically is. Such a philosophy fails to examine the material existence of things and how they affect men's life.

Phenomenology, in its methodology on the psychological level, accommodates Existentialism obligingly. Intentionality as an active selectivity of phenomena by the individual, ties in with the subjective radicalism of Existentialism. "For Sartre the phenomenological doctrine of the intentionality of consciousness not only leads to but is an existential theory."[42] Phenomenology, by dealing with the natural attitude, provides a necessary material base which is missing in Existentialism. Phenomenology, as a procedure turns its back, at least provisionally, upon the real and social and natural environment. It concentrates attention upon the states of consciousness and the array of objects scrutinized by the reflective individual.

Phenomenology rests upon the direct intuition of states of mind and immediate inspection of things, not as the initial state of knowing what they are, but as conclusive evidence of their definitive nature. The introspective thinker deliberately restricts himself to phenomena as they become manifest with the further linkage of appearances of things, with the conditions and causes of their occurrence. It is here that the entire weakness of the phenomenological method lies. The notion of perception, depending on the pre-existent element of choice, gives perception an active and intentional element which surpasses the passive mind of empiricism. However, the underlying causes of this intentionality are not examined.

Phenomenology claims to be an epistemologically neutral instrument for the inspection of the presentations of consciousness and therefore a presuppositionless philosophy.[43] In its attempts to seek out the re-construction of the Lebenswelt, it fails to come to terms with the deeper causes of aesthetic judgments. Schutz,[44] for example, in his analysis of the Other, shows that there is a jump from pure consciousness, which alone can be investigated by phenomenology, to that of sociology which cannot be phenomenologically pure since the problem of multiple realities crops up. In order to come to terms with the deeper causes for consciousness the examination of the institutional bias of the Lebenswelt has to be taken into account. That is to say, the phenomenological starting point, or epoché is itself under a particular ideological influence. Phenomenological neutrality may not be possible. Intentionality is pre-conditioned.

Let us take for example, Natanson's argument that the phenomenological method, as applied to the aesthetic object (in particular the theatre) requires a member of the audience to enact the phenomenological reduction and reconstruct the object. The natural attitude must be bracketed, otherwise one becomes too involved in the play.[45] The writer agrees with Natanson that such a procedure does take place but the underlying cause for this procedure is not entirely a subjective intentional act. This is but one aspect of the event. Conduct at a theatre, Dickie[46] argues, is governed and structured by conventions which are learned in much the same way that a native language is learned. These conventions are non-aesthetic mechanisms which could not be examined on a psychological level. They are imposed by the artistic institution or are consciously broken by the dramatist. Such conventions require historical analysis.

Kaufmann,[47] following Natanson, attempts to compare the phenomenological method to the concept of disinterestedness as it relates to the epoché. "...art bears comparison with phenomenology as converting the natural attitude towards the experienced world into the transcendental attitude toward one's experience of the world."[48] This attempt is also a failure because it cannot explain the "screening out" of a Chinese property man in a Chinese drama, nor the milling of actors amongst the audience in one of Brecht's plays. These sorts of audience behavior require "other" sorts of explanations.

These "other" sorts of explanations should be on a more complex level of knowledge of the world: for example, what Mannhein[49] has called "particular ideology." Such an analysis would examine the political, or social beliefs and values of theatre. The notion of "ideology" carries with it the implication that certain "interests" are involved. Analysis done by the drama critic, Kenneth Burke,[50] whose "dramatism" has been promoted to equal rank with "symbolic interaction" or "social exchange," provides a better explanation.

"Dramatism"[51] is a method of study of human relations in terms of "action." As a method, Burke's dramatism addresses the empirical questions of how persons explain their actions to themselves and others, what the cultural and social structural influences on these explanations might be and what effect connotational links among the explanatory (motivational) terms might have on these explanations and hence, on action itself. "As a meta-method, dramatism attempts to account for the motivational (explanatory) vocabulary of ordinary discourse and its influence on human action and for particular sociological vocabularies when they are used to explain human action."[52]

This stress on motive is infinitely superior to the phenomenological method (or taken-for-granted method) described by Natanson because Burke concerns himself with the political bias of the plot (i.e., social implications of "murder" or "theft") and the language's meaning as it relates to the institutions. Burke is interested in a tripartite understanding of motives: the language of explanation, explanation in language, and language as explanation.[53] Dialectics is his method. This involves the concept of contradiction and "the ironic presupposition that one approaches a fuller, more true, explanation for social action by taking opposing perspectives on that action."[54]

Burke, like the phenomenologists, is trying to come to an understanding of an artwork's "substance" or essence.[55] However, this "essence" is equal to the sum of the connotational attributes which he derives from an examination of the ratios of dramatic action (these ratios are derived from the relations of his pentad: Scene, Act, Agent, Agency, Purpose). Hence, his analysis provides a deeper and causal understanding of a play's essence.

Kaelin, in acknowledging Roman Ingarden's aesthetics,[56] adopts a structuralism which attempts to relate depth to surface; surface to surface and depth to depth features. The entire work of art is treated as a system which attempts to see its strata (parts) as they relate to the whole. Kaelin's structuralism includes a sociological element, but only if the artwork has "depth" (only representational elements). Social facts and ideologies on a group level are examined, but when abstract works are criticized, Kaelin resorts to a formalism in the style of Bell and Fry.

Jack Burnham's[57] aesthetic structuralism is a significant improvement over that of Kaelin because he is able to avoid formalism by adopting Roland Barthes' semiology and Levi-Strauss's anthropology. By adopting the concept of Barthes' meta-linguistics (signifying and signified), Burnham is able to examine the various ideologies presented by modern art as they relate to culture, (i.e., Cubism's attempt to eliminate Renaissance form and space; Impressionism's reaction against academic tradition; process art's attempt to eliminate art as commodity; Minimalism's rejection of all the assumptions of formalist aesthetics such as the concern for internal relationships).

Following Levi-Strauss, Burnham considers art as myth. Binary oppositions in art are formed from the relationship between the natural and the cultural. Three binary oppositions are presented in the construction of art as myth. These are:

1. The system of rhetoric in which the cultural orientation presents the aesthetic ideology behind the artwork in terms of a style, school, or philosophy. The natural opposition includes the most authoritative writing about the artwork as an ideological description.

2. The system of articulation in which the cultural orientation presents the "content" of the artwork through the experience received; the natural opposition is the art object which signifies the experience.

3. The Real System where the natural oppositions are the terms defining the materials, subject matter and work done. These are related to the cultural side which consists of the terms defined, and decisions and their meaning.[58]

Both Kaelin's and Burnham's structuralism is susceptible to the main criticisms levelled by Michael Lane,[59] who notes that structuralist analysis is centrally concerned with synchronic structures. That is, structuralism is an ahistorical study,[60] and also anti-causal. This means that certain structures are seen to be transformed into another structure. Repeated observations permit the observer to say that a given structure is always transformed in a particular way, not in response to causal laws, but to laws of transformation.[61]

Lane's critique of structuralism focusses on the investigator's search for structure which goes below the conscious reality of the subjects themselves. In doing so, there is a basic assumption which states that there are homologies, or correspondences in structure, between one aspect of a society and another. Hence, there exists a universal unconscious mind which performs similar structuring activities in all societies and through all institutions.[62] Structuralism, being an ahistorical study, presents a closed system on this level. It is re-emphasized that Kaelin has presented a pale version of structuralism. His aesthetic is closer to the formalism of Eliseo Vivas[63] and Murray Krieger[64] who are advocates for the New Critics. They claim that a work of art (in their case, literature) is a self-contained entity whose entire meaning may be derived by examining its strata alone. Cultural or societal influences are not given any attention. Due to these inefficiencies, Kaelin's aesthetic cannot explain process art as presented by the conceptual artists like Duchamp, Levine, Alex Hay, Oppenheim and others. Burnham, on the other hand, can deal with these movements, but only on the synchronic level. There is no explanation for the underlying causes of aesthetic ideologies. This would require a socio-historical approach.

8.6 Summary

In summary then, we may say that Beardsley's logical-positivism does not provide a sufficient base for a complete aesthetic. Langer's theory, it was shown, is an over-intellectualization of aesthetic phenomena, while Dewey's pragmatism is ahistorical and biological. Kaelin's aesthetics was essentially a structuralism which was closer to a formalism reminiscent of the New Critics. It was suggested that aestheticians like Burnham had developed a much more refined aesthetic, but structuralism, per se, is a closed system at the deep structural level. Lastly, it was argued that Existentialism was non-scientific while phenomenology on the psychological level was inadequate to handle sociological and ideological elements. Kenneth Burke provided an infinitely more adequate meta-criticism. It should be noted that only Beardsley provides a verifiable method for criticism. In this sense, his theory is scientific. Dewey offers relativism; Langer must rely on "intuition" in her aesthetics; while Kaelin's position is one of radical subjectivism. What is needed is a scientific aesthetic which would overcome the problems herein presented. The next chapter will argue that a scientific socio-historical aesthetic is possible.[65]

Footnotes - Chapter Eight

[1] Władysław Tatarkiewicz, *History of Aesthetics, Volume III, Modern Aesthetics*, ed. D. Petsch (Warszawa: Polish Scientific Publishers, 1974), pp. 345-346.

[2] M. Beardsley, *Aesthetics: From Classical Greece to Present*, (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1966), p. 149.

[3] M. Beardsley, *Aesthetics: Problems in the Philosophy of Criticism*, (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1958), p. 84ff.

[4] George Novack, *Empiricism and Its Evolution: A Marxist View*, (New York: Pathfinder Press, Inc., 1971), pp. 106-109.

[5] Barrows Dunham, *The Artist in Society*, (New York: Marzani and Munsell, Inc. Publishers, 1964) "Esthetic Bias (II)," pp. 22-32.

[6] M. Beardsley, *Aesthetics: Problems in the Philosophy of Criticism*, pp. 37-45.

[7] Ibid., p. 536.

[8] Janet Wolff, *Hermeneutic Philosophy and the Sociology of Art* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., 1975), pp. 43-44.

[9] Ibid., p. 4.

[10] In Merleau-Ponty's *La Structure du Comportement* as reported in Kaelin's *An Existentialist Aesthetic*, pp. 164-180.

[11] Frank Sibley, "Aesthetics and the Looks of Things," *Journal of Philosophy* 56, 1959. See also, "Aesthetic and Non-Aesthetic," *The Philosophical Review* 74, 1965, and "Aesthetic Concepts," *The Philosophical Review* 68, 1959, and "Aesthetic Concepts: A Rejoinder," *The Philosophical Review* 72, 1963.

[12] Peter Kivy, Speaking of Art (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973), and "Aesthetics and Rationality," JAAC 34, 1976, pp. 51-57.

[13] Gay Sircello, A New Theory of Beauty (London: Princeton University Press, 1975).

[14] S. Langer, Philosophy in a New Key, pp. 75-77.

[15] Robert Joyce, The Esthetic Animal (New York: Exposition Press, Hicksville, 1975), p. 9.

[16] Ibid., p. 10.

[17] Ibid., p. 13.

[18] S. Langer, Feeling and Form, p. 394.

[19] Ibid., p. 396.

[20] D. Hume, "Of the Standard of Taste" in Philosophy of Art and Aesthetics, ed. Frank Tillman & Steven M. Cahn (New York: Harper & Row Pub., 1969), pp. 115-130.

[21] Curt Ducasse, Art, the Critics and You (New York: The Library of Liberal Arts, pub. Bobbs-Merrill Co. Inc., reissued 1955), pp. 15-38.

[22] George Novack, Pragmatism Versus Marxism (New York: Pathfinder Press Inc.).

[23] John Dewey, Experience and Nature (New York: Dover Publications Inc., 1958), p. xii.

[24] Ibid., p. 96.

[25] Ibid., p. 105.

[26] G. Novack, Pragmatism Versus Marxism, p. 27.

[27] Sidney Finkelstein, Realism in Art (New York: International Publishers, 1954), pp. 164-166.

[28] Stewart Buettner, "John Dewey and the Visual Arts in America," JAAC 33 (Summer 1975):383-391.

[29] The author prefers Buettner's interpretation to that given by Jacobson in Chapter 6, Section 2, Footnote 91.

[30] Jack Burnham, Great Western Salt Works (New York: George Braziller, 1974).

[31] George Novack, Pragmatism Versus Marxism, pp. 65-66.

[32] John Dewey, Experience and Nature, p. 99.

> "...causality, however it be defined, consists in the sequential order itself, and not in a lost term which as such is irrelevant to causality, although it may, of course be, in addition, an initial term in another sequential order."

[33] Quoted from George Novack, Pragmatism Versus Marxism, p. 65, in The Influence of Darwinism on Philosophy by John Dewey, p. 110.

[34] G. Novack, Pragmatism Versus Marxism, p. 66.

[35] J. Dewey, Art as Experience. Examples are numerous throughout this book. To make the point clear, seven quotations have been picked as representative of the biological view.

> "The marvel of organic, of vital, adaptation through expansion actually takes place. Here in germ are balance and harmony attained through rhythm." (p. 14.)
>
> "What is distinctive in man makes it possible to carry to new and unprecedented heights that unity of sense and impulse, of brain and eye and ear, that is exemplified in animal life, saturating it with the conscious meanings derived from communication and deliberate expression." (pp. 22-23.)
>
> "Art is thus prefigured in the very process of living. A bird builds its nest..." (p. 24.)

> "The primeval arts of nature and animal life are so much the material, and, in gross outline, so much the model for the intentional achievements of man..." (p. 25.)
>
> "As the developing growth of an individual from embryo to maturity is the result of interaction of organism with surroundings, ..." (p. 28.)
>
> "Impulsions are the beginnings of complete experience because they proceed from need; from a hunger and demand that belongs to the organism as a whole..." (p. 58.)
>
> "Accumulation is at the same time preparation, as with each phase of the growth of a living embryo." (p. 137.)

[36] Jean-Paul Sartre, Existentialism and Humanism (London: Eyre Methuen Ltd.), p. 26. Camus and Jaspers assume that essence comes prior to existence. They say man has something called human nature, given by God.

[37] Mitchell Bedford, Existentialism and Creativity (New York: Philosophical Library Ltd., 1972), pp. 41-42.

[38] George Novack, "Basic Differences Between Existentialism and Marxism," in Existentialism Versus Marxism, ed. George Novack (New York: Dell Pub. Co. Inc., 1966), p. 320.

[39] Ibid., p. 322.

[40] Ibid., p. 43.

[41] Magda King, Heidegger's Philosophy, "The Reality of Beings Within the World," (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1964), pp. 99-111.

[42] M. Natanson, "Phenomenology and Extentialism, Husserl and Sartre on Intentionality," in Literature Philosophy, and the Social Sciences (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1968), p. 28.

[43] Ibid., p. 10.

[44] Alfred Schutz, Collected Papers Vol. 1 "On Multiple Realities," (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973).

[45] M. Natanson, Literature, Philosophy and the Social Sciences, "Phenomenology of the Aesthetic Object," pp. 79-86.

[46] George Dickie, Art and the Aesthetic (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1974), pp. 175-181.

[47] Fritz Kaufmann, "Art and the Phenomenology," in Essays in Phenomenology, ed. Natanson (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966), pp. 144-156.

[48] Ibid., p. 144.

[49] Karl Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia trans. Louis Wirth and Edward Shils (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., first published 1936).

[50] Michael Overington, "Kenneth Burke and the Method of Dramatism," Theory and Society, 4, 1977, pp. 131-156.

[51] Kenneth Burke, "Dramatism" in International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences (New York, 1968), pp. 445-452.

[52] M. Overington, "Kenneth Burke and the Method of Dramatism." Theory and Society, 4, 1977, p. 133.

[53] Ibid., p. 135.

[54] Ibid., p. 135.

[55] Ibid., p. 145.

[56] See Appendix E for Ingarden's Aesthetics.

[57] J. Burnham, The Structure of Art (New York: George Braziller, 1971), and Beyond Modern Sculpture (New York: George Braziller, 1968).

[58] J. Burnham, The Structure of Art, pp. 43-57.

[59] M. Lane, ed., Structuralism: a Reader, "Introduction," (London: Cape, 1970).

[60] Ibid., p. 16.

[61] Ibid., p. 17.

[62] Janet Wolff, Hermeneutic Philosophy and the Sociology of Art, p. 69.

[63] Eliseo Vivas, Creation and Discovery (Chicago: Regnery, 1965).

[64] Murray Krieger, and Eliseo Vivas ed. The Problems of Aesthetics (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1953).

[65] Franz Mehring, "A Note on Taste," Dialectics 4, 1937, pp. 16-20.

CHAPTER NINE

Marxist Aesthetics

9.1 Introduction

The previous chapter presented a critique of Beardsley, Langer, Dewey and Kaelin. The underlying implication of this critique was the need for a truly human scientific aesthetic which would overcome the problem of psychologism by presenting a verifiable methodology on a sociological level. It will be argued in this chapter that the direction such an aesthetic should take is towards a neo-Marxist/socio-historical theory of aesthetics.

It may be recalled that the Atheistic Existentialists' goal is to have conduct regulated and judged by relative human standards. Furthermore, man is seen as accountable only to himself and for himself and has no right to sanctify or justify his decisions by reference to any supernatural source. Marxism has the same goal, however, while the Existentialists view only the individual as a being in an alien environment ahistorically, Marxism considers man historically as "the very product of the components of a natural and social reality that equip him not only with the ability to adjust to it passively (as lower beings do) but also with the ability to alter it according to his needs."[1]

The real problem of defining a complete aesthetic may be seen in this quotation:

> By seeing only the individual, Existentialism lost society, and by seeing only society, Marxism lost the individual. There are the extremes of a truth that lies somewhere in the middle.[2]

The "middle ground," as the Marxists maintain, must have the criteria of freedom and necessity[3] to achieve the pre-conditions for art; the release from the day to day struggle for food and shelter. For the Existentialists, freedom is the necessary "middle." Theirs is "the demand for the recognition of the right of the artist to express himself with full integrity and honesty to himself and without interference."[4]

9.2 Sociological Relativism

Aesthetic theories which attempt to provide a scientific foundation for this "middle" often fall into a sociological relativism, an argument which postulates that different social groups will decide on aesthetic matters differently, and that other social strata will disagree. Furthermore, social relativists argue that in different periods different traits of objects will be deemed aesthetically valuable. Lastly, the argument sees collective tastes rather than individual tastes as more worthy to explore. Boas[5] and Brunius[6] present variations of such a view.

Sociological relativism cannot answer the societal "weighting" or shifting responses to aesthetic objects, nor can it answer questions concerning who (in a society) has access to various artworks; nor who is privileged to own such artworks, and on what grounds art is rejected or condemned. Such concerns may include religious, political, moral decisions which outweigh other values.

An institutional analysis, along Marxian lines, can provide answers to these questions and to other similar questions: for example, why there is a distinction between "high art," "popular art," "folk art," and mass media. A socio-historical analysis is able to find patterns in the recurrences of the acts of appreciation.[7]

The hypostatization of the "art world" as the institution which "knights" the work as "art;" legitimatizes the norms and aesthetic values and commands an aggregation of critics, consumers, reporters, art historians, philosophers of art, artists and art theorists, can be examined in its historical development. But caution is needed at this point. An examination of the "art world" ahistorically leads back to an "instrumentalism" or pragmatism of sociological relativity. It simply states that this is the "current" working definition of art. Questions as to why certain properties of art have been similarly valued in different circumstances and times, or questions which ask who is in control of the "art world," what structural changes it has undergone because of political and economical changes (i.e., Dada and Surrealism as political movements) can only be answered in a scientific Marxist framework.

9.3 Marxism: A Science

It is important to stop for a moment to examine the claim of "scientism" of Marxism and to compare its position against the other sciences of empiricism (Beardsley), pragmatism (Dewey) and phenomenology (Kaelin) which claim to explain human reality.

The first distinction that needs to be made is that Marxism deals with human values while empiricism deals with natural laws. Both are nomological pursuits. Like natural science, Marxism, as methodology, is "conscious" of each concept, method and procedure used. However, "consciousness" here is not the same as that referred to in the natural sciences. The prospect that consciousness about human values and relations is different than that of natural science was postulated by Dilthey.

> Wilhelm Dilthey had posited that the discipline dealing with cultural phenomena or 'spiritual products' (the Geisteswissenschaften) were to be sharply differentiated from those dealing with physical matters (the Naturwissenschaten).[8]

The Geisteswissenschaften sciences, then provide a different logical status on human relations. Beardsley's aesthetics, for example, are based on the scientism of natural science and its logic, not on cultural logic.

Phenomenology, too, has rejected the "scientific attitude" of the natural sciences by adopting the "natural attitude." Habermas writes,

> Husserl rightly criticizes the specious objectivity which offers to science a being-in-itself of facts structured accordingly to laws and which, furthermore, conceals these

> acts and consequently is interwoven with practical interests.[9]

However, Schutz, who has developed a phenomenological sociology (Verstehende), writes,

> ...rational action on the common level is always action within an unquestioned and undetermined frame of constructs of typicalities of the setting, the motives, the means, and ends, the courses of action and personalities involved and taken for granted.[10]

Whereas phenomenology examines action as "unquestioned" and "undetermined," Marxism is concerned with the ideological reasons for such action. Phenomenology, in its examination of natural attitude, "implies an unselfconscious, non-reflective man who directly and immediately enters into social relations with others in terms of his immediate personal goals and his direct and intuitive apprehension of a situation."[11]

Habermas[12] in his inaugural lecture at the University of Frankfurt, examined three theoretical orientations; the positivist, the hermeneutic and the critically oriented sciences and concluded that,

> ...the hermeneutic science neglects to account for the prior understanding of the interpretor, which is inherent in his vantage point and through which interpretative knowledge is always communicated.

A "critical orientation" as offered by Marxism overcomes the shortcomings of positivism, phenomenology and hermeneutics. Its "scientific" base rests on dialectical materialism. This is its philosophy and logical method, which deals with the evolutionary process in its entirety, including nature, society and the human mind. Historical materialism is its sociology which investigates and formulates the laws of social development; and scientific socialism is its political economy, which studies the operation of the contradictions in a society.[13] Such a science is verifiable through examination of the historical record.

9.4 Is a Marxist Aesthetic Possible?

Marxist aesthetics has been interpreted in the West, from the economic determinism of Munro,[14] who sees individuals as passive products of a social organization, to a sheer impossibility by the British aesthetician Scanlan,[15] who claims that Marx and Engels had said "little" to establish the relationships between art and economics; art and partisanship and art and historicism. Rader[16] and Baxandall[17] think otherwise, and endorse it.

The main criticism levied against Marxism, both in the West and East, is what is known as "vulgar Marxism." As Miroslav Beker[18] argues, "we reach the conclusion that Marxist criticism is a simplistic approach in which a work of art is treated like a reflection of the economic basis and its tendencies."

9.5 The Soviet View

Another side of "vulgar Marxism" has been developed by the Soviets through their interpretation of Marx's writings into the closed definition of socialist realism, the major problem being the conflict over the preference of content over form. A priority of content criteria prevails to include only representational art, and even here, the subject matter is hierarchic. It is for this reason that the view may be termed "vulgar," because the problem of aesthetic formalism is dismissed entirely or simply relegated to the category of bourgeois imperialism.

Early writings of Soviet aestheticians reflect this problem but "social realism" had not at that time been established as the official ideology. Plekhanov (1856-1918), often referred to as the founder of Soviet aesthetics as Baxandall[19] reports, gave precedence to sociological over aesthetic inquiry. At times "he let revolutionary preoccupations confuse his scientific detachment." Plekhanov offered two criteria for evaluation: the harmony of an idea and its form, and the truthfulness of an idea. Morawski[20] considers Plekhanov to be expounding an aesthetic on a biological level, and certainly the influences of Darwin are visible when Plekhanov considers human creativity as a "drive" or instinct. Plekhanov mentions sexual attraction, an imitative impulse, and a responsiveness to antithesis, to symmetry, to rhythm, and to animistic phenomena as the reasons for these creative drives. Furthermore, by presenting Marxism at the biological level, he is subject to the same criticisms as those directed at Langer and Dewey.

Anatoly Lunacharsky[21] (1873-1933), as the Soviet Republic's First People's Commissionar of Education, presented a Marxist-Leninist aesthetic. "Theses on the Problems of Marxist Criticism," written in 1928, advocated preference for the examination of social content to arrive at the social essence which it embodied. However, Lunacharsky did not forget form. Form had to reflect context "as closely as possible, giving it maximum expression and assuring the strongest possible impact on the reader."[22] Morawski[23] writes that Lunacharsky was receptive to modern movements (expressionism, cubism, futurism and purism) defending the right of art to experiment.

This liberalism did not last long. Borki and Zhdanov's writings pushed towards an "institutional" version of socialist realism. The First Congress of Soviet Writers established this doctrine in 1934-1936 and Stalin became the cultural head-hunter.

Most recently the official policy has been expounded by Vladimir Kemenov[24] and Nikolai Shamota.[25] The slogans involve such statements as,

> The art of socialist realism, which expresses the tastes of the people, fights for a peaceful life for creative labor and arouses revolutionary thoughts and feelings.

At present the translation of Marxist-Leninist thought into an aesthetic theory is a confined naturalism, even though Marx himself had no notion of mimesis.

> How could he [Marx] possibly have conceived of this reproduction as mimesis at the beginnings of aesthetic phenomena? No writer of the mid-nineteenth century knew the earliest cave art.[26]

Because of this overemphasis on naturalism by the Soviets we must look towards other translations of a Marxist aesthetic.

9.6 The Neo-Marxists

What distinguishes the neo-Marxists from "vulgar" Marxism is the position that in all social development, change in infrastructure (the economic base) is of primary importance, while the superstructure (the ideological domains of politics, law, religion, philosophy, literature, painting) is of secondary importance. However, a change in the infrastructure is not the cause, but only a precondition for changes in the superstructure. Different areas may develop relatively independently, causing ideological cross-fertilization, but the development of the whole is retarded (decadence sets in) if the economic base does not change for a long time. Change is neither predetermined nor spontaneous. It varies and fluctuates in relation to the more fundamental economic structures which determine the extent of the allocation of social resources to each institution. "There is no ultimate end, only ends that man is capable of conceiving."[27] Lukács, in Hungary, and Morawski, in Poland, present such views.

9.7 Lukács

Lukács, who is by far the most prominent of all aestheticians carrying the Marxist banner, has been given credit for showing that there is a Marxist aesthetic. Morawski[28] has praised him for the development of three nova in Marxist aesthetics. The first novum is Lukács' research method. "The study of the history of literature in the light of historical change does not seem particularly new.

What is new, however, is his view of the philosophical interpretation of artistic creation."[29] The second novum is his historical interpretation of form and genre. The change of forms to social changes were related. The third novum is Lukács analysis of realism. He analyzed the genesis of art, its function and its relation to religion, science and beauty in nature and aesthetic emotion.

Lukács aesthetic theory is both anthropomorphic and anthropocentric. He relies on the notion of "type"[30] (not average) which presents a situation which best mediates the individual (in a historical situation) to the universal (an important historical situation which best represents the age, nation or class which the individual belongs) in the "space for movement" which is the category where such a situation is presented. It is that category which falls between the extreme categories of individuality and universality.

It is not the intention here to present a complete exposition of Lukács' aesthetics. Such a review may be found in Béla Királyfalvi's The Aesthetics of György Lukács.[31] However, an examination of his treatment of intuition (Anschauung) and the unconscious is important because it contradicts Langer's theory and it attempts to provide a theory of reflection.

Lukács' aesthetics have been criticized[32] because he rejected the psychoanalytic unconsciousness in the creative process; however, as Maslow[33] has argued, this accusation is unfounded. She pointed out that terms like "spontaneity" are a preliminary stage towards consciousness and that reality, as Lukács uses the term, "has nothing to do with any subjective states of the psychoanalytic variety, but refers to an external world which exists independently of the individual mind and which is artistically reflected in literature."[34] Reflection on this reality becomes necessary, otherwise the artist remains attached to the social surface only.

Lukács, in his translation of a Marxist epistemology, considers dialectical materialism as an attempt to know reality through a rational mind. Theories which resort to intuitive philosophies are considered irrational.[35] To him, intuition is simply a part of the rational mind. Psychologically, intuition means that "the unconsciously flowing thinking process suddenly becomes conscious."[36]

Lukács treats intuition and the unconscious as parts of the primary plus signalizing system[37] (the language of art) which can express what is otherwise impossible to express through other means. Intuition is treated as a sudden perception (realization) of "some essential connection, relationship, without consciousness of the details of the process that had led to the conclusion."[38] Intuition is a rational process, presented on a cultural level. Rhythm is a good example.

> ...animal rhythm is spontaneous and inborn, while uniquely human rhythm is developed and perfected by man through conscious practice. The various forms of rhythm get into our consciousness, as for example, sounds that are originated when tools come into contact with materials.[39]

and

> Proportion and symmetry, characteristics of the objective world, were also discovered

> by man through work. As a result he created proportionate and useful tools, while making the process itself more efficient.[40]

9.8 Reflection Theory

Lukács also has a well-developed theory of reflection. Suffice to say that its fundamental premise is that "art reflects the reality that exists independently of our consciousness."[41] Man subjectively selects essential features of a situation which are really important to the present situation on the basis of interest. The "successful selection of the subjectively essential factors depend upon man's understanding of the objectively essential factors. Hence, the correct understanding of the dialectical relationship of essence and phenomenon is fundamental to life."[42] The artist goes through such a reflection process. The selection of essentials means in art the portrayal of the typical, (a degree of generalization) but without the creation of mere abstractions. The artist does not select according to personal aims or fancies, or prejudices but as a representative agent of mankind.

The theory of reflection sees the goal of the artist as presenting the contradictions of reality. The work is capable of surpassing reality, as understood in its everyday sense, and providing a deeper, more concrete glimpse of some aspect of that reality he is involved in.

9.9 Morawski

Lukács' reflection theory has been criticized for its over-emphasis on mimesis by Morawski[43] and it is to his assessment of Marxism that we now turn.

Morawski has given careful consideration to the aesthetics of Marx and Engels. Unlike Ziff[44] and Weitz[45] who state that a definition of the arts is impossible, Morawski, by applying the Marxian socio-historical model, attempted to state why some aesthetic values occur through more than a single period and are found in several geographical locations.[46] Themes such as harmony, rhythm, symmetry, mimesis, expression, catharsis and homo ludens (art as play) occur again and again in cultures of East and West.[47] These and other aesthetic values, notably originality[48] and novelty, are examined through a reconstruction of the processes by which these values came into being. He then interprets their most remote history, "against a setting of the fluctuating in a culture," to arrive at a "transhistorical" definition of the arts.[49]

A further contribution of Morawski towards a Marxist aesthetic is his attempt to clarify Marx's and Engels's original writings as well as other translations of their work.[50] His own socio-historic method is reflected in this passage.

> Art objects are not isolated phenomena, but are mutually dependent with other cultural activity of predominantly social, political, moral, religious, or scientific character. But how shall we describe the dynamics of the interdependence with these other fields of human endeavor? This mutuality is of a dual character: in current parlance it is

> a synchronic dynamism, translated in a given moment of the constituted structure of society, and it is also a diachronic dynamism, with the givens of the past being reconsidered by and affecting the present, and the future.[51]

Synchronic changes (surface appearances), Morawski argues, occur due to changes in ideologies and the conditioning of ideologies by "contradictions" which assert themselves between settled ideologies and the attitudes which individuals freshly discover in assessing the human, social and natural situation. Morawski calls these sources of contradictions "psychological" and perhaps "mythological."[52]

This dynamism occurs in two separate fields of interdependence. These are the idiogenetic setting of influence, "where new aesthetic activity is affected by previous aesthetic models," and the allogenetic setting, "where non-aesthetic givens have influence on new artistic activity."[53] From this, Morawski develops the Marxian historical-sociological approach where socio-political "tendencies" may be detected and unequal developments in certain cultural institutions may be examined as to their affect on art.

9.10 The American Marxism of Finkelstein and Joyce

Morawski, in his analysis of Marx and Engels pointed to three ways artistic values could be related to society. First, either the work could be associated with a comprehensive world view of a broad historical class; or second, the work could be associated with the hegemonic ideology of the era. Thirdly, the work could be more restrictedly attributed to a single political position.[54]

In America, Sidney Finkelstein's[55] Realism in Art (1954) presents a version of the first viewpoint.

> To understand art, we have to understand the thinking about life in each age. To do this we have to know the way in which the necessities of life were produced, the forces of production, the organization of social life, the relations of production, the division of social classes and the historical problems which rose to be solved.[56]

Although his book offers many insights into class divisions and political struggles, he translates Marx's aesthetic into a one-sided realism. Like Ortega y Gasset,[57] Finkelstein finds no use for contemporary art. For him, American art had become dehumanized.

> The main center of the new academy is the Museum of Modern Art in New York. Founded in 1939, its list of trustees reads like a roster of big banking and industrialist families.[58]

Robert Joyce's The Esthetic Animal[59] attempts to translate Marxism in broader historical terms, to show the larger changes of art from prehistoric times, through the "contradictions" created by a change to feudalism, then its changes in an urban setting to modern day capitalism. "The arts," he writes, "have been thus mishandled in good as well as in bad causes, by whatever privileged subgroup controlled the arts in any given society: the misleading advertiser and news-slanting publisher of today, the priest-king and magic-making shaman of the past."[60]

Through his entire thesis, Joyce re-emphasizes that his is an attempt to provide a human aesthetics. He underscores the fact that art is fundamentally and necessarily work which must become integral to a culture to remake culture and mind. He concludes that a Marxist aesthetic is essentially dialectic.

> Dialectics, which literally means discourse between differing views, also signifies process in general. It is the continuous transformation, the dynamic interconnectedness of things. For sensitive organs, dialectics is awareness of both matter and energy. If the arts are man's means of apprehending and conveying the dynamic, the continuous, and the moving, then art theory concerns itself with man's way of abstracting process and change. Esthetics becomes that through which man understands and works with the nondefinable aspects of existence. And in this, esthetics becomes synonymous with dialectics.[61]

The present writer would aver that the aesthetics of Finkelstein are too one-sided; Joyce's theory, while establishing the parameters of a human aesthetic, underemphasizes the artist.

9.11 Other Directions

The previous Marxist aestheticians (Lukács, Morawski, Finkelstein and Joyce) examined a dialectical analysis which underscored the social and historical function of art. This section focusses attention on the Marxian dialectics of the individual. As Janet Wolff, in Hermeneutic Philosophy and the Sociology of Art presents the problem:

> A Verstehende sociology of art...has the dual advantage of comprehending works of art in their own (artistic or aesthetic)

> terms, and of comprehending them in their relationship to social life in general. It faces the problem as soon as it moves, as sociology, from the particular artist and his social context to talking more generally about the productions of a society, or defining both the relevant social group and the relevant set of works of art, and of explaining (within a theory at the level of meaning) in what sense art can be said to be the expression of such a group.[62]

Her own conclusion to this problem was the acknowledgement of the hermeneutic theory of Gadamer, (see below) realizing that a historical perspective of social action, dialectical or otherwise, which depended on the ideology of the critic, was missing.

9.12 Hans-Georg Gadamer

Gadamer's central thesis maintains that "truth" about past events changes with the examination of every present case.[63] The application of this thesis is most evident in his etymological analysis of phronesis (practical knowledge), sensus communis (common sense), erlebnis (experience) and bildung (culture).[64]

Underlying his thesis, is Gadamer's presupposition that prejudices are unavoidable in interpretation. They are a historical reality and a necessary condition for understanding.[65] Any interpretation is a synthesis of the historical-sociological past and the interpreter's own current contextual situation.

This process of hermeneutic circling has been termed wirkungsgeschichtliche Bewusstsein[66] which literally means the "effect-historical consciousness." "The interpreter must recognize both his subject's and his own place in history, in the tradition of events, and must comprehend the relationship and fusion of the two standpoints in his work."[67] The implication of Gadamer's thesis is that "truth varies from generation to generation as each age comprehends in a different way a past age."[68]

When this thesis is applied to aesthetics, Gadamer presents a cognitive explanation of the arts at the level of meaning. Rejecting the radical subjectivism of Kant[69] where the beautiful (natural) is treated on the level of immediacy, Gadamer claims that the view of pure aesthetic consciousness does not adequately solve questions of taste and interpretation. A wider framework is needed.[70]

The notion of "play" (spiel) is his starting point. Play is "the mode of being of the work of art itself."[71] Play finds its true perfection in being art, "transformation into structure,"[72] so art as play requires an objectification or transformation into meaning.[73]

> We started from the position that the work of art is play, i.e., that its actual being cannot be detached from its representation and that in the representation the unity and identity of a structure emerge.[74]

Gadamer then continues to argue that the aesthetic dimension, at the level of meaning or reality, is a Hegelian world-view[75] and the appearance of an idea itself.

> The picture is an ontological event - in it, being becomes meaningfully visible.[76]

In short, the painting must be understood via ontology,

> The 'identity' of the work of art is not to be defined by its relation to an idea which is to be imitated and reproduced but, with Hegel, as the 'appearance' of the idea itself.[77]

In conclusion, Gadamer states,

> As a counter to the subjectivist attitude of modern aesthetics I developed the concept of play as the artistic event proper. This approach has now proved its value, in that the picture - and with it the whole of art that is not dependent on reproduction - is an ontological event and hence cannot be properly understood as the object of aesthetic consciousness, but rather is to be grasped in its ontological structure when one starts from such phenomena as that of representation.[78]

A number of criticisms of Gadamer's theory have been levied. Wolff, in reviewing Becker's criticism, shows that there has been an overemphasis on the historical interpretation. What of ahistorical, pure aesthetic consciousness where there is no need to transcend? Gadamer grants that such aesthetic experience exists, however,

> His thesis is that in transcending pure aesthetics we attain a more comprehensive understanding and appreciation of works of art, without relinguishing the aesthetic element; ...the inner coherence of the aesthetic and historical moment in the conscious of culture can be perceived... [as the] real experience of art, in contrast to arbitrary abstraction of pure aesthetics.[79]

Wolff also reviews the criticism made by Emillio Betti, who argues that in rejecting other canons of science, Gadamer leaves no reliable criterion for the correctness of an understanding.[80] Probably the most damaging criticism is that made by Habermas,

> The objectivistic way in which the hermeneutic sciences understand themselves is no less consequential. From reflectively understood, still living traditions it extracts a sterilized knowledge and ensures that everything that is in any way historical is consigned to the archives.[81]

The problem is, therefore, the inability of hermeneutics to explain changes of cultural symbols. It is limited to the world of traditionally inherited meanings which may be revealed to the extent that the interpreter's own world is made visible.

Because of such inadequacies, the writer will examine, in this final section, the aesthetic theories of Max Raphael, Lucien Goldman and Jean Duvignaud, as presenting various solutions to the question raised in the beginning of the chapter and elaborated by Wolff. None of the above offers a reductionist and causally one-sided hypothesis. It is for this reason that they are taken seriously.

9.13 Max Raphael

Max Raphael's[82] principal task is the uniting of history, society, and the artist in an individual and the presentation of a dialectical theory of creativity. It is in the individual artist and his concrete work that Raphael attempts to show how and in what manner the social and historical are exhibited. This individualized aspect is to be disclosed precisely in the successful understanding of emerging unique social themes, since no artist lives in a social vacuum.

Raphael argues that in the arts the determination of consciousness and technique may be far more heavily influenced by ideological structures than by the material basis of society. Economic organization of life and society does not determine anything directly. It sets the framework for the limits of the possibility of creation. Increase of complexity in economic and social organization obscures the relationship between artistic productions and the economic basis of society. It makes it possible for ideologies to predominate in certain epochs and over certain genres. This, Raphael, suggests, is characteristic of late (decadent) capitalist class society. It typically gives rise to aesthetic hedonisms of l'art pour l'art or "anti-art."[83]

Raphael's method, then, is to take account of the mediating elements and of the interaction of the ideological, personal and material elements. He begins with a methodological comparison of works of art. This involves the comparative study of works of art from all epochs, in the history of all peoples. From this comparative study, the most general elements, relationships, and domains of concretization are abstracted. In this way, the ideal works of art in their most typical aspects are constituted. Laws for the construction of form in the work of art, as well as laws of connection among the various kinds of art are at the same time laws of relation and association within society.[84]

Raphael proposes that aesthetic inquiry be the pre-condition for a general sociology of art. Mathematical or formal analysis of a work will reveal not merely the laws of construction of the work, but will exhibit the causal connections between aesthetic form and social conditions which give rise to it. To prove such a thesis, Raphael has made an analysis of paleolithic cave paintings, Cezanne, and Giotto.[85] In all three cases he has been able to offer a version of socio-political factors which were reflected in an alienated form in the works.

9.14 Goldman

Lucien Goldman's[86] Marxism parallels Raphael's aesthetics. Essentially a genetic structuralist, Goldman develops the notion of the "transindividual" subject which translates as Mannheim's explication of the total ideology of Weltanschauung or as Schutz's notion of "multiple realities" in the context of a total Lebenswelt. For convenience sake, Goldman uses the term "world view" to distinguish ideologies amongst groups.

Goldman's basic thesis is an attempt to show the homology of structure between an artwork and a group's world-view. Whereas Raphael's aesthetic structure was homologous to the dialectics between artist, work and society, Goldman confines his dialectics to the privileged or dominant group whose social needs, he claims, produce a total view of human life. As Goldman puts it,

> ...an imaginary universe, apparently completely removed from any specific experience - that of

> a fairy tale for instance - may, in its structure, be strictly homologous with the experience of a particular social group or, at the very least, linked, in a significant manner, with that experience.[87]

Whereas Raphael examines the ideal work as most typical of a comparative study in an epoch, Goldman studies the "peaks" of artistic achievement, because they are the most reflective of the relationship between the individual and the dominant social group.[88] Collective consciousness reaches its peak with the "exceptional" individual who can express the "collective" spirit of the group in his artwork.

Goldman uses the notion of the "transindividual" subject as the presentation of a world-view or collective vision of a social group. The "transindividual" or collective consciousness is not treated as a generalization nor as an ideal type based on an actual individual, but as an identity in itself. It is in fact the sum of the actors involved. "The consciousness of the transindividual subject has no reality of its own but exists only in the individual consciousness involved."[89]

World-views are structured non-consciously in Goldman's[90] analysis, in an attempt to solve practical problems and modify their situations. This is the central assumption of genetic structuralism.

> The...basic idea of any dialectic and genetic sociology is that human facts are responses of an individual or collective subject, constituting an attempt to modify a given situation.[91]

Goldman has been criticized by A.G. Playdell-Pearce[92] for his distinction between the "transindividual subject" and the individual consciousness as ~~an~~ exaggeration. Wolff's[93] critique is essentially against Goldman's insistence that the dominant economic class is the only single-purposed unified group which creates a world-vision. Non-economic groups, with world-vision, also have unity of purpose and they too require attention. A broader Marxist sociology is required which sees the exceptional individual as more than just the pure exponent of the philosophy of a single group.

9.15 Duvignaud

Duvignaud[94] presents a Marxist aesthetic which attempts to overcome the shortcomings of Goldman and Lukács. Duvignaud raises three criticisms[95] concerning their theories. (1) He questions the stress placed on literature to present a "world-vision." (2) "It is...debatable whether an individual can deal with an entire era." The idea that a great artist crystallizes in himself the widespread problem of his time and that his work embodies an entire civilization is doubtful. (3) Duvignaud argues that life's experiences are so complex that for an artist to choose and display those situations which embody a milieu is highly unlikely. It leads to academicism.

Like the Zagreb Group[96] who attempt to replace such art movements as Romanticism, Realism, Naturalism, etc., with a greater number of terms which could be historically defined so as to contain much less vagueness and ambiguity, Duvignaud attempts to place stress on the cumulative discoveries in art. How, for example, has space changed and modified through historical periods? How do artistic elements suggest new arrangements and redistribute themselves in a new system? Lukács et al. are not concerned with art, Duvignaud states, but the translation of philosophical problems into visual images.

Duvignaud's aesthetics is two fold: the first part deals with a working hypothesis of individual creation and the second part attempts to examine artistic attitudes and types of societies. Taking his cue from Francastel, who concentrates on the point where a work of art has not yet been consigned to a museum,[97] Duvignaud develops his own thesis: the sociology of art is drama, which he means "is a combination of behavior, emotions, attitudes, ideologies, actions and creations, which, for the creative individual, crystallizes the whole of society and places the genesis of a work of art within the complex of those contradictory forms which make up collective life."[98] These must be integrated into the system of signs which have to be understood for communication. Duvignaud also uses the concepts of anomy and the atypic for a working hypothesis for a sociology of the imaginary. Anomy, taken from Durkheim, refers to the overall state of disorder caused by the continuous process of change in a social structure.[99] During times of anomy, art finds expression in presenting new freedom. The concept of the atypic is more limited. It refers to those societies which have only one system of values, where the homogeneity of society is complete. The atypical or isolated individual, through his need to participate in his collective, creates new forms.[100]

In addition to the working hypothesis on the "individual" or psychological viewpoint, Duvignaud examines the historical and sociological viewpoints by outlining artistic or creative attitudes (known or implied) and the relation to the function art takes in particular types of societies. He lists eight attitudes[101] and a matrix of "types" of societies. These included the tribal, clannish, magical-religious theocratic societies, patriarchal communities, city-states, feudal societies, centralizing bourgeoisie, liberal societies, and industrial societies.[102] In each of these, Duvignaud attempts to explain the "universal function of art."

In conclusion, by isolating a number of artistic attitudes in history and relating those to a "type" of society and then applying his working hypothesis of "drama," anomy, atypicality, and sign system, Duvignaud argues that his sociology surpasses those of Lukács and Goldman.

9.16 Summary

It is evident from this rather lengthy chapter on neo-Marxist aesthetics that there are no "pure" aesthetic considerations except when such considerations are deliberately decontextualized. For this reason a great deal of "aesthetics" in North America distorts the nature of criticism, interpretation and evaluation.

Habermas, in Knowledge and Human Interests (1972), outlined three "sciences": the empirical-analytic, the hermeneutic and the critically-orientated. Underlying this chapter is the explicit assertion that the critically-orientated sciences, notably neo-Marxist aesthetics, currently provide the most adequate foundation for a scientific humanist aesthetic.

"Vulgar" Marxism has been overcome. However, it is clear that there are problems in theory involving the individual artist in society. Directions have been pointed towards its solution. In the last chapter the writer will attempt to incorporate the insights of this chapter in dealing with art education. It will be argued that a more intentional and active role for aesthetics in the school will go far to solve the relationship of artist and society.

Footnotes - Chapter Nine

[1] Béla Királyfalvi, *The Aesthetics of György Lukács* (London: Princeton University Press, 1975), pp. 25-26.

[2] Quoted from Walter Odajnyk, *Existentialism and Marxism* (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Co., 1965) which is found in an article by Sidney Finkelstein, "Marxism and Existentialsim," *Science and Society* 31 (Winter 1967):59.

[3] Ernst Fischer, *The Necessity of Art: A Marxist Approach* (Harmondsworth, Middlesex, England: Penguin Books Ltd., 1963).

[4] S. Finkelstein, "Marxism and Existentialism," *Science and Society* 31 (Winter 1967):61.

[5] George Boas, "Historical Periods," *JAAC* 11, 1953 and "Art, Morals, and the Teaching of Art," *Journal of Aesthetic Education* 2(3) (July 1963):93-104.

[6] Teddy Brunius, "The Uses of Works of Art," in *Aesthetic Inquiry*, ed. Beardsley & Schueller (Belmond, California: Dickenson Pub. Co., 1967), pp. 12-25.

[7] Stephan Morawski, *Inquiries into the Fundamentals of Aesthetics* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1974) p. 41.

[8] A. Tiryakian, "Existential Phenomenology and the Sociological Tradition," *The Sociological Review* 30, 1968, p. 678.

[9] J. Habermas, "Knowledge and Interest," *Inquiry* 9(4) (Winter 1966):289.

[10] A. Schutz, *Collected Papers I, The Problem of Social Reality*, "Common-Sense and Scientific Interpretation," p. 33. The underlining is mine.

[11] J. Bensman, and Robert Lilienfeld, "A Phenomenological Model of the Artistic and Critical Attitudes," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 28 (March 1968):357.

[12] J. Habermas, "Knowledge and Interest," Inquiry 9(4) (Winter 1966):293.

[13] G. Novack, Existentialism Versus Marxism.

[14] Thomas Munro, "The Marxist Theory of Art History," Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 18, 1959, pp. 430-445.

[15] James Scanlan, "The Impossibility of a Uniquely Authentic Marxist Aesthetics," British Journal of Aesthetics 15(2) (Spring 1976):128-136.

[16] M. Rader, "Marx's Interpretation of Art and Aesthetic Value," British Journal of Aesthetics 7(3) (July 1967):237-249.

[17] L. Baxandall, Radical Perspectives in the Arts (Harmondsworth, Middlesex, England: Penguin Books Ltd., 1972) and L. Baxandall, "Marxism and Aesthetics: A Critique of the Contribution of George Plekhanov," JAAC 25 (Spring 1967):267-275.

[18] Miroslav Beker, "Marxism and the Determinants of Critical Judgment," JAAC 29(1) (Fall 1970):33.

[19] L. Baxandall, "Marxism and Aesthetics: A Critique of the Contribution of George Plekhanov," JAAC 25 (Spring 1967)267-275.

[20] S. Morawski, Inquiries Into the Fundamentals of Aesthetics, p. 43.

[21] Anatoly Lunacharsky, On Literature and Art trans. A. Lebedev (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1965).

[22] Ibid., p. 16.

[23] S. Morawski, Inquiries Into the Fundamentals of Aesthetics, pp. 262-263.

[24] V. Kemenov, "The Soviet Attitude to Art," in Modern Art and the Modern Mind, Hodin (Cleveland and London: The Press of Case Western Reserve University, 1972). Professor Vladimir Kemenov was the director of the Tretjakov Gallery in Moscow and a member of the Academy of Arts in the Soviet Union. He gave the official statement on Soviet Realism in 1952 in London.

[25] N. Shamota, "On Tastes in Art [The Soviet View]," in Aesthetics Today, ed. Morris Philipson (New York: The World Pub. Co., The New York Library Inc., 1961), pp. 27-32.

[26] S. Morawski, "Introduction," in Marx and Engels on Literature and Art, ed. Lee Baxandall & Stefan Morawski (St. Louis, Milwaukee: Telos Press), p. 15.

[27] B. Királyfalvi, The Aesthetics of György Lukács, p. 29.

[28] S. Morawski, "Mimesis - Lukács' Universal Principle," Science and Society 32, 1968, pp. 26-38.

[29] Ibid., pp. 27-28.

[30] G. Lukács, Writer and Critic, trans. Arthur Kahn (London: Merlin Press, 1970), pp. 30-44.

[31] The Aesthetics of György Lukács, (London: Princeton University Press, 1975).

[32] J. Kizer, "The Problem of the Unconscious in the Creative Process as Treated by Soviet Aesthetics," JAAC 21 (Summer 1963) :399-406.

[33] Vera Maslow, "Georg Lukács and the Unconscious," JAAC 22 (Summer 1964):465-470.

[34] Ibid., p. 466.

[35] B. Királyfalvi, The Aesthetics of György Lukács, p. 30.

[36] Ibid., p. 38. Quoted from: Apolgari filozofia valsagg, p. 84.

[37] Ibid., Chapter Six, "The Language of Art." Lukács' other signalizing systems are the primary signalizing systems which is a conditioned reflex response and the secondary signalizing system which is language.

[38] Ibid., p. 88.

[39] Ibid., p. 44, from Az Esztetikun Sajatossaga, p. 242.

[40] Ibid., p. 45, from *Az Esztetikun Sajatossaga*, p. 270.

[41] Ibid., p. 56, from *Muveszet es Tarsdalom* (Budapest: 1968), p. 285.

[42] Ibid., p. 57.

[43] S. Morawski, "Mimesis - Lukács' Universal Principle," *Science and Society* 32, 1968, pp. 37-38.

[44] Paul Ziff, "The Task of Defining a Work of Art," *Philosophical Review* 63, 1953.

[45] Weitz, "The Role of Theory in Aesthetics," *JAAC* 15, 1956.

[46] S. Morawski, "What is a Work of Art?," *Radical Perspectives in the Arts*, ed. Baxandall, pp. 324-370.

[47] S. Morawski, *Inquiries into the Fundamentals of Aesthetics*, p. 77.

[48] Ibid., p. 8.

[49] Ibid., pp. 98-114.

[50] S. Morawski, "Introduction," *Marx and Engels on Literature and Art*, ed. Morawski and Baxandall, 1975.

[51] Ibid., p. 8.

[52] Ibid., p. 11.

[53] Ibid., p. 16.

[54] Ibid., p. 27.

[55] S. Finkelstein, *Realism in Art* (New York: International Pub. Co. Inc.).

[56] Ibid., p. 9.

[57] Jose Ortega y Gasset, The Dehumanization of Art (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968).

[58] S. Finkelstein, Realism in Art, p. 174.

[59] R. Joyce, The Esthetic Animal (Hicksville, New York: Exposition Press, 1975).

[60] Ibid., p. 4.

[61] Ibid., p. 90

[62] Hermeneutic Philosophy and the Sociology of Art, (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul), p. 86.

[63] J. Wolff, Hermeneutic Philosophy and the Sociology of Art, p. 103.

[64] H. Gadamer, Truth and Method (London: Sheed and Ward, 1975), pp. 5-80.

[65] J. Wolff, Hermeneutic Philosophy and the Sociology of Art, p. 105.

[66] Ibid., p. 107.

[67] Ibid., p. 107.

[68] Ibid., p. 108.

[69] H. Gadamer, Truth and Method, pp. 39-80.

[70] Ibid., p. 88.

[71] Ibid., p. 91.

[72] Ibid., p. 99.

[73] Ibid., p. 105.

[74] Ibid., p. 109.

[75] Ibid., p. 87.

[76] Ibid., p. 127.

[77] Ibid., p. 127.

[78] Ibid., pp. 127-128.

[79] J. Wolff, Hermeneutic Philosophy and the Sociology of Art, p. 112.

[80] Ibid., p. 121.

[81] J. Habermas, "Knowledge and Interest," Inquiry 9, p. 299.

[82] W. H. Truit, "A Marxist Theory of Aesthetic Inquiry: The Contribution of Max Raphael," Journal of Aesthetic Education 5(1) (January 1971):151-161.

[83] Ibid., p. 155.

[84] Ibid., p. 160.

[85] Ibid., p. 160. Raphael established a direct correlation between the material mode of production and organization of paleolithic communities and their artistic production. He has also shown how modification in the mode of production are reflected in the formal and compositional aspects of art in the neolithic period after the invention of the bow. In his analysis of Cezanne, Raphael reconstructed how social laws were reflected in Cezanne's work. This was confirmed in Cezanne's own correspondences and writing. Finally, his study of Giotto's work showed mathematically, how a certain theological world view was shown in the relationship between finite and infinite substances in his work.

[86] L. Goldman, "Methodology, Problems, History: The Sociology of Literature: Status and Problems of Method," International Society of Science Journal 19(4), 1967, pp. 493-516.

[87] Ibid., p. 495.

[88] Goldman's work on Racine's tragic plays which reflects Racine's concerns over the moral problems in contradiction to his training in the Port Royal schools run by the Jansenists is an example of this position.

[89] J. Wolff, Hermeneutic Philosophy and the Sociology of Art, p. 82.

[90] L. Goldman, "Methodology, Problems, History," International Society of Science Journal 19(4), 1967, p. 496.

> "The categorical structures, which govern the collective consciousness and which are transposed into imaginary universe created by the artist, are neither conscious nor unconscious in the Freudian sense of the word...; they are non conscious processes..."

[91] Ibid., p. 494.

[92] A. G. Pleydell-Pearce, "Art and Praxis," British Journal of Aesthetics 15, 1975, pp. 3-13. Pleydell-Pearce resorts back to Hegel's Absolute Spirit as the proper solution.

[93] J. Wolff, Hermeneutic Philosophy and the Sociology of Art, pp. 86-87.

[94] J. Duvignaud, The Sociology of Art, trans. Timothy Wilson (London: Granada Pub. Ltd., 1972).

[95] Ibid., pp. 39-41.

[96] M. Beker, "Marxism and the Determinants of Critical Judgment," JAAC 29(1) (Fall 1970):36-37.

[97] Francastel follows the advice of Henri Lefebvre's interpretation of Marx as referring to the object, in this case art object, as must human and social when its in use.

[98] J. Duvignaud, The Sociology of Art, p. 49. Duvignaud lists the following items as necessary to "dramatic" art.

1. Sociology of art must take into account the artist's position in society which was affected by real changes; and power-orientated ideologies

2. The artist's education

3. The relationship of psychological themes (through psychoanalysis of how they related to the who) and the existing forms in society

[99] Ibid., p. 59.

[100] Ibid., pp. 61-63.

[101] Briefly these eight attitudes were:

1. Aesthetic of total communication makes up the signs advanced by an individual and a human group. The symbolism of these signs is only relevant to the group which receives them (p. 67.)

2. Nostalgia for lost communication during times of transition (p. 70.)

3. The attitude of having religion or sacred art made (p. 72.)

4. The deliberate illustration of everyday life (p. 75.)

5. The art of reservations or of closed doors. Only artists understand their language (p. 78.)

6. Art as expenditure of wealth where small groups strive for political power and social dominance (p. 80.)

7. An attitude of creating art as the opposition on ethical grounds to the traditional culture of society and its established values (p. 85.)

8. The doctrine of art for art's sake

[102] J. Duvignaud, The Sociology of Art, p. 99.

CHAPTER TEN

Implications for Art Education

10.1 Introduction

In an examination of the entire flux of articles in *Studies in Art Education*, ranging from the concerns with art administration, art curriculum, art evaluation, art research and art philosophy, one perceives a faint, but visible impression of dissatisfaction with current theory and practice. Implications generated in previous chapters apply equally to these.

Champlin,[1] for example, recognizing that the goals selected for art belonged to a larger ideology,[2] wanted a constructive "crisis" to happen which would question the "theoretical" leadership and "policy" power which was coming from outside the art educational field. Because art policy was in control of the institutions of the (American) society, Champlin suggested that art should seek "aesthetic issues" which were grounded in social conflict and hence, promote more critical attitudes.[3]

McWhinnie[4] suggested that the new direction in art education in 1970 would be directed towards society, as Lanier had indicated in "The Teaching of Art As Social Revolution."[5] Eisner[6] raised the critical question concerning language concepts and art, while Wygant's[7] analysis of L.B. Meyer's book, *Music, the Arts, and*

Ideas, (1967) showed that an assessment of change would be beneficial to art education.

Efland's[8] analysis of "school art" shows the correspondence between social structure and art. Efland identified church art, corporate art, museum art and school art as having their own function, styles and themes, including support for their own artists. He points out that art as developed in the classroom relates little to what professional artists are doing. Art in the classroom becomes the symbol of the sub-culture of the school, a point which Illich has also made.[9] Art functions as "time off for good behavior" because of the repressive hidden curriculum. The school acts like a modern corporation with teacher reinforcing the type of art products he/she wants. Art becomes the scapegoat for trivial activity in the school. It is difficult for teachers to introduce serious intellectualism into the classroom such as criticism and art history.

Glaeser,[10] in his assessment of what it would require to understand the artworks of another culture, concluded that the way an artist perceives himself and the way he was perceived by others is, to a large extent, defined by his culture, especially where tradition is a guide to the future. Glaeser poses the question whether art education should train its children to simply preserve their tradition and maintain cultural values (as reecreative artists) or whether they should be creative artists while actively questioning particular values and attitudes.[11]

The same realization that research should be directed towards a response to art which does not necessarily maintain the status quo was raised recently by Lanier.[12] Environmental issues, housing issues, transportation issues, economic, social and political relationships must be viewed as moral questions in art education. Hawkins[13] has made a survey of the extent to which art research looks at the larger technological developments to see how their influences shape art and artists and art education (what goes on in our classroom). He came to realize that the technological developments of a capitalist society, with its stress on research, added pace of life, regimentation, etc., are virtually ignored in the classrooms.

This survey points out the need for a more critical orientation towards art education and aesthetic education. Neither behavioral research nor ethnomethodological research as presented by Pohland[14] will uncover the underlying political, social and ideological influences currently directing art education. The following sections will present a position which argues that a neo-Marxist position in art education needs to be adopted if the above problems are to be less severe on the grounds that (1) modern capitalism establishes the contradiction that art is a commodity which, in turn, alienates the artist, (2) contemporary art movements since the 60's have presented an attempt to free art of its elitist position by questioning such values as scarcity, novelty and commodities and its "museum like" quality. This emphasis is not however reflected in the art class to any significant extent.

The chapter will conclude with the outline of a new direction and a recasting of the triad in aesthetic education: criticism; history; and a praxiology which aims at a more active and intentional role for art education directed towards the emergence of *homo aesthetics*. Art must be politicized for *change*.

10.2 The Contradictions in Art

The major aesthetic contradiction in our present capitalist society is the treatment of art as a commodity. The present era is different from all those which preceded it because "bourgeois man could not allow the arts to be the primary social experience of the people."[15]

The capitalist class, in their struggle for power and freedom from the mass arts of feudalism, required a supression of the arts as vehicles of subjective conditions, which the Church and King had used effectively. This was accomplished when art was reduced to a commodity and could be dealt with as an object of trade. In Italy, Alberti reflected this position clearly. His family contracted their services to various merchant princes. Leonardo, by making art a scientific study (e.g., perspectives), was able to elevate the status of the arts to that of science.

With the industrial age the capitalist market transformed art into an autonomous commodity, which it never had been before. An unknown purchaser might now be the source of the artist's livelihood, and the pricing of the artwork became *the* most important factor. It required a group of experts to produce "art" because only they had the time and the surplus income to do it.

Art had lost its most vital function; that of cultural creation. The separation of art from the working class grew. Alienation of the artist from society grew. At least alienation in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance had been mitigated by the artist's participation in the class opinions of his patrons. Often these same patrons were generous with their commissions and non-interfering in the artist's execution. This was not the case under capitalism. The working man (homo faber) was separated from the product of his work. The artwork was no longer kept, used and enjoyed. It was disposed of and distributed by the owners of captial for profit.

Today, alienation exists but in different forms. The artist must become an entrepreneur, a small businessman to support himself. Film-makers, best selling novelists, film actors, successful painters become elevated to capitalists when the "value" of their work becomes acknowledged through the size of its price tag.

For the few that "make it," many more do not. The contradiction thus becomes very real and very vivid. Artists wish to give everything for their art. They rationalize that it does not matter whether they make money or not; it does not matter which themes are chosen or what methods used. What matters is the effort involved, the "feeling" of accomplishment. However, all this is an illusion in a modern industrial age. The more recognition and success the artist receives, the less able is he to claim freedom and full control over the disposal of his product. Those that do not become successful, that pursue recognition but are poor businessmen, rally to the bohemian worlds of Haight-Ashbury, Greenwich Village and Soho. Each in turn becomes an attractive community of non-conforming ways and life styles for a growing number of non-artists.

10.3 The Aesthetic Contradiction

What start to be avant-garde movements or gestures of revolt are quickly domesticated, like beads and beards, which subtly become transformed from a threat, to a modish fad, to commonplace. Aesthetic theories underlying the previous avant-garde periods properly reflect this contradiction. They reinforce and promote a consciousness of cathartic release. They are in the service of the ruling element. As Marcuse writes,

> This sort of tolerance strengthens the tyranny of the majority against which authentic liberals protested. The political locus of tolerance has changed; while it is more or less quietly and constitutionally withdrawn from the opposition, it is made compulsory behavior with respect to established policies. Tolerance is turned from an active into a passive state, from practice to non practice: la laissez-faire the constituted authorities.[16]

Aesthetic experience is seen as a release from tensions. It serves as a pacifying role to cure accumulated anti-social tendencies. Aesthetic experience seen in this way becomes therapeutic, a legitimate tool to use to purge feelings. Room is set aside for graffiti; musical gatherings like those of Woodstock and Altamont in the 60's are geared to mass audiences. Of phenomena like these, Marcuse wrote,

> And as this music loses its radical impact, it tends to massification. The listeners and co-performers in the audience are masses streaming to a spectacle, a performance.
>
> ....
>
> This music is, in a literal sense, imitation, the mimesis of effective aggression: it is, moreover, another case of catharsis: group therapy which, temporarily, removes inhibitions. True Liberations, however, remains a private affair.[17]

As a political tool bourgeois aesthetic theory provides the illusion that disappointments in the real world may be worked out.

> Tolerance toward that which is radically evil now appears as good because it serves the cohesion of the whole on the road to affluence or more affluence.[18]

Corporations such as Pall Mall, Rothmans, Prang, Remington, IBM, promote and control avant-garde "revolutions." The support system of museums, art galleries, critics, art teachers, aids in promoting the myth. Art becomes an escape, so the public may share in the artist's sense of alienation. What were once true expressions of contradicitons become legitimatized. Art becomes decadent and stagnant.

Aesthetic theory rationalizes aesthetic experience as taking place within a merger of the natural attitude and the scientific attitude. Man becomes defined as homo ludens, a playful creature, overcoming the frustrations and tensions between order and disorder.

Such aesthetic theory reflects the preservation of power, the suppression of the opposition, and the dialectics of eugenics rather than praxis. The contradiction remains; the social whole is treated as a complex which is supposedly enriched by containable differences. The status quo is maintained. Art, which is potentially revolutionary, is tamed. "The anarchy of art is directed against itself."[19] "I threw the urinoir into their faces," Duchamp wrote, "and now they come to admire it for its beauty."[20]

10.4 The New Aesthetics

With the advent of "Ecological Art," "Anti-Form," "Conceptual Art," "Body Art," "Art Povera,"[21] in the last few years, Formalism in painting and sculpture seems to be coming to an end, and with it, the change of foucs from the art object as a commodity to art as "process." Haake, for example, creates art from the natural elements of water, air, and earth. His works challenge the accepted notions of monument and time. Others, like Carl Andre, present monuments which may be dismantled at any time; while still others, like Heizer allow the weather to get rid of any trace of the work. Insley places his monumental works in tundra areas and prairies, as far away as he can from bourgeois cities like New York and Paris.[22]

Today Conceptual Art seems to be the predominant movement. It eliminates the function between critic and artist. Conceptual artists frame their own propositions, ideas and concepts. Ideologies and intentions are stated. As Meyer writes,

> An essential aspect of Conceptual Art is its self-reference; often the artists define the intentions of their work as part of their art.[23]

Since the idea of the work is revealed by the artists, it encourages the participant to evaluate his ideology at first hand.

> No art lends itself so readily to - in fact, at times depends so completely upon - publications than this art of actual materials and events.[24]

The basic claim of Conceptual Art "is that making objects is irrelevant."[25] It is an attempt to overcome categories[26] and no longer claim ownership for the work.[27] Like the earlier Dadaists, Conceptual artists reject bourgeois values. Myths of scarcity, novelty, style, quality, permanence and commodity are dispelled. Art-as-idea and art-as-knowledge replace these myths. Information theory, scientific treatises, photographic documentation and biological, sociological structures investigate the systematic relationships between actual event and conceptions. "Being an artist now means to question the nature of art."[28] Meanings change. If an artist picks up a brush he automatically accepts the tradition which accompanies the tool. The artist's role today is to question this underlying tradition. According to Marcuse, the culture finds itself in a process of "desublimation" as a result of this.

> The subverting use of the artistic aims for the beginning of a systematic desublimation of culture; that is to say, at undoing the aesthetic form."[29]

It seems the influx of these new ideas is an attempt by a new class of artists to assert their values. The Worker's Coalition,[30] created in 1969, is a significant attempt to break away from the control of the museums and support system. Among their demands are: to have artists on museum staffs, allow free admission to all museums and at night so that working people can be accommodated; allow Puerto Rican and Black direction of a section of all museums. Until minimum income is guaranteed for all people, the economic position of artists, says the Coalition, should be improved through rental fees, trust fund and profit percentage.

There are also groups of artists doing "collective art." The individualism of the artist is also under attack. The Guerrilla Art Action Group of New York (GAAG) for example, questions current artistic values and searches for its own definition of humanism.[31]

These broad attempts of contemporary art to eliminate bourgeois values are not without their contradictions. Conceptual artists who are attempting to break boundaries still need to use conventional means like the art gallery, the museum, critics and magazines like Arts Magazine, The Art Journal or Art and Artists.[32]

The Paris May Rebellion of 1968, which attempted to "desublimate" bourgeois assumptions soon had their posters, slogans, and graffiti documentated and displayed in New York museums.[33]

10.5 Limitations of Contemporary Avant-Garde Aesthetics For Art Education

Although contemporary movements have moved the notion of "art" from the élitist bon goût to a more human level, it is doubtful whether its form has become more accessible to the public.

Artists have to explain their artworks so precisely, with so many cues, that in many cases, the public does not care.

> ...no matter how many free days the museum offers, they [working people] have neither the interest and training nor the social and geographical proximity with which to benefit from these supremely humanizing products.34

On the other hand, if the "new art" is not saleable then the art market changes to those commodities which are (i.e., antiques, representational art, and prints of noted artists).

Contemporary movements, with their stress on the value of de-objectification[35] certainly present a positive direction for an aesthetic education whose aim would be to eliminate current aesthetic alienation. However the stress on "de-aestheticism" and the continuation of a Duchampian anti-art movement is detrimental to such an aim.

The main problem of anti-art is its extreme existentialism. It becomes inaccessible to the public. What is a blatant ridicule of bourgeois aesthetic values requires a form of criticism which falls into journalistic declarations of their artistic intentions, to present a coherent picture of their philosophy. In short, the philosophy underlying anti-art forms is not suitable for art education because of the over-stress on the individual. Certainly the work produced may make powerful statements about contemporary society, (i.e., Thek's surrogate meat models enclosed in glass cases) however, on the whole these works reach only a limited number of people. Marcuse raises the key question,

> But has this effort [contemporary art] already reached the point of no return, that is, the point where the *oeuvre* drops out of the dimension of alienation, of *formed* negation and contradiction, and turns into a sound-game, language-game - harmless and without commitment, shock which no longer shocks, and thus succumbing?[36]

In many ways much of avant-garde art has lost its "bite." What was, at one time, a cynical and satirical movement, has become assimilated to the point where it no longer shocks, confuses, points at or laughs. It just is. The reasons for a great deal of anti-art's plight stems from the result of its contradiction. Capitalism placed stress on the individual; the self-autonomous unit which is able to pursue its own goal. In such a system the eccentric and the madman could be assimilated and with the right connections, even raised and appraised as a great businessman or great star. If the extreme individualism of anti-art is not the model for art education, what is?

Of primary consideration to art education are the values associated with "de-objectification." "De-objectification" is taken to contain two central ideas. The first is the elimination of art as commodity, while the second, is the dissolution of all barriers between art and life. As Press states,

> For the commodity is an object, which has its value, not in itself, like an aesthetic object, but in another object for which it may be exchanged. And thus its value, 'exchange-value', is not the value of quality which defines the aesthetic object - something to be *enjoyed* - but of quantity, something to be *counted*.[37]

If "art-life" is to be consumed aesthetically, it must in principle be consumed by all. If art or the process of art should be an end in itself, then it falls back to an art-for-art's-sake philosophy. Its activities become stagnant and purposeless. Art education needs a more utilitarian aesthetic; one which can be enjoyed by all. Presently, man's alienation sees art only as a commodity even though the standard of living enjoyed on the North American Continent is sufficiently high to provide everyone with the possibility of achieving one's own aesthetic fulfilment, a more human condition than the confinements of an 8 to 5 job or the continual monotony that the assembly line permits.

The present aesthetic choices we enjoy are however, an illusion. Toffler suggests that the culture which promotes plastic bedroom sets, smooth riding Cadillacs, T.V. soap operas, commercials, spectator sports, submissive female roles, etc., shapes our aesthetic sensibilities and guides our future. Choices become superficial, as ludicrous as Zest over Ivory Soap.[38] Such a culture certainly requires a critical examination, and some kind of commitment on the part of those who make it up. Commitment is necessary because,

> ...man produces man, himself and other men, when the object which is the direct activity of his personality, is at the same time his existence for him. Thus the object that mediates my life - for I produce my life by producing objects - 'mediates also the existence of other men for me'.[39]

If one advocates the elimination of aesthetic alienation, (i.e., anything that prevents you and me from becoming less human, specifically that part of us which is or may be aesthetic) what form would art education need to take? To eliminate aesthetic alienation the values of de-objectification would need to be met in the context of the individual and society. To do this, present values need to be pulled out of their current contradictory roles (i.e., art must cease to become private or expensive).

10.6 Direction For a New Aesthetic in Art Education

In Chapter Nine it was made evident that there needs to be a happy marriage between the individual and society. If art is to become part of life, one cannot lose sight of these two elements. For art education this poses two necessary conditions. The first requires a re-evaluation of the notion of "play" from its present contradictory role in a capitalist society to one which emphasizes the individual or existential element of a human aesthetic theory. The second condition is the general aim of de-objectifying art and aesthetic theory so that all in a society may enjoy the aesthetic process. In the case of art education, society translates into the institutions of the family, school and museum. In summary, then, these two conditions would require a commitment towards the actualization of self and the actualization of a "societal aesthetic" in an active and intentional way.

A. Play: Homo Ludens

In its current contradictory mode, play is seen as a frivolous activity, a pastime. In a mechanical world with its stress on "object" and efficiency, the translation of this human dimension into a worthless state is a logical outcome of a capitalist philosophy. Play as Gadamer perceives it, is an essential human quality,

> I wish to free this concept [play] from the subjective meaning which it has in Kant and Schiller and which dominates the whole of modern aesthetics and philosophy of man. If, in connection with the experience of art, we speak of play, this refers neither to the attitude nor even to the state of mind of the creator or those enjoying the work of art, nor to the freedom of a subjectivity expressed in play, but to the mode of being of art itself.[40]

"Play" brings with it the much abused notion of creativity but here creativity is given its freedom from bondage. Play refers to the right to deal with open-ended questions, concepts and ideas. It involves the notions of hypothesis, risk taking, the category of "to see what happens if ...," experimentation, involvement. In short, it is "aesthetic experience" freed for humanization and self-actualization. As Allan Kaprow, the innovator of the Happening defined it in "systems approach" jargon,

> It...favors openness towards outcome, in contrast to the literal and goal-orientated uses now employed by most systems specialists.
>
> ....
>
> Playfulness and the playful use of technology suggest a positive interest in acts of continuous discovery.

> Playfulness can become, in the near future
> a social and psychological benefit.[41]

Play has been taken out of society and education, not only through the stress on pre-ordained answers and outcomes, but also with the elimination of surprise in our products. One is reminded of the days when the rag doll contributed to the growth of imagination and consciousness by being a malleable object. Witness today's replacement; the string pulling, mind-deadening, bed-wetting, stereo-sentenced doll which endlessly prattles, "My name is Barbie. What's yours?"

B. Society: Homo Aestheticus

But play, in itself, is not enough for a complete aesthetic program which must contribute to the actualization of the society. Here,,a political commitment is required; not a commitment towards art propaganda where a confined ideology is advocated, but a politicization towards the elimination of alienation, to free man as man.

The weighting afforded by the family and the school in shaping a child's value system by far outweighs other influences like Church, Government and Art. The aesthetic values he receives at home have their own cultural heritage[42] and therefore should not be dismissed but given due accommodation. Contending aesthetic values brought from home, from T.V. propaganda and from other sources should be examined critically in the art classroom with the general aim of de-objectification of aesthetic theory.

The institution of the family and the school have adopted bourgeois aesthetic values. These need to be examined in the classroom.

C. Praxiology

A re-casting of aesthetic education's three components, the artist, historian and critic, into a praxiology where there is a commitment towards establishing art as part of the human condition, would go far towards liberating the elements of "play" and de-objectification.

Art as Praxiology. When an examination is made of what aesthetic values have been presented by art movements in the past, we see that there has been an attempt to increase the notion of "humanness." Surrealism provided access to dreams and the sub-conscious; Abstract Expressionism added the dimension of total body involvement and accident; Expressionism released emotion while Abstraction released color as color. Currently, Conceptual Art is providing access to philosophy and the environment. Each "movement" has been committed to increasing the concept of "cultural man." Art education should do likewise. Presently, art education teaches "technique as opposed to philosophy,"[43] and "the acquirement of a 'trade'."[44]

Art History as Praxiology. History as praxiology sees man as an active shaper of his environment. Most art history is written as a literary monologue, praising man's capacity in achieving technical competence. The reaction to such history has created a spirit of anti-intellectualism amongst contemporary artists. Art has always been an active and intentional "being" for the shaping of mans' subjective nature. Art, when taken out of the museum, into the lives of the people, has always made history, not become history. As Sandler puts it,

> These issues [conflicting issues in art] become the points of departure for reviewing the past, that is, allow the living present to give us our access to the vast realm of the past. In this way, we can determine what is of significance - alive or dormant at any moment - in the past, significant because it exposes how we arrived at the present and by contrast clarifies our awareness of both past and present. In turn, the past assumes a new importance, for it is imbued with meaning that it otherwise no longer seems to possess.[45]

We have then, the notion that history can be made. It is not a passive, linear series of artistic events but an active attempt to understand man as man. "Group aesthetics" becomes possible when individual members make specific contributions to the community.[46]

Criticism as Praxiology. Nothing could be more important than a constant re-evaluation and re-examination of one's personal aesthetic values. Reflection on shared values and personal values is a necessary element for change. Kenneth Burke provides us with a paradigm case for criticism. His "dramatism" identifies the motivational framework for the ruling elite. By showing the contradictions in the situation, he prepares his analysis for public discourse. He then provides the public with an alternative justification for the action of the characters. This logic of inquiry thus gives the audience the opportunity of changing the world! Man, recreating himself through the historical process, is central to the notion of praxiology. The individual, be he art educator or student, expert or layman, must be made aware of, and encouraged to use his capacity to assess and modify his value system.

10.7 Conclusions: Praxis For Art Education

To make the aesthetic available for all (the emergence of homo aestheticus), it is desirable not to separate homo ludens from homo faber. Work, if it is to be creative, requires an active element of play.[47] This provides the necessary pre-condition for the attainment of an aesthetic experience, which, phenomenologically speaking, is characterized by the feelings of accomplishment, of commitment and of complete absorption. As the writers of The Creative Experience[48] found, it is "feelings of excitement and pleasure [which] accompany creative work."

To help establish the conditions which allow surprise and accident to accompany play; where children actively question; trust their hunches and have a desire to make a significant contribution to the world through meaningful activities, the following central value requires endorsement.

> A de-objectification in art education requires a political commitment because if "artwork" is to contribute to oneself and society it needs to be creative. "Work," per se, to be meaningful requires, an aesthetic element (i.e., aesthetic experience). For this to be realized, the aesthetic needs to be active and political.

De-objectification means eliminating current alienating aesthetic values from art education. Practices which promote a "commodity fetish" or primarily stress technique should be re-examined. Treating art objects as personal enclaves which should be revered in an iconophilic fashion upon some classroom wall can be an alienating practice if the gesture is to praise individuals who have successfully mastered a technique. Activities which would help achieve the central value cited are listed below.

1. To examine the "commodity fetish" art activities need to explore the marketing field from the perspective of how and why commodities reflect the status quo. Alternatives should be explored which would allow commodities to be more personable, reaching a wider audience. At one time the artist knew and understood his audience. This should be revived.

2. The cost of aesthetic thrills needs to be explored. To what extent have human values been disregarded for the attainment of a cosmetic thrill? Two examples illustrate this point. First,

when a chair is bought one has no idea who made it, what the materials in it are, where it came from, what it originally cost, how much labor was involved, and how much the chair had been artificially promoted through the institutionalization of advertisement. Second, human hair is bought from aging old ladies and young women, both in Crete, Sardinia, and Portugal for the cost of a few trinkets and useless trifles. This same hair is dyed, processed and sold as wigs at two hundred to three hundred dollars a piece. Art educators should make children aware of similar practices and question the aesthetic values which accompany them.

3. The exploration of aesthetic values may begin through the analysis of various institutionalized art forms. An exploration of corporate art, religious art, school art, and "in the home" art would yield competing aesthetic positions. Students would need to make their own conclusions as to which aesthetic values should be retained.

4. Class collective efforts which attempt to solve environmental aesthetic problems and collective efforts which stage aesthetic "happenings" for the public and school are activities which promote the achievement of the central value. These activities breakdown the divisions of labor and make art active.

5. Film and T.V. offer an opportunity for the application of critical theory in art education. The examination of societal values, types of audience, heroes, protagonists, antagonists, etc., provide a wealth of exploratory work for critical questioning.

Alternative endings and personal, as well as group films, which state the underlying ideology could be attempted.

6. The V.T.R. is a useful tool for exploring present aesthetic values. Urban and rural architecture and landscape could be compared. Numerous neighborhoods, mall areas, shopping centers and sporting events could be filmed to provide information to raise questions whether change should be made to make these areas and events more human.

7. A cultural analysis of rock music and more emphasis on the examination of aesthetic values underlying such political and radical actions will aid in showing students that art has an active involvement with society.

8. As far as the required institutional changes are needed, the following seem in order:

(a) Museum. The Museum requires an expansion of its present day involvement with the public. It should become a meeting place where both artist and audience could participate in critical dialogue. Groups of artists could meet and talk over ideas which they could initiate.

(b) School. There should be an attempt made for the promotion of an understanding between the art teacher's commitment to art and society and the administration. This commitment needs concretization in the form of art activities which have been mutually agreed upon by both teacher and students.

(c) Self and Family. There should be an explicit evaluation of one's own aesthetic values against the background of one's own biography. In the same vein, this assessment should be extended to the family.

10.8 Summary

An aesthetic education with a praxiological orientation which attempts to eliminate current aesthetic alienation has been outlined. This means that there needs to be a commitment to oneself and society to achieve a society where all may share in the aesthetic process. The forms such a process will take are to be collectively decided. The product of man's labor is to become a social product which shapes his historical future. It is therefore necessary to make art more utilitarian and overtly political. In such a model the moral and ethical merges with the aesthetic. As Marcuse writes,

> The fight will be won when the obscene symbiosis of opposites is broken - the symbiosis between the erotic play of the sea and the booming death industries at its shores, between the flight of the white birds and that of the gray air force jets, between the silence of the night and the vicious farts of the motorcycles ... Only then will men and women be free to resolve the conflict between the Fifth Avenues and the ghettos, between procreation and genocide. In the long range, the political dimension can no longer be divorced from the aesthetic, reason for sensibility, the gesture of the barricade from that of love. To be sure, the former spells hatred - but the hatred of all that which is inhuman, and this 'gut hatred' is an essential ingredient of the cultural revolution.[49]

Footnotes - Chapter Ten

[1] Nathaniel Champlin, "Philosophical Inquiry and the Crisis in Art Education," Studies in Art Education 6(2), 1964, pp. 7-23.

[2] Ibid., p. 9.

> "What this individual has done, then, is to select a goal he thinks is important, to assume it ought to be for everyone else's goal, and to judge that goal is insecure to the point of being in doubt."

[3] Ibid., p. 20.

> "And art education will be nurturing the young in such a way that they will be able to judge the aesthetic worth of any cultural community pattern and arrangement - for economic, political, religious, social, patriotic, or for that matter, the aesthetic worth of their very education."

[4] H. McWhinnie, "Viktor Lowenfeld," Studies in Art Education 14(1), 1972, pp. 8-14.

[5] V. Lanier, "The Teaching of Art as Social Revolution," Phi Delta Kappa, 1974.

[6] Elliot Eisner, "Towards a New Era in Art Education," Studies in Art Education 6(2), 1964, pp. 54-62.

> "There is evidence available that children possessing certain linquistic concepts are able to perform perceptual tasks that children without such concepts are able to perform." (p. 60.)

[7] Foster Wygant, "Stasis Amidst Change: A Prediction About the Arts," Studies in Art Education 14(2), 1973, pp. 47-51.

[8] A. Efland, "The School Art Style: A Functional Analysis," Studies in Art Education 17(2), 1976, pp. 37-44.

[9] J. L. Fischer, "Art Styles as Cultural Cognitive Maps," in Art and Aesthetics in Primitive Societies, ed. C. F. Jopling (New York: E. P. Dutton and Co. Inc., 1971) for the exposition of the correspondence of art and a subculture. Illich's thesis is that a school's hidden curriculum functions to socialize the individual into accepting the authority of the school as a prelude to accepting the authority of other institutions. See I. Illich, Deschooling Society (New York: Harper and Row, 1971).

[10] W. Glaeser, "Art, Concepts of Reality, and the Consequences of 'The Celebration of Peoples'," Studies in Art Education 15(1), 1973, pp. 34-43.

[11] Ibid., p. 34.

> "On the other hand, relational meaning is meaning derived from the contextual aspect of both the viewer and the particular work viewed, including the dimensions if the situation in which the viewing occurs. It is this meaning that differs from culture to culture and to a lesser degree from person to person. It is contextual aspect of art or its relational meaning that is one of the basic concerns of celebrating peoples."

[12] V. Lanier, "Conceptions and Priority in Art Education Research," Studies in Art Education 16(1), 1974, pp. 26-30.

[13] G. W. Hawkins, "Technology as an Influence in Art Education Literature," Studies in Art Education 16(1), 1974, pp. 38-44.

[14] Paul Pohland, "Participant Observation as a Research Methodology," Studies in Art Education 13(3), 1971, pp. 4-14. Pohland's research falls under the same criticism as phenomenology and hermeneutic sciences. It does not get at the larger institutional causes for changes in art. Criticisms of this position are given by Ken Biettel, "Point," Studies in Art Education 13(3), 1972, pp. 24-26. His criticisms were:

1. We are all "idealists" in the sense that Pohland uses the word since "personal knowledge" is our sources of knowledge in experience.

2. Our own reality determines this knowledge and hence morals become part of the methodology. This comes down to saying that participant observations become subjectivist unless they can be related to an ideological position.

[15] R. Joyce, The Esthetic Animal, p. 3.

[16] Herbert Marcuse, "Repressive Tolerance," in A Critique of Pure Tolerance, ed. Robert Paul Wolff, Barrington Moore, Jr. and Herbert Marcuse (Boston: Beacon Press, 1965), p. 82.

[17] Herbert Marcuse, Counter-Revolution and Revolt (Boston: Beacon Press, 1972), p. 115.

[18] Herbert Marcuse, "Repressive Tolerance," p. 83.

[19] Hilde Hein, "Aesthetic Consciousness: The Ground of Political Experience," JAAC 35(2) (Winter 1976):146.

[20] Ursula Meyer, "The Eruption of Anti-Art," in Idea Art, ed. Gregory Battcock (New York: E.P. Dutton & Co. Inc., 1973), p. 127.

[21] See Harold Rosenberg, "De-Aestheticization," in The New Art, ed. Gregory Battcock (New York: E.P. Dutton & Co. Inc., 1973 revised), p. 182-185. The term Art Povera (Deprived Art) comes from a book published by Germano Celant, a conceptual artist. Rosenberg defines its philosophy:

> "Art povera does not associate itself with the needy, but, like earthworks in America, it asserts its alienation from the art market and its opposition to 'the present order in art'." (p. 184)

In addition, poverty represents for it a kind of voluntary creative detachment from society. It is a refusal either to adopt the traditional rôle of the artist or to approve art values of any sort.

[22] See Dore Ashton, "Monument for Nowhere or Anywhere," in Idea Art, ed. G. Battcock (New York: E. P. Dutton & Co. Inc., 1973), pp. 11-17.

[23] Ursula Meyer, Conceptual Art (New York: E. P. Dutton & Co. Inc., 1972), p. viii.

[24] Rosenberg, op. cit., p. 183.

[25] Robert Hughes, "The Decline and Fall of the Avant-Garde," in Idea Art, ed. G. Battcock (New York: E. P. Dutton & Co. Inc., 1973), p. 192.

[26] Jack Burnham, "Problems of Criticism," in Idea Art, ed. G. Battcock (New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., Inc., 1973), p. 69.

[27] Lawrence Weiner et al., "Documentation in Conceptual Art," in Idea Art, ed. G. Battcock (New York: E. P. Dutton & Co. Inc., 1973), p. 178.

[28] Joseph Kosuth, "Art After Philosophy, I and II," in Idea Art, ed. G. Battcock (New York: E. P. Dutton & Co. Inc., 1973), p. 79.

[29] Herbert Marcuse, Counter-Revolution and Revolt, p. 81.

[30] Lucy Lippard, "The Art Workers Coalition," in Idea Art, ed. G. Battcock (New York: E. P. Dutton & Co. Inc., 1973), pp. 102-115.

[31] Jon Hendricks, et al., "Toward A New Humanism," in The New Art, ed. G. Battcock (New York: E. P. Dutton & Co. Inc., 1973 revised), pp. 78-83.

[32] See, Cindy Nemser, "Two Interviews: Interview with an Anonymous Artist and Interview with Scott Free," in New Ideas in Art Education, ed. G. Battcock (New York: E. P. Dutton & Co. Inc., 1973), pp. 223-234 for a comical examination of these contradictions.

[33] Ursula Meyer, "The Eruption of Anti-Art," in Idea Art, ed. G. Battcock (New York: E. P. Dutton Co. Inc., 1973), pp. 126-128.

[34] Carol Duncan, "Teaching the Rich," in New Ideas in Art Education, ed. G. Battcock (New York: E. P. Dutton & Co. Inc., 1973), pp. 128-140.

[35] Howard Press, "Marxism and Aesthetic Man," in The New Art, ed. G. Battcock (New York: E. P. Dutton & Co. Inc., 1973), pp. 156-166.

[36] Herbert Marcuse, op. cit., p. 116.

[37] Press, op. cit., pp. 160-161.

[38] Les Levine, "The Great American Art Machine," in New Ideas in Art Education, ed. G. Battcock (New York: E. P. Dutton Co. Inc., 1973), p. 15.

[39] Press, op. cit., p. 161.

[40] Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method (London: Sheed and Ward, 1975), p. 91.

[41] Allan Kaprow, "The Education of the Un-Artist, Part I," in New Ideas in Art Education, ed. G. Battcock (New York: E. P. Dutton & Co. Inc., 1973), pp. 86-87.

[42] See Vincent Lanier, "Art and the Disadvantaged," Art Education 23(9) (December 1970).

[43] Harold Rosenberg, "Educating Artists," in New Ideas in Art Education, ed. G. Battcock (New York: E. P. Dutton Co. Inc., 1973), p. 97.

[44] Ibid., p. 99. Quoted by Dan Flavin.

[45] Irving Sandler, "New Way of Teaching Art History," in New Ideas in Art Education, ed. G. Battcock (New York: E. P. Dutton & Co. Inc., 1973), p. 124.

[46] Irving Kaufman, "Art Educator: In and Out of School," in New Ideas in Art Education, ed. G. Battcock, (New York: E. P. Dutton & Co. Inc.,) pp. 203-222.

[47] John Huizinga, Homo Ludens (Boston: The Beacon Press, 1950).

[48] Stanley Rosner and Lawrence E. Abt, ed., The Creative Experience, "Conclusion and a Review of the Literature on Creativity," (New York: Dell Publishing Co. Inc., 1970), pp. 379-392.

[49] H. Marcuse, Counter-Revolution and Revolt, p. 130.

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APPENDIX "A"

Content Analysis of Eighteen Aesthetic Educators

Art Educator: Eugene Kaelin

Articles: "Aesthetics and the Teaching of Art," *Studies in Art Education* 5(2), 1962. "The Existential Ground for Aesthetic Education," *Studies in Art Education* 8(1), 1966. Kaelin's presentation to the Institute for Advanced Studies in Art Appreciation, The Ohio State University, July and August, 1966 and reported in *Guidelines*. "Aesthetic Education: A Role for Aesthetics Proper," *Journal of Aesthetic Education*, Vol. 1, 1966.

Affiliate Aesthetician: Merleau-Ponty, Sartre, Heidegger

> "My sources are principally the philosophic works of Martin Heidegger in Germany and Jean-Paul Sartre in France; in particular, *Sein und Zeit* (1927) of the former and *L'Etre et le Néant* (1943) of the latter."

Type of Criticism: Formalism (Structuralism)

> "The surface and representational elements may be referred to as 'counters'. Counters are discernible and describe elements in a work of art. Literally, they are the things which 'count' in the expressiveness of the work. If the counters are discernible parts of a work of art, they must be visible; indeed, their 'physical presence' must be verifiable publically."

Authority for Validity: Relativism

> "This is not to claim that an actual aesthetic experience begins with an awareness of the surface and then proceeds to closure in an idea, nor that there is only one interpretation of the given work; but only that the system of postulates devised to interpret the meaning of aesthetic categories affords a method of critical procedure, according to which any image or idea which is not traceable to the organization of some sensuous surface is patently irrelevant."

Art Educator: Hugh W. Stumbo

Articles: "Three Bases for Research and Teaching," Studies in Art Education 9(2), 1968. "Changes in Meaning Following Phenomenological Analysis," Studies in Art Education 12(1), 1971.

Affiliate Aesthetician: Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, Kaelin

> "The key to the solution of this problem came with the phenomenological method as expounded by Jean-Paul Sartre, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and Eugene F. Kaelin."

Type of Criticism: Formalism (Structuralism)

> "A. Levels of Integration.
>
> A-1 statements refer to sensuous qualities such as color, texture, shape, etc.
> A-2 statements refer to the correspondence between drawn or painted images and things in the environment.
> A-3 statements refer to the symbolic meanings of drawn or printed images.
>
> B. Levels of Complexity
>
> B-1 statements refer to single details within a work of art.
> B-2 statements refer to relationships between two details or sets of details.
> B-3 statements refer to relationships among details or sets of details.
> B-4 statements refer to the significant meanings of artifacts."

Authority for Validity: Relativism

> "Art activity may be described as an intrapersonal dialogue between artist and evolving art object."

Art Educator: Stuart Thompson

Articles: "Complexity in Perception: An Explanation in Phenomenological Terms by Psychology, with Some Parallels in Aesthetic Philosophy," Studies in Art Education 14(2), 1973.

Affiliate Aesthetician: Aldrich (implied) and phenomenologists

> "For the purposes of this investigation, phenomenology will be considered as an epistemological position lying somewhere between positivism and existentialism, though leaning toward the latter."

Type of Criticism: Formalism: Aldrich's attitude theory implied

> "But beyond these Gestalt laws, two more fundamental considerations must be borne in mind: (1) complexity in perception is a dynamic thing, changing continuously the configuration of perceived complexity, and (2) an object-event is always seen in context. Arnheim writes:
>
> 'The appearance of any item in the visual field was shown to depend on its place and function in the total structure and to be modified fundamentally by that influence. If a visual item is extricated from its context it becomes a different object.'"

Authority for Validity: Relativism

> "This statement at once abolishes the 'out there' and replaces it with something on the order of an inseparable self-world situation of which Platt speaks. The positivistic is replaced by the phenomenological - complexity is relative to the perceiver."

Art Educator: William Bradley

Articles: "A Proposal of Marriage: The Concept of Encounterability," *Studies in Art Education* 12(3), 1971. "Intrinsic Feedback," *Studies in Art Education* 10(2), 1969.

Affiliate Aesthetician: Kaelin, Stumbo

> "Others have tended to be more cautious in their approaching specifications for art experiences and have in many cases aligned themselves with a Parkeresque view of content as process. They have proposed that the art experience is essentially a synergetic fusion by self-projection and vertical growth."

Type of Criticism: Formalism (Structuralism)

In the Conceptual Model of Encounterability, Bradley endorses a three-fold approach; the scholarly mode of inquisition deals with historiography and criticism and it includes content sources, artists, language, physical science, mathematics, economics and history.

> "The checklist seems to require that one observe his own work from a detached point of view, and it presupposes that the artist will still have the subjective capacity to retain his mental 'openness' while objectifying his position."

Authority for Validity: Relativism

> "In as much as each individual maintains a particular world model based on prior knowledge, environmental and cultural influences, encounters tend to relate to levels of awareness in each of these categories."

Art Educator: Vincent Lanier

Articles: "Schismogenesis in Contemporary Art Education," Studies in Art Education 5(1), 1963. "Talking About Art," Studies in Art Education 9(3), 1968.

Affiliate Aesthetician: Dewey

> "It is undoubtedly obvious that I have been liberally, and I hope correctly, paraphrasing John Dewey in my description of aesthetic experience."

Type of Criticism: Contextualism.

Lanier's Canalization program includes the following variables: social attitude towards work, cultural view of art form, perceptual skills, formal qualities, symbols, associations, historical identification, judgments and relationship of artwork to life.

Authority for Validity: Sociological Relativist

> "'Start where the pupils are.' Courses of study indicate that most of us attempt to build curricula in a way calculated to attain some kind of bridge between making or looking at the fine arts and the students' prior experience."

> "But a large proportion of our pupils undeniably possess an appreciational milieu of their own to which they respond with fervour, passionate if changeable loyalty, and often more than a little critical judgment."

Art Educator: Arthur D. Efland

Articles: "Some Problems in Art and Their Curriculum Consequences," Studies in Art Education 9(3), 1968.

Affiliate Aesthetician: Dewey (implicitly supports Lanier's theory)

> "Lanier touched on a potential source of structure when he suggested that the visual arts are justified for what they, alone, provide, 'the visual art experience.'"

Type of Criticism: Contextualism

> "For example, an art critic who relies only on his phenomenological experience with an art object as the basis of his judgment would have to exclude, or bracket our many classes of information in order to isolate himself for the task of perceiving the work of art. On the other hand, a socially orientated art critic would be more concerned with relating the artwork to its broad cultural context. The latter inquiry would be, in one sense more inclusive than the former."

Authority of Validity: Sociological Relativist

> "Another consideration for curriculum construction is that many disadvantaged groups enjoy a rich and valuable cultural heritage which is frequently ignored or demeaned by the larger culture. In the context of contending values, these cultural goods are perceived as having low status not only within the larger culture but within the disadvantaged group itself. At the same time, these groups cannot identify with the values they perceive in the larger culture which they regard as hostile."

Art Educator: David Ecker

Articles: "Some Inadequate Doctrines in Art Education and a Proposed Resolution," Studies in Art Education 5(1), 1963. "The Artistic Process as Qualitative Problem Solving," JAAC 21 (Spring 1963):283-290.

Affiliate Aesthetician: Dewey

> "Qualitative problem solving is, as Dewey insisted of scientific inquiry, not a neat progression of steps but a single, continuous means-ends progression, sometimes hesitating, halting, groping; it may be rethought, move forward again, start over, in short, it is experimental behavior. And all that one can attempt is a logical analysis of distinguishable phases of the artistic process, as Dewey did in his description of scientific processes of thought."

Type of Criticism: Formalism/Contextualism

> "...Conclusion: the total quality. The work is judged complete - the total achieved - the pervasive has adequately been the control. It is a tentative affair because future evaluations may yield a conclusion for future modifications. (Indeed, some artists have maintained that they have never really 'finished' a canvas.)"

Authority for Validity: Relativism

> "...Qualitative prescription. Given a pervasive quality, whether arriving early or late in the art production, future mediations follow according to patterns of qualitative relatedness. The Artist 'infers' quality from quality in the sense that future 'qualitative steps' are anticipated or intended by virtue of presently instituted qualities."

Art Educator: Arthur Joel Newman

Articles: "Aesthetic Perception and Human Understanding," Studies in Art Education 14(1), 1972.

Affiliate Aesthetician: Dewey, Langer

> "Acknowledgment that conceptual modes of understanding are critically important, Dewey insisted that they must be complemented by and informed with interpretations which inhere in an intuitive apprehension of the intrinsic qualities of experience. For this latter purpose, aesthetic modes of knowing are the most appropriate. 'Art expresses, it does not state; it is concerned with existences in their preceived qualities, not with conceptions symbolized in terms.'"

Type of Criticism: Dewey's Contextualism and Langer's Formalism

> "Langer, like Dewey, contends that one knows the intrinsic qualities of human experience through intuition. If this notion of intuitive knowledge is troublesome, the writer cannot be terribly helpful; to do so he would have to engage in the patent contradiction of attempting to express discursively that which is held to be intrinsically non-discursive."

Authority for Validity: Objectivism as invisioned by Langer's mode

> "Langer points up that so complex and intricate is the human condition that ideas of human sentience (or basic life rhythms) admit of a welter of differing interpretations - interpretations equally authentic so long as they are symbolized in bona fide art. This is an important condition, for it permits the aesthetically-sensitized percipient to realize vicariously a range of subtly-varying interpretations of human condition."

> "Through art we learn the character and range of subjective experience,...Assuming men to be psychobiologically similar, and assuming human needs and problems to bear some universal resemblance, it is not unreasonable to suggest that they will similarly - not identically - interpret experience."

Art Educator: Francis Villemain

Articles: "Towards a Conception of Aesthetic Education," Studies in Art Education 8(1), 1966. "Democracy, Education and Art," Educational Theory 15 (January 1964):1-14.

Affiliate Aesthetician: Dewey

> "Art as experience, like any other achieved experience, is a deliberately controlled process. It is purposive. And if experiencing includes the active role of purpose, then art experience, upon examination, will exhibit means being so ordered that ends sought after are obtained."

Type of Criticism: Formalism/Contextualism

> "To recognize that this view of art is intimately associated with certain social arrangements is not to claim that no other factors were involved in its production. For some purposes it would be important to delineate a host of generating and sustaining influences which gave rise to the outlook. For the present and limited purpose, however, it is sufficient to single out one factor. The focus upon pre-democratic social arrangements will help to direct attention to the inadequacy of the conception presently at hand."

Authority For Validity: Objectivism

> "Accordingly, the working materials, the means or 'stuff' with which artists work, may collectively be called the qualities of experience. We speak of the loneliness of the moment, the Gothicness of a building, the formalness of clothing. In such cases we name distinguishable qualities - the various "nesses" of experience - discernible in a given experience. Artistic experience is primarily concerned with these sorts of matters. Art is the ordering, manipulating, refashioning of these qualities toward still further qualities."

Art Educator: Elliot Eisner

Articles: "Media, Expression and the Arts," Studies in Art Education 13(1), 1971. "Stanford's Kettering Project," Studies in Art Education 9(3), 1968.

Affiliate Aesthetician: Langer, Dewey

> "The expressiveness of the arts is known by the experience the forms of art evoke.
>
> To experience art forms, requires an ability to 'read' the form; that is, to decode what artists have encoded."

Type of Criticism:

Eisner is a Contextualist for symbolic paintings but is a Formalist for non-objective paintings. His criticism follows in the vein of the New Criticism.

> "The problems involved in dealing with forms in which only qualitative symbols are used is somewhat different. Since non-objective works display no symbols having referents outside of the work, knowledge of such referents is not relevant to the experience of such works. Non-objective works of art are formal arrays that are to be entertained for expressive qualities inherent in the forms per se. One does not and need not look for referents or analogues in the world aside from the work. And since non-objective works which, by definition, are made up wholly of qualitative symbols are not dependent upon knowledge of empirical forms or conventionalized meaning outside the work they are, in this regard, less culture-bound than works containing conventional, representational, or connotative symbols."

Authority for Validity: Objectivism

> "...we have identified three domains in which curriculum is being developed. These are the productive, the critical and the historical....Each of the concepts is used to formulate principles expressing important empirical generalizations."

Art Educator: Donald Arnstine

Articles: "Shaping the Emotions: The Sources of Standards for Aesthetic Education," Journal of Aesthetic Education 1, 1966, pp. 45-69.

Affiliate Aesthetician: Dewey

> "Aesthetic experience, or experience considered in its aesthetic dimension, will henceforth be taken to mean any experience had by an individual which fulfils, minimally, the following two conditions. First, the experience is taken to be valuable on its own account. Whether or not the experience is instrumental to the attainment of other experiences, it is felt to be satisfying, fulfilling in itself."

Type of Criticism: Formalism

> "This is not to say, however, that the perception of form is consequently purely a matter of individual and subjective happenstance or taste. The likelihood of someone's being aware of form depends upon at least two conditions: first, the extent to which he is able to apprehend experience terminally, and second, the extent to which the relations (describable in an empirically verifiable way) within a given cue for experience more or less easily lend themselves to being apprehended aesthetically - that is, as form."

Authority of Validity: Objectivism

> "Broadly speaking, standards must be available so that learners can be afforded experiences that have aesthetic quality and that at the same time are educative."

> "Along the lines just indicated, it should be possible to construct some of the criteria that can serve as standards for aesthetic education."

> "What is implied here is that there are 'experts' (or 'connoisseurs') in sensitivity to values, both aesthetic and moral, and that there are ways of determining who those experts are."

Art Educator: Evan Kern

Articles: "A Proper Function of Art Education in the 70's," Studies in Art Education 12(1), 1970.

Affiliate Aesthetician: Dewey

> "There is, however, at least modest consensus among theorists that aesthetic experience is intrinsically valued, that is, an experience which is valued for itself."

Type of Criticism: Formalism

> "A more appropriate education is seen to be advanced through the idea of the student as a connoisseur - a gourmet - a collector of visual aesthetic experience. He is connoisseur in that he is able to make reasoned judgments about the aesthetic qualities of experience; gourmet in that he avidly seeks out and savors the aesthetic qualities of experience; and collector to the degree that he endeavors to surround himself with sources for aesthetic experience."

Authority for Validity: Objectivism

> "More precisely, to attend to an experience implies that there is an interaction between the person and an aesthetic object. The interaction is controlled by the sensuous and (when present) representational qualities of the aesthetic object, that is, qualities perceived through the senses, e.g., colors, movement, warmth, etc., and representations, ideas, and images resulting from the structuring of these sensuous qualities. The sensuous and representational qualities may be given the inclusive definition of aesthetic qualities."

Art Educator: Geraldine Dimondstein

Articles: "Conceptual Framework in the Arts," Studies in Art Education 10(2), 1969.

Affiliate Aesthetician: Langer

> "It is for this reason that Langer defines the problem of sculpture as one of translating its data into visual terms, or, as she puts it 'to make tactual space visible'."

Type of Criticism: Formalism

> "The underlying assumption is that every stage of appreciation and participation in the art process depends upon the recognition and application of certain fundamental concepts inherent in the art."

Authority for Validity: Objectivism

> "The nature of experience is further illuminated by Read who suggests that sculpture is primarily an art of 'touch-space' whereas painting is an art of 'sight-space' since, he maintains the 'look' of it to the eye is distinctly different."

Art Educator: Kenneth Marantz

Articles: "Indecent Exposure," Studies in Art Education 6(1), 1964.

Affiliate Aesthetician: Dewey

> "In order to learn how to appreciate, one must become involved with the act of appreciating. When Dewey made a case for art as experience, I would want to extend the case for art appreciation as experience."

Type of Criticism: Formalism

> "But to become a perceptive appreciator, to be able to respond to the vast metaphoric connotations inherent in works of art, demand more than mere exposure."

Authority for Validity: Objectivism

Marantz's statement which asserts that "metaphoric connotations [are] inherent in the works of art" places him as an objectivist who assumes that such properties affect the emotion.

Art Educator: Harry Broudy

Articles: "Aesthetic Education in a Technological Society: The Other Excuses for Art," Journal of Aesthetic Education, Inaugral Issue (Spring 1966):13-23.

Affiliate Aesthetician: Beardsley, Sibley

> "Hence the number of items or exemplars will necessarily be small and the study of them long enough and intense enough to bring the pupil to see as the painter sees, to hear as the composer hears, to see and hear as the playwright sees and hears. The instruction may involve pointing to formal qualities the pupil might not on his own notice, sensitizing him to differences not at first apparent, even to some knowledge about the artist, techniques, and styles."

Type of Criticism: Formalism

> "Serious art, it is contended is oriented toward 'artistic truth' and is self-conscious about theory and technique. As a result, serious art is not always entertaining or pleasing. It is, at best, difficult beauty. As a consequence, it is not popular."

Authority for Validity: Objectivism

> "However, some objects in our environment do attract attention to themselves. A cloud is not always seen as a weather message, and a pretty receptionist is almost never regarded as merely a source of information. Then there are those objects which we describe with such phrases as 'the anxious face', 'the stubborn chin', 'the neat lawn', 'the smiling sky', 'the threatening sea'. Such images are what they are about, for they say in effect: Behold an instance of how 'threateningness', 'smilingness', 'anxiousness', 'carefulness', and 'stubbornness' appears to the eye.
>
> I do not propose to explain, even if I could, how or why certain forms of object are seen or heard as human-import-messages."

Art Educator: Ralph Smith

Articles: "Aesthetic Criticism: The Method of Aesthetic Education," Studies in Art Education 9(3), 1968.

Affiliate Aesthetician: Beardsley, Sibley

> "But what, more specifically, is the nature of critical activity? A survey of successful critical statements, i.e., those which have released a work's value potential previously inaccessible to untrained sensibilities, discloses little unity. The statements of critics range from crisp, schematic analysis to eloquent literary essays. The description of the phases and techniques of critical activity that follows is therefore neither exhaustive nor definitive, but it does seem to hold potential for formulating and planning defensible educational objectives and experiences."

Type of Criticism: Formalism

> "Evaluation. The term as used here implies some kind of summation or assessment of the merit of the work of art in question. The simplest kind of verdict is one saying that the work is good or bad, based on an examination of its aesthetic qualities, say, its degree of unity, complexity, intensity, or some combination of these."

Authority for Validity: Objectivism

> "In the first place, it should be clear that the characterization of elements and relationships in a work of art already shades over into the next, the interpretive, phase. Furthermore, descriptive and characterizing terms are in many cases normative as well, thus anticipating the evaluative phase. In most contexts words like 'harmonious', 'unified', and 'graceful',tend to have positive connotations, while 'shrill', 'harsh', 'unbalanced', 'disjointed', etc., seem to be not only descriptive characterizations but negative judgments as well, though perhaps not always."

APPENDIX "B"

Tally Count: Frequency of Citation of Aestheticians As Reported in STUDIES IN ART EDUCATION

NOTE: An asterisk precedes the affiliate aesthetician. The use of two or more asterisks means that these aestheticians have been given equal support for their particular aesthetic theory. The number following the aesthetician denotes the number of times he is mentioned in the particular article.

1. D'Arcy Hayman, "Art: An Integrating and Intensifying Life Force," 1(2), 1960.

   * Dewey (4); Beardsley (1); Gotshalk (1); Croce (1).

2. Lawrence Frank, "Role of the Arts in Education," 1(2), 1960.

   * Ortega y Gasset (2); Langer (1); Munro (1); Dewey (1); Panofsky (1).

3. David Ecker, "Teaching Machines and Aesthetic Values." 3(2), 1962.

   * Collingwood (1); * Croce (1).

4. Earl Linderman, "The Relation of Art Picture Judgment to Judge Personality." 3(2), 1962.

   * Munro (1); * Malraux (1).

5. Edmund Feldman, "Dilemma of the Artist," 4(1), 1962.

   * Oretega y Gasset (1).

6. Ralph Smith, "The Structure of Historical Knowledge," 4(1), 1962.

   * Hauser (2).

7. James Miles, "Aesthetic Learning Through Experiences in a Correlated Program of Instruction in Art, Music and Modern Dance." 4(1), 1962.

   * Dewey (1).

8. Manuel Barkan, "Is There a Discipline of Art Education?" 4(2), 1963.

   * Dewey (2); Read (1); Munro (1).

9. Fredrick Logan, "Is There a Discipline of Art Education?" 4(2), 1963.

   * Dewey (1).

10. Irving Kaufman, "Art Education: A Discipline?" 4(2), 1963.

    * Dewey (1).

11. Ralph Smith, "The Liberal Tradition of Art Education," 4(2), 1963.

    * Gombrich (1); * Hauser (1).

12. Vincent Lanier, "Schismogenesis in Contemporary Art Education," 5(1), 1963.

    * Dewey (1).

13. David Ecker, "Some Inadequate Doctrines in Art Education and a Proposed Resolution," 5(1), 1963.

    * Dewey (1).

14. Eugene Kaelin, "Aesthetics and the Teaching of Art," 5(2), 1964.

    Dewey (1); Sartre (1); * Heidegger (4); Croce (1); Collingwood (1).

15. Kenneth Marantz, "Indecent Exposure," 6(1), 1964.

    * Dewey (1).

16. David Ecker, "Editorial: On the Possibility of Theory in Art Education," 6(2), 1965.

    Croce (2); * Dewey (3); Weitz (2).

17. Nathaniel Champlin, "Philosophical Inquiry and the Crisis of Art Education," 6(2), 1965.

    * Dewey (3); Margolis (1); Elton (1); Carver (1).

18. Elliot Eisner, "Towards a New Era in Art Education," 6(2), 1965.

    * Dewey (1); * Munro (1); * Tolstoy (1); * Bell (1); * Fry (1); * Read (1).

19. Donald Arnstine, "Needed Research and the Role of Definition in Art Education," 7(1), 1965.

    * Weitz (1); * Read (1).

20. Ralph Smith, "Images of Art Education," 7(2), 1966.

    * Beardsley (1)

21. Dale Harris, "Comments on Lansing Paper," 7(2), 1966.

    * Gombrich (1)

22. Eugene Kaelin, "The Existential Ground for Aesthetic Education," 8(1), 1966.

    * Heidegger (2); Sartre (1); Dewey (2); Hegel (1).

23. Donald Arnstine, "The Aesthetic as a Context of General Education," 8(1), 1966.

    * Dewey (1); Bullough (1); Munro (1).

24. Hugh Stumbo, "Three Bases for Research and Teaching in the Arts: Subjective, Objective and Projective," 9(2), 1968.

    * Merleau-Ponty (2); * Sartre (1).

25. Arthur D. Efland, "Some Problems of Structure in Art and Their Curriculum Consequences," 9(3), 1968.

    * Weitz (1).

26. Ralph Smith, "Aesthetic Criticism: The Method of Aesthetic Education," 9(3), 1968.

    Aldrich (1); Urmson (1); Dickie (1); * Sibley (3); Sparshot (1); Langer (1); Weitz (1); * Beardsley (3); Stevenson (1).

27. Vincent Lanier, "Talking About Art: An Experimental Course in High School Art Appreciation," 9(3), 1968.

    * Dewey (1).

28. Brent G. Wilson, "A Proposal For Systematic Curriculum Evaluation in Art Education," 9(3), 1968.

    * Pepper (2).

29. Ronald Neperud, "Visual Arts Instruction in Primitive Societies - Its Implications for Art Education," 10(2), 1969.

    * Read (2); Hauser (1).

30. Donald Jack Davis, "A Study of Controlled Attention to Aesthetic Qualities in Works of Art by Ninth Grade Students of Differing Socioeconomic Environments," 10(3), 1969.

    * Dewey (2).

31. Geraldine Dimondstein, "A Proposed Conceptual Framework in the Arts," 10(2), 1969.

    * Langer (2); * Read (2).

32. Elliot Eisner, "The Drawing of the Disadvantaged: A Comparative Study," 11(1), 1969.

    * Read (1).

33. Nancy MacGregor, "Concepts of Criticism: Implications for Art Education," 11(2), 1970.

    * Weitz; * Sibley; * Stevenson.

34. Lawrence Dennis, "Dewey's Brief For the Fine Arts," 11(3), 1970.

    * Dewey (22).

35. Michael Parsons, "Sir Herbert Read on Art and the Intellect," 11(3), 1970.

    * Read

36. Ralph Smith, "Psychology and Aesthetic Education," 11(3), 1970.

    Aldrich (2); * Sibley (4); * Beardsley (4); Dickie (1).

37. Charles Qualley, "A Comparison of Spontaneous and Divergent Strategies to Historical Analysis of Style," 12(1), 1970.

* Dewey (1).

38. Elliot Eisner, "Media, Expression and the Arts," 13(1), 1971.

* Dewey (1); *Langer (1).

39. Brent Wilson, "Relationships among Art Teachers; Art Critics; and Art Historians and Non-Art Trained Individuals Statements About Guernica," 12(1), 1970.

* Abell (1); * Aldrich (1); * Pepper (1); * Ackerman (1); * Panofsky (1).

40. Hugh Stumbo, "Changes in Meaning That Follow Phenomenological Analysis," 12(1), 1970.

* Sartre (1); * Merleau-Ponty (1).

41. Richard Munson, "The Gustaf Britsch Theory of Visual Arts," 12(2), 1971.

* Britsch.

42. Maynard Gunter, "Langer's Semantic View of the Non-Verbal Arts - Its Meaning to Art Education," 12(2), 1971.

* Langer.

43. Laura Chapman, "A Second Look at a Foundation for Art Education," 13(1), 1971

Gotshalk (1); Croce (1); Bell (1); * Dewey (2); Read (1).

44. Brent Wilson, "The Relationship Between Years of Art Training and the Use of Aesthetic Judgmental Criteria Among High School Students," 13(2), 1972.

* Pepper (6); Beardsley (2); Dewey (2); Bell (4); Fry (3); Santayana (1); Tolstoy (2); Croce (1); Morris (1); Collingwood (1).

45. David Hysell, "Testing an Advance Organizer Model in Development of Aesthetic Perception," 14(3), 1973.

* Beardsley (1).

46. Arthur Newman, "Aesthetic Perception and Human Understanding," 14(1), 1972.

    * Langer (5); * Dewey (5); Jenkins (1).

47. Jack Hobbs, "The Problem of Language and Values in Aesthetic Education." 15(1), 1973.

    * Wittgenstein (1).

48. Herbert Gropper, "Moral Guides for the Selecting of Artworks for Teaching,' 15(1), 1973.

    * Maritain (33); * Dewey (36).

49. William Glaeser, "Art Concepts of Reality and the Consequences of 'The Celebration of Peoples'," 15(1), 1973.

    * Northrop (2); * Ortega y Gasset.

50. Elliot Eisner, "Examining Some Myths in Art Education," 15(3), 1973-1974.

    * Dewey (2).

51. E. Lancaster, "Art Education and the Importance of Materials," 15(3), 1973-1974.

    * Langer (3); Read (2).

52. Duke Madenfort, "The Aesthetic as Immediately Sensuous: An Historical Perspective." 16(1), 1974-1975.

    * Kant; * Dewey; * Langer; * Bergson; * Kierkegaard.

53. Ralph Smith, "Cultural Services, the Aesthetic Welfare, and Educational Research," 16(2), 1975.

    * Beardsley (4).

54. Susan Clark, "Modern Theoretical Foundations of Appreciation and Creation in Art Textbooks," 16(3) 1975.

    * Dewey (4); Bell (2); Croce and Collingwood (2); * Langer (5); Weitz (3).

55. M. Morris, "An Alternative Methodology for Researching Art Attitudes and Values." 17(1) 1975.

    * Pepper (1).

56. McWhinnie, "Alternative Approaches to Problems in Art Education," 17(1), 1975.

* Dewey (1).

57. Melvin L. Alexenberg, "A Semiotic Taxonomy of Contemporary Art Forms," 17(3), 1976.

* Pierce (1).

APPENDIX "C"

The Idea of Phenomenology

The purpose of this appendix is to outline the main elements of that philosophical movement known as phenomenology, as practiced by Husserl and his followers. Since there is a significant following of the phenomenological method in "aesthetic education" it is the author's intent to give the reader its fundamental thrust.

Phenpmenology, as a movement, grew out of a direct challenge to empiricism and empiricist psychology's treatment of phenomena.[1] Science is presented as Wessenchaft,[2] not physical science. The focus is on lived experience, as *immediately* lived. Phenomenology describes and interprets the actual lived or experienced world.

Whereas empiricism treated the human psyche as a passive *tabula rasa*, phenomenological investigations of immediate experience show, not a collection of private and atomic sense impressions passively received, but a system of actualities preceding reflection and conceptualization of the world. The world in this case becomes neither purely subjective nor purely objective because this distinction rises only in experience and can be described.[3]

Husserl refers to the region of experience as the "life-world." It is in this "world" - the everyday world - that the concrete phenomena of immediate experiences are analyzed. The following sections deal with major constructs concerning such analysis.

C.1 The Natural Attitude

The natural attitude is described in phenomenology as a prereflective attitude to the real world. There is a faith and belief in the continuity of the real world. This is what's given to the person in experience.[4] "Becoming aware" of this world and its objects for Husserl is the same as "intuiting them." People intuit the world as facts having spatio-temporal existence.[5] However, in phenomenological intuiting the particular phenomena are grasped at the level of their essential structures in an intuition which precedes any reflection and judgment about the phenomenon's spatio-temporal existence. Such an intuition is an essence in all its purity.[6]

The concept of essence is central to Husserlian phenomenology. Intuition of essence is not possible without simultaneously intuiting particulars. Therefore, to apprehend essence, the particulars are seen as instances which stand for the essence.[7] Intuiting particulars provides the stepping stones for the apprehension of the general essence or universal.[8] This is what has been particularized and gains meaning for the individual.

Phenomenology claims to be a "presuppositionless" philosophy.[9] Its ideal is to be a science within the framework of immediate sensuous intuition, a purely descriptive essential science. In order to do this the phenomenological attitude is needed to attend to the awareness of experience[10] - not the experience straightforwardly seized, but reflection on the experience. Phenomenology views pure events of consciousness and brings them to clarity. It requires a turn in interest from the natural attitude to the phenomenological attitude, but not in the sense of attending to two worlds. There is but one world, and different ways of attending to it.

Husserl takes the first and most important step in the constitution of the phenomenological attitude with the elaboration of the nature of the epoché.[11] The radical suspension of belief in the world is the epoché. It is the preliminary condition for employing phenomenological method. The chief problem in interpreting the epoché is the idea that it means a denial, or cancellation of reality when in fact it means an adherence to the experienced world.[12]

C.2 Phenomenological Describing

Once phenomena are intuited, they are described. Description of phenomena is based on classification of the phenomenon, but when new phenomena are experienced they are assigned a class which shows some similarity or structural resemblance to a previous class. To this extent, description already involves a consideration of essences.[13] In the process of description, metaphor and analogy are used.

The correctness of phenomenological description is judged by the degree of insight into a given concrete experience which is conveyed to the other person,[14] not to the extent to which the description conforms to objective standards. However, one of the premises of phenomenology is that a phenomenological analysis can never be completed, so there is always a better description available.[15] Husserl, himself, was never satisfied with his phenomenological development and constantly reworked his position.[16]

C.3 Phenomenological Reduction

One of the most difficult concepts of phenomenology is its methodology of reduction. Most simply, "reduction refers to a shift in attention from factuality and particularity to essential and universal qualities. More exactly, reduction is the movement from the believingness of the natural attitude to the domain of transcendental subjectivity."[17] The shift from fact to essence is termed eidetic reduction, while the movement from believingness to transcendental subjectivity is called phenomenological reduction.

Phenomenological analysis, for Husserl, was not a matter of intuitively analyzing and describing the simple "appearing" of phenomena as immediately lived with common everyday "interests" in the world, but in gazing upon the phenomenon as a "disinterested-on-looker" (epoché). Phenomena were to be intuited as phenomena with accompanying "interests" on the observer's part, so that their essential structure became visible. This was done by way of phenomenological reduction.[18] Husserl thought that "essence" apprehended in experience was the same for everyone, and because of this "essence" was an intersubjective truth which existed for all.[19] On this premise, reduction was possible.

Reduction is a method wherein the phenomena of everyday experience are detached from the "interests" that are had in the natural attitude, while aiming to preserve the content of the phenomena as fully and as purely as possible. With eidetic reduction,[20] the natural attitude begins to come into view. An attempt is made to make clear what is appearing immediately to the consciousness. All empirical, rational, historical,[21] and scientific judgments that are made in the natural attitude are put into "brackets." This "bracketing" procedure gives the objective world a different value.

In the reduction the world continues to exist as it appeared before. The difference is that no longer are natural, naive, existential judgments made in the experience of the "life-world" (Lebenswelt). The reduction aims to expose the primordial contact between consciousness and the world; a relationship which exists in the natural attitude.

This leads to the phenomenological reduction. "Tersely put, in phenomenological reduction what we know about the world and what we take for granted about experience are scrutinized in terms of a purely egological standpoint whose own origin and becoming are thematic problems for self-analysis."[22]

One gains a possession of a "pure consciousness" in the world of phenomena. This pure consciousness is called "transcendental consciousness." It is a realm beyond any spatio-temporal system.

One can apprehend himself as a pure subject or a "transcendental ego." The phenomenological field then becomes a "transcendental field."[23]

The concept of transcendental ego is central to phenomenology. In reduction there is a progression from the natural attitude (actual consciousness) to eidetic reduction (wherein the essential character of thinking apart from reality is analyzed). Finally, phenomenological reduction considers the eidetic reduction itself as an essence and an exemplar of the transcendental ego. From this it is deduced that the transcendental world and all its objects exists for the particular individual, and it is _the_ only world which can exist for him as a transcendental ego.

The transcendental ego is the origin of all meaning because it is "that" what is intuitively experienced in the natural world. The being of the pure ego exists prior to the natural being. Reduction reveals the transcendental consciousness of self, hence, transcendental consciousness is the meaning of the world[24] and a new perspective of reality is achieved. The transcendental world is another name for the constituting intentionality of consciousness.[25]

C.4 Phenomenological Intentionality

Consciousness always "intends" some object, imagined, willed, etc. Consciousness by its very nature is always _consciousness-of_.[26] Intentionality characterizes an essential relationship between object and subject. There is no subject unless it has a world as its object, and no object unless it is an object of some subject.[27] Subject and object are inseparable and without this relationship neither consciousness nor the world can be grasped. The consciousness of something signifies a direction towards an object. There is a focus on a limited area of the complex flow of phenomena. In this sense it is an intention. "The essence of consciousness is its directionality,"[28] and all perceptual acts, according to Husserl, have one dominant characteristic: they point toward, or intend, some object.

The concept of intentionality presentsa notion of reality in itself where the notion of an absolute object becomes absurd and unthinkable. By beginning with transcendental consciousness the structure of the intentional world can be constituted and hence the constitution of meaning deduced.[29]

The constitution of intentionality of consciousness is not a "putting together" of dispersed sensations in order to construct an object, but it is rather a synthetic union of actual and potential subjective processes having a common object.

All these processes are united by intending the object as being one and the same throughout a multiplicity of appearances of the object in question. The synthetic structure of their union is called the constitution of the thing purely as what is intended.[30] The object's appearances are synthetized by the consciousness as one and the same object, experienced through a multiplicity of appearances. Therefore, for Husserl, the object is not constructed by consciousness: it gives itself or reveals itself in a series of acts as having a certain objective sense.

The notion of "noema" and "noesis" to stand for the intentional object and the intentional act are introduced to refer to the polarity between object and subject. The noema is the referrent of noesis[31] and this duality is central to the meaning of intentionality.

C.5 The Life-World: LEBENSWELT

In the simplest terms, the life-world comprises the sum of man's involvement in everyday affairs, his knowledge, interpretation, response, and organization of his experience.[32]

The life-world familiar to any individual exists at some time in history. Discussion of perception of objects or situational references carries with it contextual references to age, the times, public circumstance of events, etc. The content of life-world varies from period to period in history, as well as from culture to culture at any time.[33] For the phenomenologist, the history of the life-world is not the theme but the invariant structure of the life-world or Lebenswelten at any given time. The historical circumstances in which particular events emerge at any time are taken as the occasion for inquiring back into their developmental sources - into their origins.

C.6 Summary

"Phenomenology is a presuppositionless philosophy which holds consciousness to be the matrix of all phenomena, considers phenomena to be objects of intentional acts and treats them as essences, demands its own method, concerns itself with preproductive experience, offers itself as the foundation of science, and comprises a philosophy of the life-world, a defense of Reason, and ultimately a critique of philosophy."[34]

Footnotes - Appendix C

[1] M. Natanson, Edmund Husserl: Philosopher of Infinite Tasks (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973), pp. 140-145. In a direct challenge to phenomena as interpreted by Lockeian empiricism which distinguished primary qualities (qualities measurable in the object itself) and secondary qualities (qualities attributed by the mind), phenomenology treats phenomena as something displaying itself, or being there as itself. There is no primary or secondary distinction

[2] Ibid., p. 16.

[3] Calvin Schrag, Experience and Being (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1969), p. 149.

[4] M. Natanson, Edmund Husserl: Philosopher of Infinite Tasks, pp. 20-41.

[5] C. Schrag, Experience and Being, pp. 49-81.

[6] Andre de Muralt, The Idea of Phenomenology: Husserlian Exemplarism (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1974), pp. 87-89.

[7] M. Natanson, Edmund Husserl: Philosopher of Infinte Tasks, pp. 130-135. Natanson uses a match box as illustration of this concept. Each perception of the box becomes a new configuration until the box is apprehended as an essence.

[8] It is possible to see particulars without seeing general essence, but not possible to see them "as particulars" without seeing the general essence which they particularize.

[9] M. Natanson, Edmund Husserl: Philosopher of Infinite Tasks, p. 12.

[10] Ibid., pp. 42-62.

[11] Ibid., p. 56.

[12] Ibid., p. 57. The epoché has been translated as "suspension," "disconnection," "abstention," "setting aside," "cancelling," "placing in abeyance," "putting out of action," "bracketing," etc.

[13] A. de Muralt, The Idea of Phenomenology: Husserlian Exemplarism, p. 45-47.

[14] M. Natanson, Edmund Husserl: Philosopher of Infinite Tasks, p. 66-70.

[15] Husserl, Ideas, trans. W. R. Boyce-Gibson (New York: The Crowele-Collier Pub. Co., 1962), p. 175.

[16] M. Natanson, Edmund Husserl: Philosopher of Infinite Tasks, in "Conclusion," pp. 190-204.

[17] Ibid., p. 65.

[18] Husserl, Ideas, p. 96.

[19] For the idea of intersubjectivity see Alfred Schutz, Collected Papers, Vol. I: The Problem of Reality, with an Introduction by M. Natanson and a Preface by H. L. VanBreda (The Hague: Hijhoff, 1962) and M. Natanson, Edmund Husserl: Philosopher of Infinite Tasks, Chapter 6, "Phenomenology Applied," pp. 105-125.

[20] M. Natanson, Edmund Husserl: Philosopher of Infinte Tasks, p. 66.

[21] Ibid., pp. 71-72.

[22] Ibid., p. 74.

[23] Ibid., p. 84.

[24] Ibid., p. 87.

[25] Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, trans. Dorian Cairns (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1960), p. 33.

[26] M. Natanson, Edmund Husserl: Philosopher of Infinite Tasks, p. 13.

[27] Husserl, Ideas, p. 109.

[28] M. Natanson, Edmund Husserl: Philosopher of Infinite Tasks, p. 85.

[29] Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, p. 39.

[30] Ibid., p. 40.

[31] M. Natanson, Edmund Husserl: Philosopher of Infinite Tasks, p. 86.

[32] Ibid., p. 127.

[33] Ibid., p. 19.

[34] Ibid., p. 19. In his introduction Natanson lists ten descripitons which cover the field of phenomenology.

APPENDIX "D"

Aesthetics of Martin Heidegger

Martin Heidegger's aesthetics were developed in his lectures which were given in 1935 and 1936. These lectures were published in 1950 in Holzwege specifically under the essay title of "Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes." There he examines the origins of the work of art.[1] The intention of this appendix then is to present the fundamentals of these lectures in an "understandable" manner by examining its English translation[2] and its various interpretations.[3] One section, briefly covering his existentialist ontology as presented in Sein und Zeit (1927), will be covered as background to his aesthetics.[4]

D.1 The Theme of SEIN UND ZEIT (1927)

Sein und Zeit is an inquiry into the meaning of being.[5] An existentialist ontology is presented which presents man (Dasein) as having real and dynamic existence[6] because of his capacity for reflective and projective powers to transcend his existence.[7]

Mans relationship to things within the world is practical in daily circumstances. He does not view things theoretically to comprehend things as they are "in themselves,"[8] but when this daily routine becomes interrupted man becomes aware of the "meanings" that utensils or "things" are put to use.[9] To understand the "meaning" of "things" it becomes necessary to understand the context of the meaning in which they first appear. By examining "things" Heidegger hopes to uncover the existentialist characteristics of man in his "world."[10] This is the central concept and needs further explication.

In Heidegger's works Vom Wessen des Grundes and Sein und Zeit he maintains that all human existence revolves around these two factors. Those factors he calls "existing reality" (das Seiende) and "being of existing reality" (das Sein des Seienden). Existing reality, Heidegger maintains, is man and those things which exist around him - those things which are often referred to as "entities" of real world.[11] and the being of existing reality is the context in which these things are viewed. The context provides a unification of the relationship between these entities to give meaning to the world. Existing reality, Heidegger maintains, is ever-concealing and self-withdrawn, and never reveals an absolute nature or essence of its own.[12] So to know what existing reality is, man must transcend reality - including himself - and relate to reality within a context, within a realm of being. He must transcend those things which exist around him to realize their being so that they reveal to him what they are.[13] In doing so, Heidegger maintains that man can clearly reveal what he, and those things around him, are, and furthermore, he can know what the ever-concealed reality really is in truth.[14] For Heidegger then, man exists on two levels - the level of das Seinde and das Sein des Seienden and man must transcend the first level of being to know what "real" things are.

Existence, then, testifies to human freedom. Man is free to choose to take different attitudes towards beings within the world and provide those beings with different contexts in which they appear as meaningful.[15] There is a realm of possibilities which man may project his goals thus transcending existing reality, including "himself."[16] Man's fundamental state of being, his being-in-the-world is his transcendence. Only when he is able to see the range of his possibilities within the horizon can he grasp himself as a whole.[17] This does not happen until Death where one confronts the ultimate unescapable horizon of activities.[18] In confronting death man confronts his own nothingness and with this confrontation man becomes aware of his freedom and transcendence. This is the thesis of Sein und Zeit.

D.2 The Origin of the Work of Art: Its Essence

Heidegger's main objective was to uncover the riddle of the origin or the essence of a work of art. On his first analysis an obvious answer presented itself. The origin of the work of art was the artist and the work of art was the origin of the artist. This interrelationship if investigated, may provide the answer. Heidegger uses circular reasoning to do just that.[19]

Rather than comparing works of art in order to find common characteristics, or trying to derive essential definitions from "principles" or "higher concepts." Heidegger proposed to examine artworks as "things."[20] In many ways works of art were "things."

By examining their essence or nature he hoped that the nature or essence of art would be revealed.

Rather than examining the nature or "things" as all entities, Heidegger narrows the field to "mere things."[21] "Mere things" were the mundane lifeless objects like stones, earth, pieces of wood. "Things" like plowers, animals and useful tools fell into a different category.[22]

To ascertain the nature or essence of "mere" things, Heidegger examined three fundamental interpretations which had been developed in the Western tradition. The Nature of a thing was considered as substance, a bearer of characteristics; or secondly, the thing was a unity of sensations or lastly the thing as formed matter.[23]

Heidegger rejected all three classical doctrines as inadequate in determining the nature of any one "thing."[24] All three theories applied equally well to every thing in the "real world" but neither one of them had grasped the distinctive "thingness" of the "thing." Their failure had shown that "mere" things refused to reveal themselves.[25]

Heidegger tackles the problem from another viewpoint. Because all three definitions were too general, Heidegger maintains that the focus should be placed on the description of one particular thing.[26] He reasoned that these three theories had obscured the experience of a "mere" thing. This experience, which Heidegger calls "brute" or "immediate," was the primary encounter with nature. It was a preanalytic and pre-scientific experience which was obstructed by classical ontology.[27] "Mere" things, such as stones and wood, the things of the earth, as they are encountered pre-analytically become an unrecognized form when they are "explained" by philosophical or scientific theories.[28]

D.3 The "World"

The particular "thing" Heidegger goes on to examine is tools or objects which are made to be useful. They occupy an intermediate position between "mere" things and works of art. An examination of their nature could smooth a way for an appraoch to the essence of an artwork.

For his analysis Heidegger chooses a painting of a pair of peasant's shoes by Van Gogh.[29] Heidegger concludes that these shoes, in the summation of their character as footwear, are able to show the essence of all "equipment" (useful objects). This essence is their "reliability" or "dependability." "Equipment" (tools or useful objects and in this case shoes) is of service only when it is dependable.[30] The shoes have served the peasant woman for years - and by force of their constant reliable service, they have assured the old woman's existence.[31]

To grasp the nature of the peasant's shoes as "equipment" one had to be reminded of the life of the wearer. The shoes had to be placed in the total context in which they belonged. In doing so, the "world" of the peasant was revealed.[32]

"World" in Heidegger's metaphysics, did not mean the environment nor the sum total of objects in external reality.[33] It essentially paralleled the Husserlian Lebenswelt or "life-world"[34] and roughly meant the state of existence.[35]

Heidegger did not attempt to describe the pair of shoes as the object of a painting but as a thing that revealed its true nature by the service it gave.[36] Yet in using his shoes the peasant never made them an object of inquiry. Its (the shoes) Being (essence) only emerged when its seviceability was interrrupted, in this case by the painting.[37]

If one only stared at the pair of shoes or Van Gogh's picture, one never experienced what kind of Being the shoes had. However, the shoes were isolated, enabling the perceiver to experience the peasant's world.

D.4 Towards the Notion of "Truth"

The account of the peasant's shoes had helped Heidegger discover something about the nature of "equipment." It had shown that each "thing" had "dependability."[38] However, it had not shown whether "equipmental things" were the only "mere things" which possessed this trait. The nature of other "mere things" had not been resolved.[39]

What had been discovered was not the nature of the artwork but that Van Gogh's painting had revealed what the peasant's shoes really and truly were. The work of art revealed the true being of things. It revealed truth. Artwork revealed the "actual nature" or "being" of things in the "fixity" of the artwork.[40]

9

The conception of art as revelation of truth is different from the age-old conception that art was the imitation and representation of reality and that the truth of art consisted in the fact that the represented things agreed with reality.[41] Being and truth, in Heideggerian metaphysics, belonged together.

D.5 Truth in the Work of Art

To determine what was "truth" itself so that it could realize itself in art, Heidegger began with the description of a Greek temple. He did so because he claimed it copied or represented nothing. It could be examinable "resting-in-itself."[42] Heidegger concluded that the temple embodied the "world" of a historical people.[43] The work of art established a truth by means of erecting a "world" which transcended external reality. This was one characteristic of "truth" in art.[44] Part of the essence of an artwork, then has to disclose the "highest-realities," to be a vehicle wherein a "world" occured. The temple was always of a particular historical people and could not be understood apart from the traditions which constituted that people.[45] The Greek temple depicted nothing at all and yet it established the regions of the sacred and profane. It opened up a world in which the thoughts, actions and passions of a people took on significance.[46]

This view of the "world," in an artwork, was analogous to religious revelations. But unlike revealed truths of religion, which were said to be true irrespective of the period in which they were uttered, works of art, as Heidegger conceived them, were tied into a period in a fundamental way.[47] If part of the essence of the work of art was to reveal a historical "life-world," then if a work was viewed out of context, its world perished or became withdrawn.[48]

Thus Heidegger's problem was to rethink the relation between art and history so as to preserve the independence and self-sufficiency of the work of art. The solution was in contradiction to Western thought but was consistent with his general metaphysics.[49] Art could not only reveal truth, but it could actually institute truth in three senses of "institution." In the first sense, art instituted a world in which particular things first appeared. In the second sense art revealed truth by making visible the context in which being stands and in the last sense, truth in art may give direction to a people by instituting a new world. In this last, sense, art makes history in the Hegelian sense of the word.[50]

D.6 The "World" and the "Earth"

The description, which Heidegger had attempted for the Greek temple embodies two fundamental characteristics. It sets up what he has called "a world" (as explained above) and also an "earth."[51] The addition of this other characteristic of essence presented a view of the artwork which was similar to his view of man; the artwork, like man, existed on two different levels. But, he explained, the levels of artworks were not called das Seinde and Sein des Seienden (see Part A) but were termed die Erde, "the earth," and der Welt, "the world."[52] The earth was the so-called, existing reality of the work of art. It was the medium which the work was made from (i.e., stone, wood, color).[53] The world, he maintained was the "being of existing reality" of the work of art. It was the context of higher relationships which gave meaning to artworks.[54]

The description of the temple attempted to establish this interrelationship between "world" and "earth." In the erection of a "world," the work of art used the "earth." But in a work of art the material (earth) was not used in the same was as in the production of a tool (equipment). Material "disappeared" in its usefulness.[55] The matter (material) of a useful object (tool) was always determined by its use.[56] As long as the tool functioned, the matter of which it was made did not claim attention as matter.

The work of art, on the other hand, brought out the true nature of the material and claimed attention. When material was revealed, it was revealed as it was, in itself. The rock revelaed its massiveness and color revealed its radiance.[57]

The earth of the work, like existing reality, was ever concealed, ever enclosed and always drawn in itself. The earth, Heidegger maintained, was unrevealed. Its nature was undisclosed and resisted all attempts to uncover its characteristics. One could break up a boulder, and study its contents, measuring its mass but one could never know what these things really were. One could never entirely reveal the earth. At best it could be made "apparent" and "open" as earth. To make earth "apparent" it had to be set in the context of being which would enable the earth to be. This context was the welt or "world."[58]

Held in the "world" of the work, die Erde became "apparent" or "open." The work of art erected a world by reinstating the world in the earth.[59] Hence, of the two elements, the world was "self-revealing" and the earth was "self-concealing." The erection of a world and re-establishment of the earth were the two essential characteristics which made up the artwork. Both belonged together to make up the unity or whole. An interrelationship was established. The "world" enabled the "earth" to appear; while the earth served as a foundation for the world. Their unity constituted the "truth" of the work of art.[60]

D.7 Strife Between Earth and World

The union or relationship between the earth and the world was a permanent "strife" or "struggle."[61] The metaphor of "strife" was not to suggest disorder or lack of harmony,[62] but it presented a confusion as to what Heidegger actually meant. The usual account of this relationship may be stated as follows.

The world and earth are engaged in a struggle. In this struggle each "opponent" attempts to assert its own essence in the artwork.[63] The earth, the concealing and self-closing realm, tries to draw the world into itself. The world, the open and hidden realm, tries to overcome the hidden earth. This struggle causes "truth" to emerge in the artwork.

Problems occur when Heidegger claimed, "In strife, each opponent carries the other beyond itself."[64] He explained that the struggle was never entirely resolved in the artwork, but rather was set and established within the design or Gestalt.

This relationship of "strife" has been variously labelled dialectical or static, depending on the interpretation of "strife" as the raising of each opponent "beyond themselves." "Strife" is usually presented as the existence of the "world" as open and unhidden because it is based on a closed, hidden realm. The earth, the concealed and self-hidden realm, can be seen only if it is placed in the unhidden realm. The world can only be world if contrasted with earth and earth can only be earth if it is revealed by the world. Neither can assert itself. Each is what it is because of the other.[65]

Is this relationship dialectical? One writer[66] claims that this relationship is not dialectical. Neither element arises out of the other, nor are the two drawn into a higher synthesis. Each element is seen for what it is because of its relationship with the other. In order for each to assert itself each needs the other as its instrument. In short, Heidegger is saying nothing more than a work of art's expressive aspects must be embedded in the material and that its material must serve some artistic concept. "Strife" in this sense seems to confuse the issue. Metaphorically, it holds a dialectical tone but pragmatically the word tension seems more appropriate. The words accommodation or co-operation have also been suggested.[67]

D.8 More on Art and Truth

One cannot help concluding that "strife" is nothing more than a Gestalt configuration, however, the meaning of "strife" remains undecided and this undecisiveness is the artwork's decisive characteristic. Heidegger concluded that the decisive characteristic of the work of art is its undecisiveness.[68] By presenting the undecisiveness of the strife between earth and the world, the work of art realizes truth. Truth does not mean a standard or a conventional manner. It is not something correct.[69] Truth is inherent in the work of art as a paradox between the polarities of elucidation and concealment; "existing reality" and "being of existing reality," unconcealment (earth in the context of the world) hiddenness and unhiddennes. All these synonymous polarities constitute the essence of truth. The struggle exhibits what is in the bounds of a work of art.[70]

Such a view of truth has given Heidegger the label of a cognitivist in the most emphatic way.[71] Truth as the unfolding or disclosure of the highest reality which, in the final analysis, seems to be seeing things in themselves in the context of a "world." The artwork in essence, discloses truth concerning Being of what is.

There is a further qualification to the essence of truth as an unconcealment. This is the element of a "denial."[72] Concealment has two qualifications. It is a "refusal" and a "dissembling."[73]

Dissembling occurs when one entity counterfeits another or hides or obscures another. Refusal seems to be an *exclusion*. In any act of choosing, certain elements must be excluded.[74]

In summary, world is the revealing "moment" in the work; while "earth" corresponds to whatever, in the disclosure of a work, remains concealed. This concealment is qualified by "refusal" and "dissembling."

D.9 *The Creative Process*

Heidegger finally had found the essence or nature of artworks. Artworks projected the truth ~~of the~~ struggle between world and earth but he still had not discovered the source of this essence. The origin of the artwork still eluded him. Heidegger dismissed the artistic process as providing the answer.[75] He concluded that the creative process was not anything special, unique or exclusive to works of art. All kinds of crafts were made the same way. His answer came by examining the *fact* of creation, not the way of creation. The *fact* of creation distinguished the artwork from other objects.

The making of an artwork, unlike the making of utensils, had no defined function or use. It had no real purpose except to exist. Its creation consisted in making use of the "earth" (that is, whatever is concealed) to establish truth in form.[76] In contrast, the manufacturing of an utensil consisted in the forming of matter as a preparation for its use.

A second difference between the artwork and an utensil was the act of creation. In the former's case it was an extraordinary event.[77] Every true work of art filled the observer with wonder about the fact that it existed; that it was and could be created. The miracle of creation was inherent in every true work of art and emanated from it because of art was unique and extraordinary. The artwork changed the appreciator's usual relationship to the world and to the earth so that one stopped what one was doing to attend to the truth in the work.[78]

This realization was not automatic. The work had to be allowed to create its effect. The observer had to let the work reveal itself to him. Heidegger maintained that the work became "preserved"[79] when it was observed and absorbed as a work. "Preservation" occurred when appreciators responded to the truth in its being. "Presentation" was necessary for creation. The act of creation and preservation comprised the origin of the work. Heidegger concluded by defining the essence of the artwork as: "creative perservation of truth in the work of art."[80]

Footnotes - Appendix D

[1] As reported in E. F. Kaelin, "Notes Toward an Understanding of Heidegger's Aesthetics," in Phenomenology and Existentialism, ed. Edward N. Lee and Maurice Mandelbaum (Baltimore: The John Hopkin's Press, 1967), pp. 59-60.

[2] Albert Hofstadter, "The Origin of the Work of Art," in Philosophies of Art and Beauty, ed. Albert Hofstadter and Richard Kuhns (New York: The Modern Library, 1964), pp. 647-701. From here on in will be designated as OWA.

[3] These translations have been primarily drawn from the following sources and will be designated as follows: Hans Jaeger, "Heidegger and the Work of Art," Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 17, 1950, pp. 58-71. Here on in designated as J. S. L. Bartky, "Heidegger's Philosophy of Art," British Journal of Aesthetics 9, pp. 353-371. Here on in designated as B. William H. Bossart, "Heidegger's Theory of Art," Journal of Aesthetics and and Art Criticism 31 (Fall 1968):57-66. Here on in designated as H. Robert B. Stulberg, "Heidegger and the Origin of the Work of Art: An Explication," Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 34 (Winter 1973):257-265. Herein designated as S. E. F. Kaelin, "Notes Toward an Understanding of Heidegger's Aesthetics," in Phenomenology and Existentialism, ed. Edward N. Lee and Maurice Mandelbaum (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1967), pp. 59-92. Here on in designated as K. Magna King, Heidegger's Philosophy (New York: MacMillan Co., 1964). Here on in designated as M.

[4] Mostly from Magda King, Heidegger's Philosophy: A Guide to His Basic Thought (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1964).

[5] King, M, p. 5.

[6] King, M, pp. 66-67.

[7] Bossart, H, p. 57.

[8] Bossart, H, p. 58.

[9] King, M, pp. 6-14.

[10] Bossart, H, p. 58.

[11] Jaeger, J, pp. 62-64 and Stulberg, S, p. 261.

[12] Stulberg, S, p. 261.

[13] Jaeger, J, p. 61. For example, a rock, or a stone is in the world of man not merely as a physical object with discernible dimensions but having the possibility of being; it may be appropriated as a weapon, a building material or a sculpture, etc.

[14] Stulberg, S, p. 261.

[15] Bossart, H, p. 66.

[16] Jaeger, J, p. 63.

[17] Bossart, H, p. 58.

[18] King, M, p. 165ff.

19 Stulberg, S, p. 257.

[20] Hofstadter, OWA, p. 650.

[21] Bartky, B, p. 353.

[22] Hofstadter, OWA, p. 655.

[23] Hofstadter, OWA, p. 655.

[24] Hofstadter, OWA, pp. 656-659.

[25] Hofstadter, OWA, p. 661.

[26] Jaeger, J, p. 60.

[27] Hofstadter, OWA, p. 661.

[28] Bartky, H, p. 356.

[29] The description may be found in the following sources: Jaeger, *J*, pp. 60-61; Bartky, *B*, pp. 356-357; Bossart, *H*, p. 61; Stulberg, *S*, p. 259; Hofstadter, *OWA*, p. 663; and Kaelin, *K*, pp. 78-79. In each of these sources Heidegger's use of circular argument is evident. What is being examined is the shoes but the shoes are the work of art which is the original intent of the inquiry. Hence a work of art is being used to examine a work of art.

[30] Jaeger, *J*, p. 60.

[31] Stulberg, *S*, p. 259.

[32] Hofstadter, *OWA*, p. 671.

[33] Jaeger, *J*, p. 62.

[34] See Appendix C under "*Lebenswelt*."

[35] Bartky, *B*, p. 357. Heidegger's use of the term "world" also carried with it a further sense of *historical epoch*. A "world" makes itself manifest in philosophy, science, political institutions and arts and a new "world" occurs when a radical change in these and other domains are ordinated. Heidegger never makes clear how this happens.

[36] Jaeger, *J*, p. 60.

[37] Bossart, *B*, p. 61.

[38] Jaeger, *J*, p. 61.

[39] Stulberg, *S*, p. 259.

[40] Stulberg, *S*, p. 260.

[41] Jaeger, *J*, p. 61.

[42] Stulberg, *S*, p. 260.

[43] For the description of the Greek temple, see Jaeger, *J*, p. 61; Bartky, *B*, p. 357; Kaelin, *K*, pp. 81-82; Stulberg, *S*, pp. 260-261.

[44] Jaeger, J, p. 63.

[45] Bossart, B, p. 62.

[46] Bossart, B, p. 63.

[47] Bartky, B, p. 358.

[48] Hofstadter, OWA, p. 688.

[49] Stulberg, S, p. 264.

[50] Bossart, B, p. 62 and Stulberg, S, p. 265.

[51] See Jaeger, J, pp. 64-65; Stulberg, S, p. 261; Bartky, B, p. 359; Hofstadter, OWA, pp. 672-675.

[52] Stulberg, S, p. 261.

[53] Bartky, B, p. 359.

[54] Stulberg, S, p. 261.

[55] Hofstadter, OWA, p. 672.

[56] Jaeger, J, p. 64.

[57] Hofstadter, OWA, p. 673.

[58] Jaeger, J, p. 64.

[59] Jaeger, J. p. 64.

[60] Hofstadter, OWA, p. 676.

[61] Hofstadter, OWA, p. 675.

[62] Bartky, B, p. 360.

[63] Stulbert, S, p. 262.

[64] Hofstadter, OWA, p. 675.

[65] Hofstadter, OWA, p. 676ff.

[66] Bartky, B, p. 360. Heidegger's mystifying interpretation seems no more than the illusion of hidden Gestalt figures. Either one attends to the figure (world) or to the ground (earth).

[67] Bartky, B, p. 360.

[68] Jaeger, J, p. 64.

[69] Stulberg, S, p. 265.

[70] Stulberg, S. p. 265.

[71] Bartky, B, p. 361.

[72] Hofstadter, OWA, p. 674.

[73] Bartky, B, p. 362.

[74] Bartky, B, p. 363.

[75] Stulberg, S, p. 263.

[76] Bossart, B, p. 62.

[77] Jaeger, J, p. 67.

[78] Bossart, B, p. 64.

[79] Stulberg, S, p. 263.

[80] Hofstadter, OWA, p. 689.

APPENDIX "E"

Aesthetics of Roman Ingarden

Kaelin has credited Roman Ingarden with presenting the most complete theory of phenomenological communication. Das Literarische Kunstwerk (The Literary Work of Art), 1931, presented that thesis.[1] What is presented here is Kaelin's analysis of this work[2] as well as Roman Ingarden's own thoughts in his posthumous essay "Phenomenological Aesthetics: An Attempt at Defining Its Range."[3] Max Rieser's "Contemporary Aesthetics in Poland"[4] will be used to round out this discussion.

The Literary Work of Art contains a theory of literature, in strict phenomenological terms, which describes objects as "purely intentional."[5] In accordance with Husserl's principles the ontology of the work of art is aimed at overcoming "psychologism" and "positivism." It is not made up of any mental stuff and it is no "real" thing either. It is an intentional object which means that "it has no autonomous ontic status (as have chairs and tables)[6] but is produced by mental operations."

In his description of Literature, Roman Ingarden distinguishes four "strata"; a "polyphonic harmony" of sound and sense. These internal strata were; linguistic sounds, units of meaning (phonemes), the schematized aspects of the represented objects, and the represented objects themselves.[7]

The distinction between schematized aspects of the objects and the objects themselves is based on phenomenological theory. A real object appears in a series of phenomenological manifestations.[8] "Polyphonic harmony" is the suggested metaphore for describing the effect of apprehending the total work.

Ingarden distinguished between the artistic and the aesthetic object. It is the latter which presents the schematized aspects and is judged by the perceiver when he assesses his own concretization (experience) of it.[9]

The use of strata is Ingarden's attempt to avoid form and content distinction. As an intentional object, the work of art experienced as a concretization has supplementary qualities built-up by the appreciator's mind.[10] Ingarden further fuses this distinction with his analysis of the relationship between perceiver and artist. He argued that it was inappropriate to regard all experiences by the artist as active, while those of the observer were passive and purely receptive. Both artist and perceiver act in an active-passive manner. The artist is active when he manipulates his materials and passive when he examines what he has done.[11] The perceiver undergoes a similar process. By attending to different strata various changes take place in the object as particular characteristics emerged in immediate perception. The bodily actions of such "aesthetic experience" constitutes the "active" perceiver.[12]

Ingarden applied this theory to painting. The aesthetic experience starts either with a sense-foundation of surface whose "details" are read into a shape of the work or the observer instantaneously perceives the work of art itself (i.e., as a representation). Now in subsequent phases the perceived painting begins to work aesthetically upon the observer who, in the aesthetic attitude, actualizes qualities that the work has suggested to him.[13] Finally, the perceiver reacts towards this total expressiveness which has imposed itself, in a positive or negative emotional response. This leads to a change in the perceiver's behavior. In this sense the painting reveals "that part of the human soul which is normally hidden or difficult to reach."[14]

The perceiver, in Roman Ingarden's scheme, is not a "naive" spectator. He further examines specific strata and critically examines and evaluates their effectiveness. In this attitude he begins to understand the work differently. This understanding does not concern what is being expressed of the mental life presented, but what the individual strata of the painting contributes to the whole.

The concern is with the achievement of new techniques, new presentations of emotions; determination of the most important aesthetic and artistic elements. The answers to these questions end with the spectator becoming a "connoisseur."[15]

At the time of writing his methodology for the evaluation of a painting, Kaelin, it seems, was unaware of Roman Ingarden's analysis of painting.[16] He claimed that Ingarden's literary theory could be adapted to visual works of art and he proceeded to do so, criticizing Ingarden for his failure to explain phenomenologically how the various strata interacted.[17]

Footnotes - Appendix E

[1] R. Ingarden, The Literary Work of Art, trans. George G. Grabowicz (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1973).

[2] E. Kaelin, "The Visibility of Things Seen: A Phenomenological View of Painting," in An Invitation to Phenomenology, ed. J. M. Edie (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1965), pp. 30-35. Hereafter designated as VTS.

[3] Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 24 (Spring 1965) :257-269.

[4] Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 20 (Summer 1962) :421-428.

[5] Kaelin, VTS, p. 30.

[6] Rieser, JAAC, p. 421.

[7] Kaelin, VTS, pp. 31-32.

[8] Rieser, JAAC, p. 422.

[9] Rieser, JAAC, p. 424.

[10] Rieser, JAAC, p. 423.

[11] Ingarden, JAAC, p. 261.

[12] Ingarden, JAAC, p. 266.

[13] Ingarden, JAAC, p. 266.

[14] Ingarden, JAAC, p. 267.

[15] Ingarden, JAAC, pp. 268-269.

[16] Kaelin's article, "The Visibility of Things Seen: A Phenomenological View of Painting," was published in 1965, whereas Ingarden's phenomenological analysis of painting was published in Stadia z Estetyki, Volumes I and II, Warsaw in 1958. The repetition of that thesis in "Phenomenological Aesthetics: An Attempt at Defining Its Range," was given in Amsterdam University Institute of Aesthetics on March 17, 1969. It was published in Polish in Volume III of his Stadia z Estetyki, Warsaw, 1970.

[17] Kaelin, VTS, p. 34.

APPENDIX "F"

Aesthetic Theory of Mikel Dufrenne

The aesthetic thought of Mikel Dufrenne is appended here because of two important reasons: first, Dufrenne presents a complete phenomenological analysis of aesthetic experience which, like Kaelin's purports to surpass the aesthetic theories of Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, Roman Ingarden et al;[1] secondly, Kaelin has dismissed Dufrenne as presenting an insufficient explanation of the ontological status of the artwork.[2]

A three part presentation is given: The Phenomenology of the Aesthetic Object, The Phenomenology of Aesthetic Perception, and The Affective A Priori.[3] These notions follow the outline of his book. Part II, "Analysis of the Work of Art" will not be examined to any great extent.

F.1 The Phenomenology of the Aesthetic Object

In order to avoid the pitfalls of intentionalism (affective and biographical) Dufrenne takes the perceiver's point of view. He makes the distinction between the art object and the aesthetic object. The latter, Dufrenne maintains, provides the structure for the aesthetic object. Whereas the artwork could be used for documentation, historical reviews, historical identification through portraiture, etc., the aesthetic object is immune to such analysis. The artwork becomes an aesthetic object when it is perceived.[4]

A specific act of perception is required to affect the aesthetic object.[5] In aesthetic perception the spectator attends to the artwork's "sensuous" elements. The aesthetic object is considered "the apotheosis of the sensuous."[6]

A further distinction is now made by Dufrenne. In ordinary perception "brute sensuousness" is encountered whereas "aesthetic sensuousness" is unique to the aesthetic object.[7] This aesthetic sensuousness is expressive and demands attention.[8] Both perceiver and artist are expected to be submissive and do justice to the aesthetic object.[9] From the perceiver's and the artistic view point, the aesthetic object takes the initiative and prescribes its own norms and asserts its own autonomy.[10]

Besides the sensuous as an indispensable element for the appearance of the aesthetic object, the artwork meaning or "sense" is crucial. "'Meaning' is immanent in the sensuous, being its very organization."[11] All the aesthetic object's meaning is given in the sensuous: no meaning exists outside or beyond the perimeter of the sensuous.

"Meaning" is organized by sensuous elements by means of spatial and temporal "schemata" which differ in complexity and configuration from art form to art form.[12] Dufrenne attempts to show that all arts have temporal and spatial features. The space of every object is temporalized while the time is spatialized.

The aesthetic object, as an object, which harbours the internal relationship between time and space presents a "world" of the aesthetic object.[13] The world is characterized by a specific quality which permeates it. This affective quality makes the "world" of the aesthetic object expressive. The aesthetic object, therefore, includes a sensuous base (en-soi) and an inherent world (pour-soi).[14]

F.2 Phenomenology of Aesthetic Perception

Dufrenne places an additional criterion on the aesthetic object. This is the "for-us" criterion making it a public object. The aesthetic object exists as an in-itself - for-itself - for-us. Treated this way, the ontological status is neither that of an ideal signification (pour-soi) nor a purely intentional object (en-soi). It is "the being of a sensuous thing which is realized only in perception."[15] It exists for the perceiver because it needs to be perceived to confirm its autonomy. The perceiver needs to complete it.[16]

To complete the aesthetic object means not to remain passive but be actively engaged in the work to the point of being lost or alienated in it.[17] Any action that occurs outside this activity (i.e., political, social), is not part of the aesthetic experience. The form of the action is perception.[18]

In Part III Dufrenne presents a general theory of perception. In his theory, perception is seen in three stages. The first stage is at the level of presence; perception occurs much like Merleau-Ponty had described it; as global, pre-reflective and at one with the body.[19] At this level, one experiences the force of the sensuous through the agency of the body.

The next level is representation and imagination. Perception objectifies distinguishable entities and events and the imagination acts in a transcendental way identifying representational objects. However, imagination plays a minor role in aesthetic experience.[20] At times, the imagination is restrained because the aesthetic object may not need further elaboration as in non-objective works.

The last level is the full development through reflection and feeling.[21] Perception becomes an understanding and knowledge by a form of objective reflection. Perception can also be steered towards a different sort of reflection which Dufrenne calls "sympathetic" rather than objectifying and is more closely related to feelings rather than understanding. Such reflection clarifies and supports feeling.[22] This reflection is aesthetic and feeling becomes accessible. Feeling allows the spectator to respond to the depth of the aesthetic object, that is to be expressed world. This response is not merely emotional but consists in the apprehension or "reading" of the singular affective quality characterizing the expressed world.[23]

Through feeling the perceiver connects with the aesthetic object's inherent expressiveness. Durfrenne concluded that "the very height of aesthetic perception is found in the feeling which reveals the expressiveness of the work."[24] In short, feeling (subject) consists precisely in reading the aesthetic object's expression and in resonating with this expression. Feeling is the final phase with the spectator completing the aesthetic object.[25] It is at this point that the autonomy of the work is at its lowest.

To avoid psychologisms of the affective and intentional variety, Dufrenne claims that the aesthetic object is not valid for itself alone but elicits and embodies a feeling.[26] This feeling is always someone's feeling as the expression of the depth of a human subject. It is through feeling that spectators become present in the aesthetic object. This presence occurs in two ways. In the first, the artist is present in the object created insofar as he is responsible for a particular work[27] and second, the spectator becomes present in the work as well, by reading the expression and drawing his own feeling by engaging himself in the expressed world. The spectator's depth matches the object's depth and hence no longer an impassive on-looker.

F.3 The Affective A Priori

The sensuous in Dufrenne's scheme serves as the linking third entity for the two principal kinds of aesthetic depth; the depth of the expressed world of the object and the depth of the beholder of this world. If feeling can be defined as the "reciprocity of the two depth worlds"[28] then it can be seen as the means by which the perceiving subject and the aesthetic object are capable of reconciliation.

Feeling is the culmination of aesthetic perception and is the "communion" of the object and subject. This is his answer to the problematic question, how does the aesthetic object and the perceiving spectator come together in an aesthetic experience?

This reconciliation of subject and object in aesthetic experience is revealed in terms of the "transcendental" or a priori dimension of his existence.[29] This dimension is described in Part IV. The claim is made that the aesthetic object's affective quality not only characterizes but constitutes its expressed world, serving as the guiding principle. To be constitutive in this manner is to possess the status of an a priori. "An affective quality is an a priori when, expressed in a work, it is constitutive of the world of the aesthetic object."[30]

The perceiving subject also exhibits an a priori aspect. This subject could not apprehend or comprehend the a priori structure of the expressed world, (its constitutive atmosphere or affective quality), unless the same subject already possessed certain affective categories which allowed him to recognize the affective qualities as a certain kind of quality, (i.e., tragic, sublime, picturesque).

Knowledge of such categories is itself a priori in character; it is antecedently possessed, hence "virtual," yet clear when awakened. Dufrenne considers this virtual knowledge to be an important aspects of the subjects total being - of his "existential" a priori. Since virtual knowledge, is in turn, knowledge of the a priori in its objective embodiment in the work of art, there is a link between the subjective content of his experience.

A reflection on the a priori itself results in a larger unity. Dufrenne calls this the unity of being. This dimension underlies Dufrenne's theory of truth in art. Art can be "true" because both art and reality are aspects of being.[31] Art is not a flight from the real (i.e., when strictly conceived as an imaginary character) it illuminates the real[32] by way of feeling, which delivers the real "affective essence."[33] Art attains truth, not through representation or imitation of the real, but by eliciting and expressing the real's affective essence *within* itself and in its own terms. So it is through its pervading quality (pour-soi) and from within itself (en-soi) that the objects relate to the real world is display truth. The truth is deepened in the *sensuous*.

In Dufrenne's claim for truthfulness, a truthfulness which is conveyed by an affective quality, the sensuous has not been left behind. It is the organization of the sensuous which enables the affective quality to show itself. They are inseparate in aesthetic experience. In art, then, the affective (feeling) and the sensuous (the perceived) adumbrate each other.[34]

Footnotes - Appendix F

[1] M. Dufrenne, The Phenomenology of Aesthetic Experience, trans. Edward Casey et al. (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1973), pp. 199-215. Hereafter referred to as PAE.

[2] An Existentialist Aesthetic (Madisson: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1962), "Appendix A; Mikel Dufrenne on the Phenomenology of Aesthetic Experience," pp. 359-385. Kaelin's basic objection with Dufrenne is his analysis of representational works. Dufrenne maintains that even non-objective art such as a Grecian temple calls for the appearance of some kind of representation so Dufrenne comes up with the "idea of a temple" as the object of the temple's representation. To this solution Kaelin answers that "the idea of a temple as the object of a temple's representation is a'patent' absurdity." The idea of a cathedral is precisely what is presented in the physical presences of the object of concern.

[3] M. Dufrenne, The Notion of the A Priori, trans. Edward Casey, (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1966).

[4] M. Dufrenne, PAE, pp. 232-233. This is unlike Roman Ingarden who holds that there is a distinction between the work of art and aesthetic object when the aesthetic object is the 'concretion' of the work of art.

[5] M. Dufrenne, PAE, p. 66.

[6] M. Dufrenne, PAE, p. 13.

[7] M. Dufrenne, PAE, pp. 137-138.

[8] M. Dufrenne, PAE, p. 155.

[9] M. Dufrenne, PAE, p. 45.

[10] M. Dufrenne, PAE, p. 199.

[11] M. Dufrenne, PAE, p. 12.

[12] M. Dufrenne, PAE, Part II, pp. 239-326.

[13] M. Dufrenne, PAE, Chapter 5, "Aesthetic Object and World," pp. 147-190.

[14] M. Dufrenne, PAE, p. 244 and pp. 328-329.

[15] M. Dufrenne, PAE, p. 218.

[16] M. Dufrenne, PAE, p. 204.

[17] M. Dufrenne, PAE, p. 56 and pp. 231-232.

[18] M. Dufrenne, PAE, p. 86.

[19] M. Dufrenne, PAE, p. 335.

[20] M. Dufrenne, PAE, p. 340.

[21] M. Dufrenne, PAE, p. 370.

[22] M. Dufrenne, PAE, p. 422.

[23] M. Dufrenne, PAE, p. 415.

[24] M. Dufrenne, PAE, p. 49.

[25] M. Dufrenne, PAE, p. 437.

[26] M. Dufrenne, PAE, p. 521.

[27] M. Dufrenne, PAE, p. 196.

[28] M. Dufrenne, PAE, p. 483.

[29] See, Notion of the A Priori.

[30] M. Dufrenne, PAE, p. 446.

[31] M. Dufrenne, PAE, p. 539.

[32] M. Dufrenne, PAE, p. 528.

[33] M. Dufrenne, PAE, p. 542.

[34] M. Dufrenne, PAE, p. 547.